

THE ANDOVER REVIEW

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THE PREACHER AS AN INTERPRETER.

WHAT is the significance and worth of human life? That is the question of the ages. The old words about the passover, "What mean ye by this?" are the symbol of an older and more momentous inquiry—an inquiry that asks for the reason and value of existence itself. This question, as I have said, is the question of the ages; yet it is ever new. It is as fresh and original, as vital and imperative, in the heart of the latest as in the heart of the first.

Here is this wonderful thing called life, made up of deep feelings, fierce energies, and confused thoughts, all interlinked with similar forces in beings like ourselves; solemnly related to an interminable past, and facing in earnest expectation an unknown, illimitable future.

What does it all mean? Is it "a walking shadow?" Is it

"A tale

Told by an idiot, full of sound and fury,"

but "signifying nothing?"

Or shall we say:—

"A sacred burden is this life ye bear,

Look on it, lift it, bear it solemnly,

Stand up and walk beneath it steadfastly?"

This question of all time, old, and yet ever new, appears before each generation amid peculiar circumstances and conditions.

In certain ages the question is asked with a predisposition to pessimism. When it comes from the heart of a representative Jew in the second century before Christ in the words: "What profit hath a man of all his labor wherein he laboreth under the sun?" we can almost anticipate the answer: "All is vanity and a striving after wind." The inflection and intonation, audible

in the very form of the question, lead to the anticipation of the answer afterwards given. So in revolutionary France. The significance and worth of life was questioned then, as at all times, but in the very atmosphere of doubt and denial, amid the dissolution of moral and social bonds, amid the wholesale destruction of human life, amid the unhappiest conditions, and so with a mighty impulse from within and from without toward a pessimistic answer.

In other ages there is a predisposition to think well of life. The question as to its meaning comes out of an atmosphere of large and noble expectation.

This large and noble expectation characterized the mind of the Jew as he went out of Egypt, as he went into Palestine; characterized it in the reign of David and Solomon, in the return from the Captivity, and, to some extent, in the time of Christ. It characterized the mind of Europe at the outbreak of the Reformation.

Large and noble expectation, amid puzzled and often baffled thought, seems to us the most striking characteristic of the earnest life of our time. In our day, as in all days, life is a puzzle. Very earnestly and very solemnly men ask what it means, and yet they ask it out of hearts charged with great hopes.

Whether this generalization is true is a question which every man must decide for himself. The grounds on which such generalization as to the prevailing mood of an age can be justified are not difficult to find. One of the surest is its representative men. As great rivers drain into themselves vast sections of the land through which they flow, so these men gather into their own thought the thought and sentiment of their time and country. They enlarge it. They reveal it. They carry it out before the eyes of the world. Socrates supplies a pathetic commentary on the experience of his age when, in his argument before the judges, he contends that even if death be a state of unconsciousness to die would be gain. For then all time would be like one night of dreamless sleep, and many such nights are not passed in this world. No, not by the great Persian king himself. Sophocles speaks for many in Greece when he says: "Not to have been born at all is the happiest fate, and the next best is to die young." Lessing interprets hearts other than his own when he congratulates his infant son on his unwillingness to come into such a world as this, and commends his good sense on leaving it so soon after having been compelled to enter it. Carlyle in his individualistic, ulti-

mate optimism for heroic souls, and Carlyle weary, waiting for death, and lamenting that the Roman method of self-release had passed into discredit, reflects a mood beyond himself, though happily not widespread. On the other hand, in the matchless melancholy music of the "In Memoriam" is heard the sweet voice of faith born anew in a million hearts. Various moods prevail in every age. All generalizations are limited. It is left to each man to determine whether in this limited sense the earnest, thoughtful mind of our time is characterized by large and noble expectation.

Hints of the justification of this characterization may be found in the theistic form which Evolutionism is everywhere assuming; in the cordial reception which Loetze's thought is meeting among studious men; in the earnest faith underlying, animating, and invigorating much of the best work in the important field of psychology; in the welcome accorded to such representative books as "The Republic of God," "The Continuity of Christian Thought," "Orthodoxy of To-day," and "The Freedom of Faith," — books differing, indeed, in many ways, but all large in their outlook and hopeful in their tone; in the vast stimulus felt in all educational movements, and the new emphasis put upon ethical ends by so many eminent educators. These are hints of the wide range of fact supporting our inference as to the mood of the times.

In an ancient and sacred record we are told of a king who had a dream that troubled him. His problem was to find the meaning of the dream. He sought an interpreter. A Hebrew youth appeared before him. To him the king said: "I have dreamed a dream, and there is none that can interpret it; and I have heard say of thee that when thou hearest a dream thou canst interpret it." The young Hebrew replied: "It is not in me; God shall give Pharaoh an answer of peace." This king and his dream seem to me to suggest very forcibly the world of our day and its life; while the Hebrew youth brings before us the preacher who is to be the medium of the divine interpretation.

The world is troubled over its life. It knows it is troubled, and that it is troubled over something. It will never accept as an answer that it is indeed troubled, but troubled over nothing. "Much ado about nothing" is, on all hands, felt to be a poor and mocking rendering of the movement in men's spirits over the mystery of existence. Neither destructionists nor subtractionists are the interpreters according to the world's heart to-day. Suppose when the king had told his dream, suppose after he had laid

it out just as it had come to him in the midnight hours, the answer to have been: "My lord the king is unduly excited. Possibly he did dream something in consequence of indiscretion at dinner, and this something thus originating, amplified by imagination and colored by all the gross superstitions in his kingdom, may trouble my lord the king; but, in reality, it is nothing. It is idle as the wind. Respect it not." Would not this have been the rejoinder? "What the dream means I do not know. I do not profess to know. For that purpose I brought you hither. But that I had a dream, — a clear, impressive, wonderful experience, duplicating itself and marching through my spirit in solemn grandeur, — that I do know. It is a fact. It is a fact that troubles me. It must mean something, and something grave and momentous. If you cannot explain the fact, hence to your dungeon."

Such seems to us the earnest world's answer to-day to all the destructionists and subtractionists, as we have called them, to all who strive to ignore, explain away, or belittle the great facts of the troubled human consciousness. Men have thoughts and feelings: that they know. These they circulate by word and act. They are deeply, vitally, solemnly related to their fellow-creatures. They stand in the presence of conscience. They stand in the presence of the Enlightener and Lord of conscience. They can see that human life points impressively and significantly out toward the Infinite. These are facts, indestructible realities of human consciousness. The man who ignores or belittles them cannot be accepted as the true interpreter.

The general attitude, then, of the earnest, inquisitive mind in our day, as it seems to us, is not averse to Christian truth, to the Christian idea and philosophy of life. The attitude is not one of doubt, but of puzzled thought. It does not deny; it interrogates, and interrogates in the hope of an answer of peace. It blends the question and the mood of the bewildered Pharisee, "How can these things be?" with that of the grave, but eager, expectant Ethiopian, "How can I understand unless some one teach me?" Troubled thought over life in an attitude of large and noble expectation — that is the prevailing mood of our time.

To find for men, — with the aid of all that history has done to help him, — to find for men the significance of this troubled dream of existence is and always has been the high calling of the preacher. Two methods, — not indeed absolutely separable, each, in fact, always leading to the other, yet sufficiently distinct to be characterized as different, — two methods of interpretation are open

to the preacher. His method may be subjective. He may make it the business of his life to find the intellectual value and permanent worth of the generic impulses, forces, feelings, experiences of the human heart. In his endeavor he will lead outward from within to objective truth, to that which justifies all his interpretations and upholds them in the living experience of men's hearts. For illustration, take the Platonic method of reaching the conclusion of the soul's preëxistence. The fact of knowledge arrests the eager, subtle Greek thinker. What is this fact? Here it is in the soul's consciousness. What is this fact of knowledge? It is not simply cognition. It is re-cognition. This being the significance of the fact we are at once carried, and on the wings of a sure logic, to that wonderful invisible realm where the soul first beheld the glory of truth, and thus to its preëxistence.

This method, though certainly not the characteristic method of Paul, or of any of the apostles, that apostle nevertheless did occasionally employ, and notably in his speech to the Athenians, where the intellectual implication of their devoutness is clearly seen and exhibited, and that devoutness led forth to its objective and eternal satisfaction. Along this line much has been accomplished by some of the best, most characteristic, and most widely influential preachers of recent times. Robertson is, perhaps, first of all an interpreter of the human consciousness on its religious side; and then finding the intellectual significance of that leading forth to the objective beliefs that uphold and cherish it. This is, indeed, a most fruitful method to-day. There is no richer field for a true religious thinker than in tracing the confused but glorious feelings of the religious heart to their generic principle and meaning. The enrichment and purification which would thus accrue to theology can scarcely be overestimated. One can hardly read the biography of any great and good man, especially of generations preceding our own, while admiring the depth, vitality, and preciousness of the experience, without perceiving the utter inadequacy in many cases of the intellectual apprehension. Luther's experience, for example, is so great, has such a world of noble and mighty theology lying in it, while Luther's interpretations are often so very inadequate. It is our privilege to understand Luther better than he understood himself.

Take another great life, the rich and noble life of Dr. Chalmers, so deep, so sincere, so genuine, and so divinely devoted to the highest ends. Here, again, the life is so much richer than the self-interpretation, the wine of experience than the poor Calvinis-

tie skin into which, to the peril of both, he so often tried to put it.

The great biographies of the world supply the experiences which hold implicitly the noblest and mightiest theology. The preacher of insight, discrimination, and comprehension may render, by true and adequate interpretations of these experiences and such as these, very great aid to the progress of Christian thought.

In a narrower circle and in a humbler way much of every faithful preacher's work will consist in giving to his people true self-knowledge; in drawing out all the wonderful theological implications of evil inheritance, sin, moral infirmity, sorrow, and death; in tracing the streams of human feeling from their rise in the hidden recesses of the soul along all their windings and through every variety of scenery and climate, through every paradise and wilderness of outward good and evil, through the consuming heat in the zones of passion and the biting winds in the zones of sorrow, forth to that "immortal sea," their goal and satisfaction, whose "mighty waters" are "rolling evermore."

This, however, I do not think the method that is most loudly called for to-day. The method to which I have referred is, "Know thyself." You will soon find that you cannot know yourself without coming to God. A healthier method is to strive to know God. The knowledge of Him will bring self-knowledge in its healthiest and noblest form. The need of the earnest, thinking community to-day, its most pressing need, is the interpretation of its life by a fresh interpretation into that life of the permanent truths of the gospel. This at once brings into view the doctrinal need of our time. This need is for a re-interpretation of the abiding truths of Christianity. The call is for the spiritualization, and so the vitalization, of the common, tried, enduring creed of Christendom.

The spiritualization of popular Christianity, the transformation of its idea of election from pagan partialism into the choice of Infinite Love wide as the human race, in correspondence with its thought of a universal atonement; the discovery of the law of Divine Revelation through creation and character whose consummation is in the Incarnation; the disclosure of sin as spiritual evil, as practical atheism; the elimination of immoral ideas of reconciliation, the true glorification of that doctrine, in exhibiting its relation to spirits and its power over their sinful life; the removal to their own place of the unmoral ideas of salvation as seen in the current conceptions of justification by faith and forgiveness which, the more one learns of the law of the spirit of life

in Christ Jesus, are felt to be not expositions but thick obscurations of Scripture; the weeding from retribution of its materialism and its restoration to power over the enlightened conscience; the banishment of the bad ethics that so disfigure popular conceptions of Christianity — the spiritualization of Christian beliefs and the relating of them more closely to the living processes in the spirit of man — this we take to be the highest calling of the preacher of our time.

As an example of what we mean by this re-interpretation of Christian beliefs into the consciousness of the time let us take the deepest and most momentous of all — the belief in God.

The preacher will find, we think, a twofold meaning in the common habit of mind toward God — a psychological and a theological meaning. What is the habit?

It is not, as some seem to think, that men do not now feel the force of arguments for the Divine existence drawn from outward facts. They do feel their force. They confess it with awe and joy. Unsophisticated men, men who have kept the integrity of their reason in the midst of all the fashions and caprices that are ever coming into the world of thought, such men own, inwardly and solemnly, that every change in the world around them, every event in time, the whole procession of changes and events independent of the will of man, the grand total of mutable things, must come from something as cause and fountain of all, itself without variable-ness or shadow of turning.

Men feel that something cannot come from nothing, that if nothing were, nothing would appear; that the mutable and dependent must rest back upon something immutable and independent.

Nor are men unsusceptible to the old design argument when restated into their own habits of thought. Because Paley and Dr. Chalmers, its famous defenders in other days, are believed to have held to a conception of God transcendent and not immanent, a conception of God outside his universe and manufacturing it as a carpenter does a house, a barn, or a woodshed, certain writers infer that the argument is next to worthless. Nevertheless the argument is of unchangeable value. So long as order not made with hands shall impress the intellect, so long as order fruitful of order, as the order of vision following upon the order of the eye, shall call for explanation, so long as men shall rise through this continuous fact of fruitful order to the rational source of it, so long will the design argument do service in the interest of belief in God. Paley's sins, ethical and theological, may be many and

great, but they do not lie in the essence of his theistic argument. Paley affirms that order fruitful of order, as the order of the watch issuing in the order of time, everywhere and inevitably calls for explanation; that the explanation is not found in the thing itself, but in a principle analogous to that which explains the order in man's free spirit, that is, in the facts and power of reason.

Mr. Mill's ingenious objection, repeated by Mr. Fiske in his interesting little book, that contrivance implies limitation of power, rests upon the ambiguity in the word "contrivance." Contrivance does, indeed, carry with it in human experience the sense, or at least the suggestion, of difficulty to be overcome, but it is just as true and evident that contrivance stands for the method of reason as opposed to the method of brute force; the method that raises not simply the rude stone as a memorial of sheer power, but that lifts it into all but the living expression of beautiful thought. Contrivance is the mark of intelligence. The implication of limitation found in the word is borrowed from finite experience. Contrivance signifies working by reason, proposing ends and selecting means for their attainment. To object to contrivance is to object to the method and self-manifestation of reason. If by its very nature contrivance be a mark of limitation, then reason and omnipotence are mutually exclusive; then the stronger God is, the less rational He is; the wiser God shows himself to be, the weaker He shows himself to be. Surely such a *reductio ad absurdum* should lead to a revision of the idea of power.

Of those who have kept reason in its undiminished susceptibility to truth it may be said that there never was a time when the structure of all things, of the heavens above and the earth beneath and the waters under the earth, bore more steady and impressive testimony to the presence of creative ordaining intelligence. To its tens of thousands of investigators the universe is speaking in the old words, "I am fearfully and wonderfully made."

The force of the first half of the 19th Psalm, no less than the second, is still felt:—

"The heavens declare the glory of God
And the firmament sheweth his handiwork;
Day unto day uttereth speech
And night unto night sheweth knowledge."

Addison's noble theistic hymn ought to be sung as never before:—

"The spacious firmament on high,
With all the blue ethereal sky
And spangled heavens, a shining frame,
Their great Original proclaim."

Nevertheless, while their force is felt and acknowledged, there is noticeable a divine impatience with all merely outward proofs of God's existence. They are not enough. They do not quench the soul's deep thirst for certainty. After the ablest statement of them the debate goes on with almost unabated earnestness and solicitude as to whether God can be really found or not. There is still a wistful yearning after the Infinite, an imperious hunger after close and conscious fellowship with Him, a pathetic wonder as to whether it be true of God and the soul that "each can hear the other's call."

Here is the fact. Here is the dream. What is the interpretation? First of all, there is in this mood a psychological meaning. It means that the soul was made for God, that the Infinite has wondrous attractions, irresistible charms for the rational finite, and that the possibilities and probabilities of outward proof must merge in the demonstration of the Spirit. It means that the pain of selfishness, isolation, sin, is rousing the soul into mighty desire.

"O Wedding-Guest ! this soul hath been
Alone on a wide, wide sea ;
So lonely 't was, that God himself
Scarce seemed there to be."

It means that the divine element which prevents such a consciousness from becoming the consciousness of despair is at work.

It is the withered leaf, the barren pasture, the fruits of industry arrested in growth, the failing springs, the shrinking streams, the hot bed of the vanished brook, the whole earth, in its mighty fever-thirst, appealing for help to the heavens.

This rapid and very imperfect notice of the psychological significance of the prevailing habit of mind in regard to God is necessary to the comprehension of its theological import. The mood, once understood, suggests its own method in the interpretation of the Divine Reality. This mood demands that those evidences of God's existence that lie the closest to the soul's life, that are most readily apprehended, and are of the deepest worth and most affecting power, be used more and more in the proof and interpretation of his existence.

For this reason we have often thought that one of the most

affecting methods of reaching and realizing the Divine existence is through the simple fact that self-consciousness involves God-consciousness. One may articulate it to himself in this way. Something I know is limiting, defining, conditioning, encircling, resisting, nourishing my personal existence. Through the knowledge of this something I come to the clear knowledge of myself. At first I call it the world. The consciousness of self involves the consciousness of something other and mightier than self. I set about inquiring what this something is, and if I am able to conclude, with Berkeley, that ordered sensation is the revelation of a Mind and Will continually in contact with my own; if I am able to believe, with some of the deepest of philosophic thinkers, that the fixed objective conditions of sensation are in the last analysis modifications of the Infinite Being, — then let me forget the process and stand face to face with the result, and what profound and amazing realization there may be of the Divine existence. Wrapped up with the consciousness of self will be the consciousness of God; every act of clearer and intenser self-recognition will imply the closer presence and more searching power of that Being whose existence is other than mine, its complement and eternal satisfaction. We believe that Berkeley's theistic argument, or his method of reaching and realizing the fact of the Divine existence, is of profound and enduring worth if reconstructed in the spirit of his whole philosophy, especially if reconstructed in the terms of a later and riper form of that philosophy. Nature will then address the thoughtful mind as the spirit does Faust: —

“At the whirring loom of time unawed
I work the living mantle of God.”

If the popular power of this method of realizing the Divine Being is questioned, it is worth remembering that the noble thinker who was the first to use it was himself a preacher; that in the education of the spirit which came to possess “every virtue under heaven” the value of the method by which Berkeley, the man, reached a sense of the forming presence of God is impressively illustrated; that it was doubtless his intention that all his fellow-men, for whom he had an interest so deep and devout, should learn to converse with the living God through the wondrous world of ordered vision, hearing, and touch.

Again, the moral evidence of the Divine reality demands new emphasis. The moral order of the universe, the moral nature of God, is ever disclosing itself, forcing itself upon human discern-

ment in the common, spontaneous, involuntary discriminations of conscience. The disclosure takes place in this way. Men know that certain types of thought and feeling ought to be cherished, and others ought to be repressed. They know that certain things sweeten, increase, and perpetuate the happiness of home, and that other things desecrate and destroy it. They know that certain forms of conduct bind men together in social and business life, give them mutual respect and confidence, bring them into the elevated consciousness that all are parts of a moral and marvelous whole. There is a right way and a wrong way, a divine order and a devil's order, for the family and society. Let the preacher remind men of this fact, that from the rising of the sun to the going down of the same they are occupied with thoughts about the ways of life and of death, and so about the mind of the Maker and Ordainer of all. Let him remind them that here, in the heart of their thoughts, in the heart of their family, in the centre of their social and commercial intercourse, the moral order of God is rising like the peak of some mighty rock piercing the ocean's surface and indicating by its presence the structure of the whole unseen world out of which it has come. Let him remind them that in their individual, domestic, and social existence men may see the moral order of the universe revealing itself, rising like an Ararat above the vile flood on which they now float, beckoning them toward it, that there they may rest until the waters abate, — until in the presence of the unveiled face of the moral world they can build an altar to the Most High.

This moral proof must be followed by the experimental. The ground of the experimental mode of reaching and realizing God is this: When one desires to do a piece of work, besides the wish or purpose he must also have the power, without which the work cannot be done. If the work is accomplished, then he is sure that all the instruments necessary for its accomplishment existed at the time.

Imagine a very young child sitting alone in a room. Some tempting toy lies near it. Its attention is caught and riveted. The desire of possession is elicited into strength. Instinctively the purpose of possession forms. In accordance with this the child raises its hands, extends them, seizes the precious object and holds it fast. Here is something done. An object has been overtaken. Something more was needed than the mere wish or purpose. Powers were needed. The attainment of the end is a witness for the existence of those powers. Perhaps never before had

the child been conscious of these powers. Of this fact it was made conscious by another, namely, that it had succeeded in overtaking the object of its desire. Nothing could be clearer to us than this: that intense and steadfast purpose to be and to do his best, vigorous endeavors to actualize his possibilities, enthusiastic pursuit of the noblest form of life, will sooner or later bring a man to the belief that God is and that God's help is essential to the success of his undertaking. The work cannot be done without the faith. As he progresses with his work, as he advances in his noble life, finding the work and the life once impossible now easy and delightful, he will herein discover the deepest and divinest assurance of his Father in heaven. The work in process of accomplishment will bear irresistible witness to all the powers necessary for its accomplishment: among others, to the indispensable power of God.

Take an example from Paul's life. Paul tells us that there was given him a thorn in the flesh, a messenger of Satan to buffet him, that he should not be exalted over much. "Concerning this thing," he says, "I besought the Lord thrice that it might depart from me, and he said unto me, My grace is sufficient for thee." Here was a trial which was found to be unendurable. Prayer is made that it be removed. The trial was not removed, but Paul was strengthened. Through prayer to God, the unendurable became the endurable, the sense of infirmity occasion of exultation. For thus God's strength was made perfect through Paul's weakness. That is, there was open a continuous opportunity for ever grander verifications of the Divine reality.

Take the agony in the garden, for another example. Here Jesus contemplates his cross, his passion, his death: all that lies before him as his work. For this end he came into the world. But now that his hour is come he cannot but shrink from it. The thought of it brings the agony and the bloody sweat. Then we are told that being in an agony he prayed: "Nevertheless not my will but thine be done." After that prayer he returned to his disciples no longer anxious for their sympathy, but for their souls. He returns in the kingly consciousness of the divine presence and power. It is the consciousness of God wrought into fullness and absolute supremacy through the appeal of his needy humanity that explains his awe-inspiring power over the soldiers who came to take him, his speechless and unspeakable dignity in Pilate's judgment hall, the sublime beauty of his prayer for those who crucified him, the

tender assurance of life to the penitent thief, and his last words, "Father, into thy hands I commend my spirit." The Father revealed himself, verified himself, proved himself to the Son through the work which He enabled the Son to do.

In a warm summer day we may take up a story of Arctic adventure. We read about those frigid regions, with their mountain ranges of ice and the slow heaving of polar seas under perpetual starlight. We can imagine all, we can enter into the life of the adventurers and into the whole scene with quick sympathy. Nevertheless it is something very remote from our experience; hardly anything more than a piece of intensely realistic fiction. But in the month of March or April, when the east wind is biting the hardest frame and cutting its way through the healthiest lungs, though the fields of ice are still invisible, they have now become real. Their power is in the wind. The wind is with us, enters into our being, and thus demonstrates the existence of the unseen world. Thus, while God is not in human life, all the proofs of his existence, however sympathetically we may enter into them, only serve to render that existence a highly interesting and immensely probable supposition; only serve to render that existence real to thought with the energy and life of the soul unreached and unblest. But when men desire to live as they know they ought and cannot, when they appeal to God for help and that help comes, then God becomes real to the whole spirit — real to thought, to feeling, and to life. Then He is in them and working with them to will and to do of his good pleasure, and thus is blessing them with the most awe-inspiring and overwhelming proofs of the reality of his own existence.

Thus, when through the elementary, common and inevitable acts of moral discrimination the moral order of the universe stands revealed, bringing the ordaining mind of the Supreme Being into the very heart of human life, then the preacher is to press men on to the complete gratification of their thirst for certainty about God. He is to press men to the active preference of the type of thought and feeling which they know to be best, and to join themselves in the purpose and endeavor of self-sacrifice. He is to press them into the fellowship of unselfish endeavor, and then he knows that God's existence will be no longer only a thing of inference; that although the transcendent essence of the Divine Being, that which dwelleth in the light unapproachable, that which no man hath seen or can see, will still lie outside the circle of conscious life, yet God in the form of all-sufficient help will be there, God in the

form of mighty moral results which no individual or domestic or social will could effect, God in the form of peaceful, spiritual triumph, will dwell in their hearts.

There is no work more needed and there is none more inspiring for the true preacher of to-day than this holding forth of the promise of certainty about God to those who combine in the holiest aspiration and endeavor. The church is such a combination. It is called the body of Christ. We may call it the body of God. For into its corporate consciousness God is yet to come. There is to be this re-incarnation of God. Human beings united in holy love and unselfish endeavor are to be his habitation through the Spirit.

Here, then, is this sad earnestness about God. It is a fact. The motto for the earnest, thoughtful, and most promising life of our time is this, "Lord, I believe, help thou mine unbelief." This is part of the soul's mysterious dream — this eagerness and inability to believe. The preacher is called upon to interpret it. He ought to obey the call with joy. He ought to feel that men are longing to realize as never before the blessedness of belief in one God and Father of all; that they are being formed into a condition of mind in which they may be influenced by the mighty fact of the Divine existence from the centre of life to its circumference, through all the circles of hidden and unhidden desire, through all the associations of thought, secret and evident, through all the processes of the Spirit, conscious and unconscious.

It may be expected that in speaking of modes of thought and life through which the Divine existence is to be ascertained and realized, the chief place ought to be given to that mode in which God became man, to the Lord Jesus Christ and to the revelation of Deity made in Him and through Him. But this would lead away from the purpose of this essay. It would lead to a consideration of the Incarnation as one of the enduring beliefs of the church out of its proper relation. God, Revelation, Incarnation, although each leads up to the other, are distinct portions of Christian faith, and any of these may be used in illustration of the principle of interpretation here said to be the great answer to the need of the time. The Incarnation is, indeed, the supreme revelation of God; it is not the only but the only adequate and full verification of his Being. It does not in the least discredit the modes of ascertaining and verifying the Divine existence that we have indicated. As Burke said, "every subject leads out to infinity." Push these processes and they bring us to the Incarnation. All

proofs of God's existence on the divine side are simply his varied self-revelation. If so, the supreme self-revelation must be the supreme proof. But there is no need of pressing our present line of thought into the Incarnation; no more necessity than there is for pressing it over the whole field of Christian faith. Our illustration requires but a single belief. Our choice was the belief in God.

To recapitulate. We have said the preacher is an interpreter. It is and must ever remain his duty to find the intellectual value of the soul's experiences and to trace them forth to the fixed, immutable, objective truth whose existence they imply and silently proclaim. But a special duty, we think, rests upon the preacher of to-day. He must re-interpret into life the common, tried, enduring creed of Christendom. The character of the re-interpretation demanded we have indicated in a single word. That word is "spiritualization." The spiritualization of Christian truth as popularly held, and the putting of it in this new form into the intellectual and vital possession of intelligent but puzzled believers and non-believers, is a duty to which the preacher of these days is assuredly called. As an example of this interpretation we have taken the deepest and most solemn of all our beliefs — the belief in God. We believe, with Coleridge, that in every age, to the thinker, to the doer, to the sufferer, the problem of problems is the existence of God. That settled, everything dear to the immortal craving of man's spirit is also settled and secured. Then we know that there is a great fixed star in the heavens, that the light has started for our darkness, and that how long soever the journey may be between that world and this, the swift-moving beam from the ever-shining centre will arrive at last and turn night into day.

Geo. A. Gordon.

BOSTON.

SKETCH OF WILLIAM PYNCHON.

WILLIAM PYNCHON was one of the Puritans, and came to New England, with Governor John Winthrop, in 1630. He was more than an average man among those who came from England, but a careful study of his life will help us understand what sort of men those were who laid the foundations of this Commonwealth.

"The first of the Pynchon family,"¹ says Prof. Thomas R. Pynchon, D. D., now of Trinity College, Hartford, Conn., "came to England with the Conqueror, and had a grant of manors in Lincolnshire. Thence they drifted, after some generations, into Northamptonshire, where W. Pynchon resided, who was the grandfather of Henry Chicheley, Archbishop of Canterbury, who flourished in the time of Kings Henry IV., V., and VI., 1414 to 1443. From Northamptonshire they passed into Essex and had property at Writtle, near Chelmsford. The church of that town, a noble building, has in its chancel many fine monuments running through several generations of the family." Nicholas Pynchon was sheriff of London in 1532.² His son John, of Writtle, Essex, married Jane, heiress of Sir Richard Empson, one of the ministers of Henry VII. John Pynchon died in 1573, leaving six children. His second son, John, settled in Springfield, Essex, near Chelmsford. His son William, of whom I am to write, was born, probably in Springfield, about 1590. The date of his birth is determined by an inscription³ on his portrait, now in possession of the Essex Institute, at Salem, which indicates that the portrait was painted in 1657, and that his age was sixty-seven years.

William Pynchon, gent, as his name is always written in the records of the colony, was a man of fortune, well versed in affairs, and well educated. It is said that he was not a graduate, but his works show that he had some knowledge of the Latin, Greek, and Hebrew languages, and a wide acquaintance with the theological literature of his time.

He is one of the patentees named in the Charter of the Colony of Massachusetts Bay, from Charles I., which bears the date of March 28, 1628.⁴ He was also named in the same charter one of the eighteen Assistants, and was connected with the government of the Company before it was transferred to this side of the Atlantic by the notable vote of its members.

He was the leader in the settlement of Roxbury, and one of the founders of the first church in that town.⁵ He was engaged in business, perhaps as a merchant. While at Roxbury he was for some years Treasurer of the Colony, and was elected, from year to year, one of the Assistants. He was early licensed as a fur-trader.

¹ MS. letter from Prof. T. R. Pynchon, dated T. C., Hartford, Mar. 4, 1886.

² *Heraldic Journal*, No. 14, April, 1866, quoted in *Records of the Pynchon Family*.

³ "Guil. Pynchon armg. Effigies. | Delin. Anno Dom. 1657. | æt. 67."

⁴ Bancroft, i. 265, 281. *Mass. Records*, i. ⁵ *Hist. Boston*, i. 401-11.

In 1632 he paid twenty-five pounds into the treasury of the Colony for his license as a fur-trader. The same sum was paid each year until 1635, when the General Court remitted one fifth of the amount, probably because the trade had become less lucrative.

It is not easy to understand why it was that, within five or six years after the settlements near Boston were begun, the people in a number of these settlements were moved by a common impulse to go further west. The reasons given, says Winthrop,¹ were their "lack of accommodations for their cattle, so that they were not able to maintain their ministers, nor could receive any more friends to help them; and also the fruitfulness and commodiousness of Connecticut, and the danger of its being possessed by others," Dutch or English; and, what is always the decisive reason with persons seized by the Western fever, "the strong bent of their spirits to remove thither." Cotton Mather says, "It was not long before the Massachusetts Colony was become like a hive overstocked with bees, and many of the new inhabitants entertained thoughts of swarming into plantations extending further into the country." "The Colony," he says,² "might fetch its description from the Scripture: 'Thou hast brought a vine out of England; Thou hast cast out the heathen and planted it; Thou preparedst room before it, and didst cause it to take deep root, and it filled the land.' But still there was one stroke wanting, to wit, '*She sent forth her branches unto the river,*' whereupon many of the planters, belonging especially to the towns of Cambridge, Dorchester, Watertown, and Roxbury, took up resolutions to travel an hundred miles westward from those towns for a further settlement upon that famous river, the report of which had made a little Nilus of it." All of which means, that Boston, Cambridge, and the rest were full, as the people thought, and they were already feeling the stirrings of that wonderful instinct which in two centuries and a half has belted the continent with Puritan populations, which stretch already as far as the Massachusetts charter gave a title, even to the Western sea.

The 14th of May, 1634,³ the General Court granted leave to the inhabitants of Newtown "to remove their habitations to some convenient place." On the 6th of May, 1635, it was voted to grant liberty to the inhabitants of Watertown, and to the

¹ Winthrop's *History of New England*, i. 140.

² Quoted by Dr. Holland in *Hist. of Western Mass.*, i. 20.

³ *Mass. Records*, i. 136.

inhabitants of "Rocksbury to remove themselves to any place they shall think meete, not to prejudice another plantation, provided they continue still under this government." That same year a company, or several companies, settled on the Connecticut River within the present limits of Connecticut.

In 1635 two men, John Cable and John Woodcock, were sent by Mr. Pynchon to the Connecticut River to build a house for the new plantation. It is probable that Mr. Pynchon himself had before this crossed the country, to the valley of the river, and selected the place for the settlement.

In the spring of 1636 Mr. Pynchon and seven other men made their way through the wilderness, following, it is supposed, the Bay Path, so called, and began a new plantation. Their goods were sent by water, in Governor Winthrop's vessel, — the "Blessing of the Bay," — which left Boston April 26th. We ride to Springfield, over almost the exact route of the Bay Path, in three hours. The pioneers were perhaps a week cutting their road through the forest, following, for a part of the way, an Indian trail. The date of their arrival is not known, but on the 14th of May they subscribed an agreement, which contains fifteen articles, and which was designed as the fundamental law of the colony. It gives it the name of the Plantation of Agawam, spelled in the agreement *Agam*, according to the pronunciation of the Indians of the vicinity. The first article provides for the settlement of a "Godly and faithful minister," "with all convenient speed, with whom we propose to joyne in church covenant, to walk in all the ways of Christ."¹ The second limits the number of families to forty; or by general consent to fifty at the utmost. The others provide for the allotment of land to the various settlers, and for defraying the expenses of the settlement. It was stipulated that no man except Mr. William Pynchon "shall have above ten acres for his house lot."

On laying out the land the general course was to "allow each inhabitant a house lot on the west side of" what is now called Main Street, "eight rods wide, from the street to the river; a like width in the meadow in front of his house, to the foot of the hill; and a wood lot, of the same breadth, extending, at first eighty, and afterwards an hundred rods, nearly to the top of the hill; and when practicable, an allotment in the intervale, on the west side of the River, of the same width, and, as near as might be, directly against his lot."²

¹ Judge Morris's *Address*. 1876. Appendix.

² *Address* by George Bliss, March 24, 1828.

Mr. Pynchon acted as magistrate in the colony, at first under a general commission from the General Court, dated March 3, 1836,¹ which authorized eight persons to determine in a judicial way differences, and to inflict corporal punishment or imprisonment, or to levy fines, in various plantations on the Connecticut River.

There is on record at the Registry of Deeds in Hampden County² a paper which conveys the Indian title to the lands on both sides of the river for four or five miles to William Pynchon, Esq., Mr. Henry Smith (his son-in-law), and their heirs and associates. It is dated July 15, 1636, and is signed by thirteen Indians, by their marks. The consideration acknowledged in the deed is eighteen fathom of wampum, eighteen coats, eighteen hatchets, eighteen hoes, and eighteen knives, besides certain presents made to some of the chiefs.

The year following the settlement the people secured the services of Rev. George Moxon, and under him they formed a church.³ Mr. Moxon had received Episcopal ordination in England. He was a graduate of Sidney College, Cambridge, and took his degree of A. B. in 1623. He was a personal friend of Mr. Pynchon's, and continued in the colony only so long as Mr. Pynchon did.⁴ A house was built for him by a voluntary assessment in 1639, and he received a salary of forty pounds a year, of which in 1638 Mr. Pynchon paid £24 6s. 8d.⁵

All the settlements on the Connecticut — Wethersfield, Hartford, Windsor, and Agawam — were at first united under a joint commission, appointed by the General Court of Massachusetts, of which Mr. Pynchon was a member. He attended a court held at Hartford in November, 1636, and also in 1637. In 1638 Rev. George Moxon and John Burr were chosen to represent Agawam at the same court.⁶ It had been uncertain how many of the settlements were under the jurisdiction of Massachusetts, but in 1638 the people of Agawam became satisfied that "by God's Providence they were now fallen into the line of the Massachusetts jurisdiction," and they chose Mr. William Pynchon "to execute the office of a magistrate in this our plantation of Agawam," "till we receive further directions from the General Court in the Massachusetts Bay." The record of this action occupies the second page in the manuscript volume known as "The Pynchon Record Book."

¹ *Mass. Records*, i. 170-71.

² *Hist. of Conn. Valley*, 33.

³ *Hist. of Conn. Valley*, 33.

⁴ *Dr. Holland's History*, i. 29.

⁵ *Holland's History*, i. 31.

⁶ *Holland's History*, i. 33.

The magistrate was authorized "to administer oaths, issue warrants, hear and examine misdemeanors, inflict corporal punishment by whipping and the stocks, to commit to prison; to try actions for debt or trespass, and keep records of verdicts, judgments, and executions, and whatever else may tend to the king's peace."¹ It was agreed, on account of the scarcity of men, that six persons should be deemed a "good and sufficient jury to try any action under the sum of ten pounds."

This was really a form of government, adopted by the inhabitants of the colony, and was an assumption of the right of self-government, and especially of independence of the authority of Connecticut. This led to a prolonged controversy, in which Mr. Pynchon acted as the leader of the colonists. Their position was finally sustained by the General Court of Massachusetts, which on the 2d of June, 1641, adopted an elaborate paper,² which asserted the claim of the Massachusetts Colony to the plantation, and ordered that "William Pynchon, gent, for the year shall have full power and authority to govern the inhabitants of Agawam, now Springfield, to hear and determine all causes and offences both civil and criminal, that reach not to life, limbs, or banishment, according to the laws here established."

A little earlier than this, namely, the 14th of April, 1640, the inhabitants assembled in general town meeting and changed the name of their Plantation from Agawam to Springfield, as a compliment to Mr. Pynchon, whose home was in Springfield before his removal to New England.³

Mr. Pynchon was the magistrate of the colony from the beginning to 1651, first as a member of the joint commission, then by vote of the people of Agawam, and after June 2, 1641, by commission from the General Court.

The records of his court show the variety and importance of his duties. One of the most important cases was a suit for slander. John Woodcock was complained of for slandering the pastor, Rev. George Moxon, by saying that the said Moxon had taken a false oath against him at Hartford. Mr. Moxon claimed £9 19s. damages, but the jury awarded him £6 13s. There were suits for the collection of debts, and for violation of contract; estates were settled in Mr. Pynchon's court, and the inventories in his Record Book give us glimpses of the sort of property and of household furniture in those times, as well as of the prices at which articles

¹ Holland's *History*, i. 33.

² *Mass. Records*, i. 321.

³ Holland's *History*, i. 34.

were valued. In 1651 Hugh Parsons was apprehended on charge of witchcraft. The testimony against him is recorded by Mr. Pynchon. The duties of the magistrate consisted in the examination of witnesses. Parsons was sent to Boston for trial. Witnesses were produced, and the testimony taken in Springfield was read, and the prisoner was found guilty of the sin of witchcraft. The General Court reviewed the case and reversed the verdict. The wife of Parsons had been insane, and had taken the life of her infant child. She was arrested for the double crime of witchcraft and murder. Her examination was before Mr. Pynchon. She was tried in Boston, and found guilty of murder only. As there is no further record in her case, it is probable that she died in prison.

The settlers very early adopted a code of municipal regulations. The annual town meeting was fixed upon the first Tuesday in November.¹ Every householder was required to have a ladder annexed to his house, as a security in case of fire, and to have his chimney swept at stated periods. It was forbidden to carry fire from house to house, not being sufficiently covered, on penalty of a fine of 5s., and a liability for all damages. As the houses were covered with thatch, the chimneys were wooden frames covered with mortar, and there was much inflammable material in the street, the need of this regulation is apparent. November 14, 1639, it was ordered that the "Sealed Peck which Mr. Pynchon hath shall be the ordinary Peck to buy and sell by in the Plantation." "The exercise of trayning was to be practiced one day in every month." No person was to trade, give, or lend to any Indian any quantity of powder, little or great, under penalty of 40s. The wages of carpenters were fixed at 2s. 6d. a day, for the nine best months, and at 2s. from the 10th of November to the 10th of February. Mowers should have 2s. 6d. a day. Sawers 6s. 6d. per hundred feet, "they to fall and hewe, and the owner to bring to the pitt." Ordinary farm labor was 2s. a day for nine months, and 18d. for three months; only from the 24th of April to the 24th of June they "are left to their liberty as men can agree." A day's work was the whole day, allowing convenient time for food and rest. Violation of these rules to be punished "by the Magistrate according to the quality and nature of the offence." Any man elected to any office in the town, and refusing or neglecting to serve, "shall pay to the Town Treasurer 20s., unless he have served in that office the year before." And any inhabitant who should absent

¹ Address by George Bliss, 1828. Appendix N.

himself from town meeting should be liable to a fine of 2s. 6d. "Jan. 8, 1646, it was agreed by the plantation with John Matthews to beat the drum for the meetings, for a year's space, at 10 A. M. on Lecture days, and 9, on the Lord's days, in the four-noons only, and he is to beat it from Mr. Moxon's to R. Stebbins house, and ye meetings to begin within half an hour after, for which his paynes, he is to have 7d., in wampum, of every family in the town, or a peck of Indian corn if they have not wampum."

Mr. Pynchon succeeded in preserving friendly relations with the Indians of the vicinity by a wise and conciliatory policy.¹ One part of his policy was to treat the Indians as an independent people. In 1648, for example, he was directed by Lieutenant Governor Dudley to take into custody certain Indians who had murdered some other Indians. In his answer Mr. Pynchon convinced Governor Dudley that neither the murderers nor those murdered were under the jurisdiction of the colony. The attempt to interfere was at once abandoned by the authorities at Boston. But whenever the Indians committed offenses against our own people, Mr. Pynchon claimed jurisdiction, and by a wise blending of authority, with an appeal to the Indian's sense of justice, he commonly succeeded in securing redress. The Indians had confidence in him, and were plainly ready to be guided by his wishes.

Besides his public duties, Mr. Pynchon was an active business-man. The trade in beaver and other furs was very lucrative, and this trade in the vicinity of Springfield was controlled by him. To facilitate this trade, he early established a warehouse near the southern limit of what was then considered Springfield. This place still retains the name Warehouse Point, and is a station on the railroad below Springfield. It was for many years the centre of an extensive trade with the Indians, and was the point from which the furs were shipped to England. Mr. Pynchon added very largely to his fortune while in Springfield, and at the time of his return to England was one of the richest men in New England.

He was also the representative man of Springfield abroad. The communications of the government at Boston were made through him. For a few years after he went to Springfield he was naturally left off from the Board of Assistants. But, in 1643, the colony having become well established, and the Bay Path more easily passed over, Mr. Pynchon was again elected an Assistant, and was reelected annually until 1650.

¹ Address by Judge Morris. 1876.

This brings us to the time of the publication of Mr. Pynchon's famous book, entitled "The Meritorious Price of Our Redemption." It is a small quarto volume of a hundred and fifty-eight pages, "printed in London, by T. M. and George Whittington and James Moxon, and to be sold at the Blue Anchor in Cornhill, near the Royal Exchange, 1650." It is now exceedingly rare. There is one copy in the Congregational Library, Boston, one in the British Museum, and only one other, so far as I can learn, — that an elegantly bound copy that belonged to the Brinkley Library, and was purchased by H. S. Sheldon, of Suffield, Connecticut, for the sum of four hundred dollars.

This book was received in Boston in the summer of 1650, and produced a great excitement. The General Court,¹ coming together in October, adopted a solemn protest against the many errors and heresies of this book. This protest was made, they say, "for vindication of the truth," and also "to keep the people here committed to our care in the true knowledge and faith of our Lord Jesus Christ," "and likewise, for the clearing of ourselves to our Christian brethren and others in England," "where this book was printed and is dispersed." They protest their innocence, as not "privy to the writinge, composinge, printinge, nor divulginge thereof," and declare that they "detest and abhorre many of the opinions and assertions therein, as false, erronyous, and hereticale;" and for proof of their sincerity in this protest they "condemne the said booke to be burned in the market place, at Boston, by the common executioner." They also summon Mr. Pynchon to appear before the next General Court to answer whether "he will owne the booke as his or not, which, if he doth, we purpose (God willinge) to proceed with him according to his demerits, unless he retract the same." It was also ordered that Rev. John Norton, of Ipswich, "should be entreated to answer Mr. Pynchon's book with all convenient speed." It was also ordered, — and this casts light upon the motive for their rapid and extreme measures, — that the foregoing declaration "be signed by the Secretary, and sent to England to be printed there." No one can tell, at this distance of time, all the reasons for this unusual action of the General Court. It is plain that it was not simply a judicial proceeding. There were politics in the case. The state of parties; the opinions of men who happened to be, just at that time, at the head of affairs; the fears of those who were most solicitous to maintain a certain type of theological

¹ *Mass. Records*, iii. 215.

opinion; the presence in the colony of men whose views were more liberal, and the desire to hold them in check,—all these entered into the motives of those who controlled the action of the General Court.

Mr. Pynchon was an honored magistrate, a member for many years of the General Court, a gentleman now past his sixtieth year, whose opinions had been treated with great respect throughout the history of the colony, and who was certainly entitled to be treated with great consideration. But the defection of such a man from the truth, as it was held by such men as Endicott and Dudley, would be a very serious matter, and one that must be checked if possible.

There was a law of Massachusetts, passed four years before, which condemned to fine and banishment whosoever should "go about to subvert and destroy the Christian faith and religion by broaching and maintaining" certain "damnable heresies," among which was specified that of "denying that Christ gave himself a ransom for our sins."¹ This the book was understood to do.

Mr. Palfrey also suggests that there was an unusual solicitude in the colony as to the course of affairs in England, after the execution of King Charles; and also that the moderating influence of Governor Winthrop was removed just at this time.² We know that Thomas Dudley was governor,³ and John Endicott deputy governor, both of whom were men disposed to favor extreme measures for the maintenance of their standard of orthodoxy. A letter written by John Cotton to certain brethren in England, at the time, shows that the action was hastened by the fact that "a ship was in the harbor, ready to sail for England." "Now the Court,"⁴ he says, "perceiving by the title-page, that the contents of the book were unsound and derogatory both to the justice of God and the grace of Christ, which would do great harm, they judged it meet, whilst the ship stayed, to declare their own judgement against the book, and to send a copy of their declaration to England by that ship."

The book itself is worthy of more than a passing notice as a part of the history of the times. It is the production of a very intelligent layman, living upon the outermost rim of civilization, and moved by the currents of theological opinion in his time to

¹ This is the statement of Mr. Palfrey. He cites *Mass. Records*, ii. 177, Code of 1658, p. 34.

² Palfrey's *History*, ii. 395. Note.

³ *Mass. Records*, iii. 182.

⁴ Appendix to John Norton's *Answer to Pynchon*.

put forth his independent protest against opinions that seemed to him inconsistent with the Word of God. Those were the days of the Westminster Assembly, which sat from 1643 to 1647. The Assembly had carried the expression of Calvinistic doctrine further than moderate Puritans like Mr. Pynchon would be ready to go. For Mr. Pynchon, like many of those who came with Governor Winthrop, had been a devout member of the Church of England. He was one of the wardens in the church in Springfield, in Old England.¹ His theological opinions had been formed under the preaching of the ministers of the Established Church, rather than under the Calvinistic preachers of New England. He was a Non-Conformist, but not a Separatist.

The Assembly² declares that Christ "bore the weight of God's wrath;" "laid down his life an offering for sin;" "satisfied divine justice;" was "under the infinite wrath of God;" that He "did fully discharge the debt of" the elect, "and did make a proper, real, and full satisfaction to his Father's justice in their behalf;" that we are justified by the "imputing the obedience and satisfaction of Christ" unto us; that God "imputes the righteousness of Christ" unto us.³

The ministers of New England were accustomed to use language which went further than these guarded statements of the Assembly. John Norton, in his reply to Pynchon, maintains, in an elaborate argument, that the sins of the elect were imputed to our Saviour; that for their sins He suffered the torments of hell, and that the righteousness of Christ is imputed to the elect.

The heresies which the General Court found upon the title-page of Mr. Pynchon's book were these: That Christ did not suffer for us those unutterable torments of God's wrath which commonly are called hell torments; and that He did not bear our sins by imputation, and consequently did not bear the curse of the law for them; and also that the righteousness of Christ is not imputed to us. The most vigorous part of the book is the discussion of the texts of Scripture which are supposed to prove that our sins were imputed to Christ, and that He suffered the wrath of God, and the punishment due for the sins of the elect. The

¹ These facts are given on the authority of Professor T. R. Pynchon, of Hartford, who states that there is a tablet in the church in Springfield which shows the fact.

² *Larger Catechism*, ii. 49. *Ibid.*, ii. 38.

³ *Conf.*, xi., s. 11, chap. xi. 1. *L. C.*, 271.

discussion of Isa. liii. 4-6; 2 Cor. v. 21; Ps. xxii. 1; Matt. xxvi. 37; Luke xxii. 43-44; and Heb. v. 7, is very close and logical. He shows an acquaintance with the Hebrew and Greek texts, refers to the Septuagint version, compares the rendering of various passages in the Geneva version with that in Tyndale, and in King James's Version. He was a correspondent of Ainsworth, and quotes in support of his opinions an autograph letter from that theologian. He quotes Ainsworth, Broughton, Robert Wilmot, John Calvin, Martin Luther, Nichols, Richardson, Ursinus, Bastingius, Goodwin, Palanus, John Forbes, and St. Augustine.

Following this polemic part of the book is the constructive part, in which he attempts to define the real basis of our redemption. In this he starts from the passage in Rom. v. 19, which reads: "For as by one man's disobedience many were made sinners, so by the obedience of one shall many be made righteous." He holds that as Adam's disobedience ruined the world, so Christ's perfect obedience, as our Mediator, redeemed the world. Christ had his work set before Him by the Father. This was the work which He completed, when He said, "I have finished the work thou gavest me to do."¹ If his obedience had been in the slightest degree imperfect, it would have vitiated the entire work. His death was the final test of his obedience. If He had died unwillingly He had died in vain. So the death of Christ was a voluntary death. "I lay down my life that I might take it again. No man taketh it from me, but I lay it down of myself. I have power to lay it down, and I have power to take it again."² Mr. Pynchon says: "His divine nature was the altar upon which He sacrificed his human nature." His humanity was the oblation. "Then," he goes on to say, "his mediatorial death may well be called a miraculous death. It was no less miraculous than the raising the dead body of Lazarus." The devil and his agents had power to bruise Him, and buffet Him, and to nail Him to the cross. But they had no power to separate his soul from his body. So his death was not passive. It was active, and so a part of his mediatorial obedience. He quotes Augustine, who says, "Who can sleep when he wist, as Christ died when he would? Who can lay aside his garment, as Christ laid aside his flesh? Who can leave his place so as Christ left his life?"³ Christ died before the thieves, so that "Pilate marvelled if He were already dead."⁴ He died when the life of obedience set for Him was finished,

¹ John xvii. 4.

² *Tractate upon John*, 119.

³ John x. 17-18.

⁴ Mark xv. 44.

"whereof his mediatorial death was the master-piece." He said that it was "finished," and then "He bowed his head and gave up the ghost."¹ So Christ did not suffer the wrath of God, but He did the will of God. We may be saved because the law, which was broken by disobedience, was honored and restored by the obedience of the God-man.

It was ordered by the General Court, after they had burned Mr. Pynchon's book, "that Mr. Norton, one of the reverend elders of Ipswich, should be intreated to answer Mr. Pynchon's booke with all convenient speed."² This Rev. John Norton was a man of great reputation in his day. He was a student at Cambridge University, was master of an elegant Latin style, and the author of the first book written in Latin in this country. He was the author of a system of divinity. He succeeded John Cotton as pastor of the First Church in Boston.³ He was a man of so much eloquence that people used to come from the neighboring towns, and even from Ipswich, to hear him preach his Thursday lecture. His widow, Madame Norton, gave the Old South the ground on which the Old South Church stands.⁴ Mr. Norton's reply is entitled, "A Discussion of that Great Point in Divinity, the Sufferings of Christ." It is a very able and learned work, thoroughly scientific in its methods, and sets forth the doctrine of the Westminster Assembly concerning the Atonement, and goes beyond their Confession in respect to Imputation.⁵ For this work Mr. Norton received from the General Court the sum of £20, with a vote of thanks, and they sent his book to England to be printed.

In addition to providing for a reply to Mr. Pynchon's book, the General Court advised him to confer with the Rev. John Cotton, Mr. Norrice, and Mr. Norton about some points in his book.⁶ His conference with them naturally broadened his view of the subject he had in hand.⁷ He had been but a solitary thinker, and in giving emphasis to his protest against the extreme satisfaction theory, he had failed to do justice to the relation of the work of the Redeemer to sin and guilt. This, as a conscientious man, he was more than willing to acknowledge. Accordingly he appeared before the General Court, in May, 1851, with the following paper:—

¹ John xix. 30.

² *Mass. Records*, iii. 216.

³ *Memorial History of Boston*, i. 464. *Sprague's Annals*, Congl., i. 58.

⁴ *Memorial History of Boston*, 194.

⁵ Palfrey, ii. 396. Note.

⁶ *Mass. Records*, iii. 239; also iii. 248.

⁷ *Mass. Records*, iii. 229.

"According to the Court's advice, I have Conferred with the Rev. Mr. Cotton, Mr. Norrice, and Mr. Norton about some points of the greatest consequence in my book, and I hope I have so explaind my meaning to them as to take off the worst construction; and it hath pleased God to let me see that I have not spoken in my book so fully of the price, and merit of Christ sufferings as I should have done, for in my booke I call them but trialls of his obedience, yet intending thereby to amplyfy and exalt the mediatorial obedience of Christ as the only meritorious price of man's redemption: but now at present I am much inclined to think that his sufferings were appointed by God for a further end, namely, as the due punishment of our sins by way of satisfaction to divine justice for mans redemption.

"Your humble servant, in all dutifull respects,

WILLIAM PYNCHON."¹

This is spoken of by several authorities as a retraction, and Dr. Holland² intimates that he "was convinced against his will." But there is no retraction here; but only a frank statement by a sincere and ingenuous man that after conference with his friends, the learned divines, he had become satisfied that in one respect he had failed to do justice to one side of an important truth; and further, that he found that some of his expressions had been misunderstood. Certainly, Mr. Pynchon was not the man to be "convinced against his will," or to retract any statement which he believed to be true. Besides, as we shall see, Mr. Pynchon was really master of the situation, and his opponents had more occasion to fear him than he had to fear them.

That his paper was not taken as a retraction is evident also from the action of the court, which voted that this paper showed Mr. Pynchon to be in a hopeful way, and dismissed him till the October session to study the questions by the aid of Mr. Norton's reply, directing that he should appear in October and give all due satisfaction.

At this session of the General Court Mr. Pynchon was not re-elected as one of the Assistants, and was left out of the magistracy.

In October he failed to appear, and the General Court³ judged

¹ *Mass. Records*, iii. 229.

² Holland's *History*, i. 38. Art. on Pynchon in *N. E. Hist. and Gen. Register*, Oct. 1859.

³ *Mass. Records*, iii. 257.

it "meete that all patience be exercised towards him, that he may be reduced into the way of truth, and renounce his errors and heresies," and therefore, as nothing else was possible, gave him until the next General Court in May, "that he may give full satisfaction for his offense, which they more desire than to proceed to so great a censure as his offense deserves." So he was placed under bonds of £100 to appear in May "to stand to the judgement and censure of the Courte."

This is the last reference to this case in the "Records" of Massachusetts. Mr. Pynchon did not appear at the next session of the court. Whether his bail of £100 was forfeited we have no means of knowing. During that year he returned to England. Of course he went openly; and probably sailed from Boston. A part of his family followed him, but his son John remained in Springfield, and became the most important man in the colony, succeeding to his father's influence and authority.

Thus it appears that, notwithstanding the vigorous terms employed by the General Court in October, 1650, proposing, "(God willing) to proceed with" Mr. Pynchon "according to his demerits, unless he retracts his heresies;" he yet remained within their jurisdiction for about two years, and in that time appeared before them only once, although summoned three times, and in the end chose his own time for leaving the colony, and retiring with his princely fortune to his estate in England.

It deserves to be mentioned, as a part of the history of the times, that Sir Henry Vane wrote to the magistrates, complaining of the course they had taken, and was answered in a joint letter by nine of them.¹ A letter was also written by certain men of influence in England to the ministers of Boston, and others, urging them to set a favorable construction upon the tenets set forth in Mr. Pynchon's book "as disputable, and to some of note probable;" and requesting the ministers to "intercede with the Magistrates to deal favorably with him, as a gentleman pious, and deserving."² To this letter a reply was made, signed by John Cotton, Richard Mather, and three others, which explained the occasion of the promptness of the court in its first action, and states that the court was disposed to deal favorably with the author of the book, appointing three, all friends and acquaintances, such as himself chose, to confer with him, and finding him yielding in some main point which he willingly expressed under his own hand, the court readily accepted the same.

¹ Palfrey's *N. E.*, ii. 396.

² Appendix to Norton's *Answer to Pynchon*.

On arriving in England Mr. Pynchon settled in Wraysbury, on the Thames, in Buckinghamshire. This place is in the very heart of England, "about three miles below Windsor Castle, and directly opposite Magna Charta Island, and Runnymede. Horton, where Milton at one time lived, is an adjoining town."¹ He found himself under the Puritan Commonwealth, in England, which must have been agreeable to one of his political and religious opinions. In the enjoyment of an ample fortune, surrounded by many friends of his earlier life, with abundant leisure, Mr. Pynchon appears to have given the ten remaining years of his life to study and writing.

The year of his arrival in England he published : —

"The Jews' Synagogue, a Treatise concerning the Worship used by the Jews. Quarto. London, 1652. John Bellamie."

Two years later he published two treatises on the Sabbath : —

"The Time when the First Sabbath was ordained. By William Pynchon, Esq. Published by authority. London: Printed by R. G., and to be sold by T. N. at the Three Lions in Cornhill, near the Royal Exchange. 1654."

"Holy Time: or The True Limits of the Lord's Day. By William Pynchon, Esq. Published by authority. Printed at London, by R. G., and are to be sold by T. N., at the sign of the Three Lions, in Cornhill, near the Royal Exchange. 1654."

Mr. Norton's answer to Mr. Pynchon's first book was not published till 1653. Two years later Mr. Pynchon published a rejoinder, of which the following is the title : —

"The Meritorious Price of Man's Redemption; or Christ's Satisfaction Discussed and Explained. By William Pynchon, late of New England. 1655. Thomas Newbury, London, 1655."

It is dedicated to Oliver St. John, the author esteeming him "an able Judge, not only in those controversies that concern the common laws of the land, but also in divine controversies."

This is a quarto of 440 pages, and is by far the most elaborate of Mr. Pynchon's works. In this he uses the "altar terms," as they have been called, and seems to recognize the side of truth to which he referred in his letter to the General Court; namely, that in some way "the sufferings of Christ" "were appointed" as "the due punishment of our sins, by way of satisfaction of divine justice." He controverts again, with great ability, the doctrine that our Lord suffered the vindictive wrath of God and the torments of hell.

¹ MS. letter from Prof. Thos. R. Pynchon.

A copy of this book is in the library of Harvard University.

His last book was entitled : "The Covenant of Nature made with Adam Described, etc., and Cleared from Sundry Great Mistakes." In this volume the address to the reader is dated : "From my Study, Wraybury, Feb. 10, 1661."

Mr. Pynchon died at Wraybury some time in October, 1662, aged seventy-two years.

He was twice married. No record that I have seen gives the date of the first marriage, or the name of his wife. She came with him to New England, and died in Roxbury during the first year, perhaps in consequence of the hardships of the life in the new country. The children of this marriage were : —

John, born 1621 ;

Annie, who married Henry Smith ;

Margaret, who married William Davis, of Boston ;

Mary, who married Elizur Holyoke ;

And a son, who was drowned in the Connecticut River.¹

After the death of his wife Mr. Pynchon married Mrs. Frances Sanford, "a grave matron of the church at Dorchester," as the Roxbury church records say, but they do not give the date of the marriage. Mrs. Pynchon died at Wraybury, October 10, 1657.

There is a striking portrait of Mr. Pynchon in the possession of the Essex Historical Society of Salem. It was painted in England, and sent by him to his son John. It gives a very different impression of him from the engraving we so commonly see, which was taken from a daguerreotype of the portrait, and is reversed. With his long, closely-fitting coat and small-clothes, the broad collar or band of linen lying flat upon his shoulders, and a closely fitting silk cap upon his head, he was the impersonation of quiet dignity and patriarchal grace. His seal ring, with his arms, is still in existence, in the possession of a descendant at the South.

Ezra H. Byington.

MONSON, MASS.

¹ "Mr. Pynchon lately lost a boy, who tending cows near our river, too venturously went into a birchen canowe, which overturned, and he was drowned." [Mr. Moxon's letter to Gov. Winthrop about 1638.] — *Conn. Valley*, i. 40.

SOME CONCLUSIONS CONCERNING THE EDUCATION OF THE AMERICAN NEGRO.

THE opinions of any individual concerning such a subject as the education of the American negro carry but little weight unless he has had ample opportunity for the study, at short range, of its conditions and possibilities. Had not the writer of this article enjoyed such opportunity he should count himself presumptuous in seeking public audience for his own personal conclusions. But three years of active field-work in the service of the American Missionary Association have given him facilities for the study of this problem such as but few men have been permitted to experience.

In such a study close observation and careful reflection are equally essential; neither without the other is of any avail. The certainty, however, that the views which I shall present are grounded in both gives me such conviction of their truth as removes all hesitancy about their publication; and I feel the greater freedom from the fact that my statements, while founded on official experience, are not official, but individual and independent utterances. Nor is assurance lessened by the passage of some months since the work of direct observation was suspended.

1. The first conclusion which will be forced upon any practical observer is that *the magnitude of the task of educating the negroes of America is far beyond the conception of any who are not in direct contact with it.* I will not stop to array figures in support of this proposition, for no amount of statistical detail can convey the breadth and depth of the truth in the case. Statistics can give us our multiplicand, some millions of, half-civilized black and yellow people; but the multiplier, at best, can only be expressed algebraically. Density of ignorance, dearth of ideas, depth of superstition, and weakness of moral purpose cannot be reduced to any arithmetical expression.

The great numbers of these unfortunate people, the small share of them yet reached by anything worthy the name of education, the rapid rate at which they are multiplying, and the fact that those untouched by education multiply most rapidly of all, are factors of the appalling product; nor can we cancel or eliminate other factors less capable of exact expression, such as their pagan ancestry, the effects of material poverty and low living, and the dreadful moral entail of slavery, — the inconceivably low estate in

which it left them, not only as to conscience and moral ideas, but also as to the power of self-direction. Never before did such a mass of helpless, unequipped, morally emasculated human beings enter suddenly into the necessity of caring for themselves as the freedmen of 1865. That they were not engulfed by starvation and license is a hopeful fact and worthy of reflection.

Southern people, the best and most thoughtful of them, even, are prone to challenge such views as are here implied of the results of slavery; but that fact only illustrates anew the perennial phenomenon that familiarity breeds inadequate appreciation, and that the thing always near at hand is usually very imperfectly observed.

Only twenty years have passed since the American negro was expected to have or allowed to have a moral character, in any but the most limited sense. Will five times twenty years suffice to establish independent and enlightened manhood in a race with such antecedents? History has yet to find an affirmative to such a question; and only the most easy-going optimism can rest serenely in the belief that the future will certainly be radically different from the past.

2. It is an easy inference, from what has already been said, that *the great work to be done for this people lies in the direction of intelligent morality,—intelligence for the sake of morality.* There is no hurry about the negro's enlargement in politics; he has had too much of politics already. There is no overwhelming urgency about the civil-rights question, even. The petty and senseless discrimination, on account of color, practiced at the South in all hotels and theatres, on most railroads, and even in most churches, is not the worst of all evils. It is an injustice and an insult to the best part of the colored people; but it is not an injustice to the whole race.

The great, inexorable urgency is that the negro be *moralized*. That result will carry all other desirable things with it as surely as day follows the sunrise. And this moralizing process is not, as some weak spirits would fain believe, a hopeless undertaking. There is, ready at hand, in the negro's mental constitution at least one powerful lever for this work. His religious tendency — propensity, I had almost said — is strong. He is a worshipful being. And he has not been without Christian instruction. It is true, as averred by Southern writers, that the slaves were taught the Christian doctrines, some of them. The trouble is, that they had teaching rather than training, — preaching is so much easier than

training,—and the teaching was partial and narrow, theology rather than morals, dogmatics rather than Christian life.

What is most needed now is to fill up these religious conceptions with their full and proper content, to *so* preach and teach and train that morality may no longer be left out of religion, that faith be no longer left without works, dead. And to this end it is a great advantage that the negro has no such prejudice against the Bible as may be found in these higher latitudes, but the reverse rather. Opposition to the Bible, even in the public schools, finds no soil in which to root among the negroes. And so the way is clear and open to give the Scriptures their rightful place as the great grammar and dictionary of morals and the higher life.

There are among the negroes no Jews, no atheists, next to no Catholics. And here is the place to say that there is no reason in the Roman Catholic bugaboo which some good people are always raising anew as to the colored people. The negro is by nature no Romanist. While he may love pageantry he has no taste for vicarious worship; worship with him *must* be coöperative and democratic. He will do no praying by proxy; he finds it hard enough to resign preaching to the clergy.

But the Bible needs to be *taught*, not simply preached. It needs to be taught thoroughly and systematically, like history or arithmetic,—not in the desultory, sentimental fashion so often found in our Sunday-schools, but as studied work. And there is danger, of course, that even this may become formal, shallow, and sectarian.

3. All must agree in theory, whatever their practice may show, that such a labor as this, the moralizing of a race by quickening its intelligence and opening its mind to moral motives and a true spiritual life, *demands soundness in its methods, and the utmost thoroughness and practicality in their application.*

And this thoroughness must begin at the bottom, extending from the ground up to all that is done in the schools. It will not do to be slipshod in the rudiments of education, trusting to thoroughness with the very few who come forward to Greek and geometry. This mistake, common enough in the past in our young Western colleges, has, I am bound to say, been repeated and magnified in much of the missionary educational work of the South. There has been too much ill-considered haste to get pupils on to something that could be dubbed “collegiate.”

The reasons for this are to be found in the collegiate antecedents of the leading workers, their classical studies, and their

almost total lack of pedagogical training and study, leaving them under the common delusion that anybody can be a great teacher who has once studied the Greek grammar. A mistake may have a noble origin and yet its result be none the less ignominious; and loose foundations are ignominious in themselves.

One of the greatest perils connected with negro education lies in the line of shallow self-conceit as a product. Here, as nowhere else, is exhibited a truth in the saying, —

“A little learning is a dangerous thing.”

The slave looked upon learning as the secret of the white man's power: but he could not possibly conceive how much was involved in that learning. When he found that simple ability to read and write did not bring him the fullness of power, he transferred the idea to Latin and Greek; and since then he has hungered not after thoroughness in common things, but for a smattering of the tongues of Socrates and Cicero. And his teachers have been somewhat too ready to humor him in this mistaken ambition, as if thinking that some distinctively Christian result were sure to follow the infusion of a little pagan literature in the original tongues.

Of course these things are not meant in any sweeping sense. Thoroughness in foundations does not mean an endless grind on “the three R's.” Classical training is excellent in its proper place. And not all missionary teachers have itched to teach Greek to unprepared youth who itched for such teaching; as witness that wise hero who has wrought at Hampton Institute these many years. Neither has there been an entire lack of colored youth properly fitted for and honestly carried through regular college work; as witness Fisk and Atlanta universities.

But I do assert that the evil results of a premature straining after “the college idea” among the colored people are already discernible, in some places, in a shallow smartness which assumes that a diploma from an alleged college is a certificate of infallible wisdom and a guaranty of unlimited ease.

4. But if there is mischief in the practice which offers the colored youth Latin before he knows English enough for everyday purposes, *there is still greater danger from the idea that a very little schooling is all he needs*, that he should be content with reading, writing, and enough arithmetic to enable him to “make change.”

Such a modicum of learning as is offered the negro by the public schools of the Southern States, so far from establishing char-

acter and opening the doors to rational life, does not even furnish the foundation for the commonest degree of intelligence. It is of little consequence that a man be able to read, after a fashion, if he does not use that power, if he has not the reading habit. And to give this, to develop the appetite for reading and what reading brings, has been found by the teachers of the colored man to be a process of the greatest difficulty, demanding much time, skill, and patience. No mere primary school does this work in its pupils, to say nothing of character-building; and the public schools of the South, outside of a few cities, are as yet only primary schools of the crudest and most ineffective type. It is impossible that they should be anything else for years to come. I would not minify their value nor underrate them as civilizing agencies; but there is little danger of that. The tendency of the public mind, just now, is in the opposite direction, that of optimistic overestimate. I am profoundly convinced that if the public schools of the South were left to contend with their problem unaided, unsupplemented by missionary effort or national aid, they could by no means maintain the present status; there would begin at once a course of moral and intellectual retrogression throughout that region.

I am not blaming the South for the wretchedly inefficient character of its schools. Insuperable reasons why they must be such are found in the poverty of the people, and the general conditions of a sparsely settled country, to say nothing of historical reasons. The South is making educational advance, especially in the way of public sentiment; but it must have help from without. And it is hard to understand the ignorance or the apathy which should lead any Northern man to question the duty of the nation as a whole to promptly extend such aid as it can to public education in the States of greatest illiteracy. Every consideration of common sense, prudence, justice, and public policy demands the enactment of the "Blair Bill," or an equivalent, at the earliest possible day.

But it should not be supposed that the extending of national aid to public schools in the South will in the least diminish the need for missionary schools. It will multiply their possibilities and opportunities, as could easily be shown, but will relieve them of no responsibilities. It will make them more free to attend to their legitimate work.

5. Experience forces the conclusion in all minds conversant with the facts that *the true policy of the missionary societies is that of concentration*, the fostering of a few strong rather than

many weak institutions, the policy of growth inward and upward rather than that of lateral expansion. It is better to do a thorough and lasting work for even a few select minds than a superficial, temporary work for many average minds. There are in every strong, large school the inspiration of numbers and the stimulus which comes from seeing grade rise above grade, under the same roof, up to a reasonably finished product; and one such school as Fisk University or Hampton Institute is worth a thousand little parish schools scattered here and there, valuable as they may be.

The calls for help are many and wide-spread, and the temptations to diffusion of effort are almost irresistible; but wise stewardship demands that they be firmly resisted until the revenues of the societies are much larger than now. It is not right to starve the older children that new ones may be born. It is not right to hamper those institutions which have justified their existence, in order that experiments may be tried in new fields.

6. Experience, furthermore, seems clearly to teach that *the Southern negro should be educated in situ, not in the North, but among his own people*. It has been a favorite theory with some warm friends of the negro that those who are to become the leaders of their race should be educated at the North, those at least who seek a college training. There is a show of force in the reasoning that they need to be got away from the low level of half-civilization in which they are born, and taken into a new atmosphere where the tonic elements of general thrift and general culture may constantly envelop them, and thus the keynote of their being be set to new ideals of life and action. Nevertheless, the theory is a fallacious one, at least from the missionary point of view.

It is missionary policy to educate no man for his own sake merely, but for the sake of his future influence, his multiplicative value morally. Whatever, therefore, tends to destroy that multiplicative power by throwing him out of sympathy with the more needy strata of his own people, creating a distance between himself and them which he cannot bridge, is assuredly a blunder. And this seems to be the almost certain result of educating colored young men in Northern colleges. They acquire a Northern standard of living, as to material comforts and refinements, which they cannot easily bring themselves to lay aside. They aspire to become lawyers, or what not, at the North; or if they do return to their native region they cannot adapt themselves again to the

humble aspect of life there, and so are liable to become not sympathizing and wise helpers of their own race, but impracticable self-pitiers, counting themselves strangely neglected, and education an expensive delusion.

It would be easy to array letters from colored graduates of Yale, Amherst, and other Northern colleges, which clearly verify the truth of what has just been said; and personal observation tells the same tale. This is not unaccountable by any means but it stands in striking contrast with the greater devotion and self-sacrifice of hundreds who have received their training in the missionary schools south of Mason and Dixon's line. It may, therefore, be pretty safely written that the farther northeast you carry a colored youth for his education, the less likely he is to become a successful helper and teacher of his race.

7. There has been of late much interest in that new phase of educational method which has received the name of "industrial education," or, more accurately, "manual training," whose motto is "the brain and the hand."

Whatever may be thought of the value or practicability of this movement as related to our Northern common schools, there can be no doubt that it is full of promise for the colored youth of the South. The reorganized labor system of the South involves a sort of stratification of labor, the blacks forming the substratum and taking the heavier and more menial services, while the whites monopolize the upper strata of skilled labor, the trades, and even the factory spindles. The missionary schools are wise in seeking to graft the industrial feature into their work. (1.) Because it tends towards self-helpfulness, giving to the colored youth one means of bettering his own status as a laborer and for breaking down the color-line in labor. (2.) Because it puts manual labor on a new basis of honorable appreciation by placing it alongside of language and mathematics as a topic of systematic instruction, and also serves to check and prevent certain false views of the office of education which lead both black and white to look upon it as a means of living without work. (3.) Because whatever tends to make labor honorable, to yoke it with intelligence, and free it from unjust and false restrictions, tends to bring society and religion itself up to a higher plane of purity and fruitfulness. For the soul's sake train the hand also.

8. To all familiar with the colored people it is evident that their intense sectarianism is one of the most inveterate obstacles to their moral elevation and religious enlightenment. The trouble lies

not in the fact that nearly all are nominally Methodists or Baptists, but in the parallel fact that their denominationalism is seldom a matter of understanding and intelligent choice, but rather of invincible prejudice and sheer partisanship. Colored Methodists and Baptists cannot work together peaceably, even in the patronage of a public school; and one of the most trying hindrances of county school officers who have any interest in the educational welfare of the negro is found in these irreconcilable sectarian differences. It may not seem a natural conclusion, but it is doubtless a true one, that *those Christian workers do the freedmen the most good who press their own ism least*, preaching and teaching only the common elements of Christianity, and pressing, above all, for Christian morality and life.

This has been, to a great extent, the policy of the American Missionary Association in past years, its aim being to make sound Christians rather than denominational proselytes. But it is to be feared that the push of an evidently rising denominational spirit among its constituency may do both it and the freedmen a harm. The waving of a denominational banner strikes prompt alarm into the hearts of the old sectarian leaders, and the result is a building of fences against the new and unfamiliar *ism*; the children are largely withdrawn from our school, and our chief opportunity is curtailed or lost. If we are too eager in this fishing for men we shall win no more than does the impetuous and impatient fisherman among the trout-brooks.

And, further still, there is danger lest there be an over-haste for the multiplication of feeble mission churches, feeble in numbers, feeble in power of self-support, and feeble in moral steadfastness, — churches good to count in annual reports, but constant burdens on a lean treasury. Better one strong, living, Christian school, able to teach religion and pure morals seven days in the week, than a score of puny churches where a few listen to the preaching of the Word one day in the week, the scattered seed falling too often into soil which is past further tillage.

9. It is but commonplace to assert, in closing, that the American people has before it the greatest opportunity and responsibility of modern times. This problem of preparing the American negro for the citizenship of earth and heaven is undoubtedly the most colossal which now lies upon this nation or any other nation. But there is every reason for good courage and hope in its prosecution. But twenty short years have passed since its inception, and miracles have already been wrought. That any one should

fail to realize the great progress which has been made by the freedmen in these years must result somehow from the fact that we have all along been, and still are, expecting too much of the colored man, applying to him, unconsciously, tests which we do not apply to the white man, and asking results from our scattered labors such as we do not reap among our own race.

It ought to be plain to even the most cautious and unsentimental mind that the Christian friends of the negro have reason to lift up their hearts and be glad. The instrumentalities are, indeed, incommensurate with so great a work, a work but well begun; but it is God's work, the seal of his blessing is upon it, and we must still believe that "one with God is a majority."

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VICARIOUS SACRIFICE.

ALL the works of God have a veil of mystery about them. Rightly, then, has Christian thought always held that there must be something unfathomable — a mystery that defies all speculation — in that grandest of God's works, the redemption of man through Christ. But there is here a very important distinction to be made. While the mysteries of God may baffle our understanding, they ought not to be so presented as to offend the conscience. All the genuinely Christian theories of redemption have respected this distinction. They have not been framed in the interests of mere speculation curious to pry into what God has hidden. They have had a purely ethical motive, seeking to harmonize the God revealed in Christ with the God revealed by the human conscience.

Even St. Anselm's theory had that merit. It was an earnest and not altogether unsuccessful effort to present Redemption in a manner less shocking, ethically, than did the old doctrine of Origen and his successors who had described Christ's sacrifice as essentially a bargaining with and over-reaching of the devil. But Anselm's doctrine, although ethically a great advance upon the past, still left much to be desired; and hence there have been continuous efforts at improvement. In the very last of them, the doctrine of Schleiermacher and Bushnell, the moral element has been made so much of, that the Scriptural ideas of atonement

and vicarious sacrifice seem to have sunk wholly out of sight. And so the deepest Christian thought still holds this great problem before it as one not quite solved. These brief notes claim to be nothing more than hints towards the solution to be desired.

I. *The nature of sacrifice.* The sacrificial idea forms the very kernel of all religions; and always its essential meaning is that of yielding or spiritual surrender to the Divine Will. In the pagan religions this ever tends to degenerate into the conception of mere gifts or homage. But the entire ceremonial of Judaism was designed to keep alive the true meaning of sacrifice; to teach that the gift was valueless save as a token of the yielding of the spirit. This was the significance of the shedding of blood without which there was no remission of sins, the flowing blood of the animal betokening the spiritual yielding of the worshiper; also of the laying of the hands upon the victim; of the typical death of the high priest within the veil; in fact, of almost every detail of Mosaic sacrifice. This, too, is the plain and incessant teaching of the Psalmist and the Prophets. Probably no one will doubt this; but if any one does, let him consult Bähr ("*Symbolik d. Mos. Cultus*," ii. 192, 313, *et in al.*) where the essential meaning of sacrifice as spiritual surrender is brought forth with great fullness of proof, but with no insight into its true relations to the redemptive work of Christ.

But this sacrificial surrender of the spirit unto God was to man, by himself, impossible. And that chiefly for two reasons: (1.) Man is sinful; and sin is essentially rebellion, enmity towards God. The life of the very best is a dark struggle of self-will, with bright flashes of impulse toward surrender and pardon. (2.) Most important of all, the individual is but one member of a sinful organism, — a world always at enmity with God. He is more helpless than a soldier in a rebellious army, swept along by his organic connection with the whole, despite his own faint and wavering impulses towards surrender. He could not surrender save by dis severing his connection with the life of mankind.

This impossibility is purely ethical. Man, by sinning, has voluntarily brought himself into this condition where real surrender to the will of God is impossible. But both the justice and the love of God refuse to pardon him who continues in rebellion. Pardon under such circumstances would be a mockery; and every tender conscience would feel it as a curse rather than a blessing. Thus sin has brought a dead-lock, as it were, between the soul and the pardoning mercy of God. No human effort can remove it.

A vague sense of this impossibility caused that deep undertone of sadness and despair so audible in the best life of paganism. It caused, also, every devout Jew to feel the insufficiency of his sacrificial system, and to look forward, with undefined longing, towards the Redemption that was yet to come.

II. *Christ came to make, as representative of the race, this sacrifice of surrender for us which we could not make for ourselves.* (1.) All Scripture converges upon this description of Christ as representative of redeemed humanity. He is the Messiah, the King, and thus the representative of his people. He is the true, eternal High Priest; and the functions of the high priest were always representative, especially in his going behind the veil to die sacrificially for the people. He is the Head of the church, the second Adam; in fact, there is hardly a Scriptural allusion to the Saviour that does not present Him in this representative capacity. This, too, is the meaning of the mediatorial language; for this the Son of God has become the Son of Man.

(2.) He alone could make the true, perfect sacrifice of surrender to God which was demanded. Consider, again, the two conditions which made this surrender impossible to a mere man. The first was individual sinfulness; but Christ was sinless; tempted at all points as we are, He yielded himself absolutely to the will of God. The second was the organic connection of the individual with a sinful, rebellious race; but from this connection Christ was absolved by his divine origin; He comes into contact with the race only of his own will, and then only in the capacity of its Redeemer: He was made subject unto death—that most universal mark of humanity—only through his own desire of making the most absolute yielding of himself to the will of God.

III. *This sacrifice becomes ours, through acceptance of Christ and acquiescence in his redemptive work.* And here we come to the very heart of the problem. Can we here also justify, ethically, the Christian doctrine that the act of one person is the ground of pardon and salvation for all others? I answer that we can, if we keep firm hold of the conception of sacrifice as surrender. And not otherwise. It is not, to the unbiased human conscience, ethically possible that the guilt of one man should be removed by the punishment of another innocent one; or that guilt pardoned in this way might not just as well be pardoned without any punishment whatsoever. But it is in accord with all principles of morality that the surrender of the leader, the representative, should be treated as the surrender of all those who accept his

leadership and trust themselves to the efficacy of his surrendering act.

We may go even farther, and say that a true sacrificial surrender could not be brought about otherwise than in some such vicarious way. For the very essence of surrender is not action but acquiescence. The sense of personal merit, of power and striving, is hostile to it. We approach it only as we trustfully accept what has been done for us by Christ. A vicarious sacrifice, then, so far from being a moral difficulty, is the very one demanded by the very nature of things.

IV. *The agency of faith in the redemptive work.* St. Anselm's theory of atonement as penal substitution leaves this wholly in the dark. If Christ has borne the infinite penalty of human sins in order to clear the guilty, what else can be demanded of man? But if our doctrine is true, then faith is just what the Christian church has always held it to be, — a supremely essential factor in the plan of redemption. Faith in Christ is that impulse of acceptance and acquiescence through which his act of sacrificial surrender becomes our own. Without that the sacrifice of the Cross would be as of little avail to us as the surrender of a general to those who refused to own his leadership. Thus faith justifies, not in the sense of making righteous, but as putting us in that position where pardon is possible, since we are no longer rebels but at peace with God through our Lord Jesus Christ. Here, then, the two great factors of the Christian system — Christ's sacrifice and justifying faith — fit into each other with absolute precision, as they never have done quite accurately heretofore in Christian theology.

These brief notes give but an outline. They do not pretend to fathom all the mysteries of their great theme. Heaven forbid the insolence of such an assumption! Doubtless the divine agencies of the Cross are working on through the centuries in many ways that are hardly perceptible to our dim eyes — much less are capable of being put into the lifeless formulas of speculation. Nevertheless, all the interests of Christian thought and life do demand one thing. That is, more light upon the relations between the doctrine of Christ's sacrifice and the moral intuition of mankind.

S. S. Hebbard.

THE EVOLUTION OF TRUTH.

FROM the lowest to the highest forms of sentient life there is the increase, more or less gradual, of one element, the degree of which in any class or individual marks its place in the scale of being. This element is consciousness. It is this that distinguishes a merely sentient organism from one that is informed by intelligence and discriminating choice. A higher degree of this quality distinguishes the man from the brute, the more developed man from the less developed, the mature man from the infant.

The individual consciousness of man extends itself in personal relations on the one hand toward human society, and on the other toward a personality, in dependence upon whom and in whom he lives and moves and has his being. This threefold consciousness, embracing self, human society, and God, has been fully realized only in one unique individual, the Saviour of the world. But men may progressively realize it through response to the spirit working in them and through the discipline of life. This is the evolution of truth. And the object of this essay will be to outline some of the principles which promote, govern, and limit it.

The evolution of doctrine and of life from the data furnished by Christianity has been of such vast significance as very much to overshadow the study of the development that preceded and led up to it. But it is hardly necessary to say that the subject is studied under great disadvantages from this limited point of view. The revelation that came by Jesus Christ did not appeal to men as a thing absolutely new, or as a solitary episode in the world's history, but as a continuation with new and important factors. He who revealed himself as the Light was not now for the first time in the world. He was the visible manifestation, the incarnation of the conscience or moral reason, "the light" that lighteth every man that cometh into the world. True, the kingdom of heaven was represented as springing from a new germ of truth, but this was planted in, and derived its sustenance from, an old soil that had been prepared by ages of growth and decay for its reception. It was to grow as other things had grown in a like soil, subject to limitations and hostile influences; and it was to reach maturity only through successive modifications, and endlessly varied responses to an equally varied environment.

If, then, we study the history of the growth of ethics with a view to discover by what steps conscious morality and religion

were reached under heathen civilizations, we ought to come upon some general principles which will throw light upon the development of Christian doctrine and life.

The consideration which seems to me to afford the true starting-point is this. Morals, regarded as a human product, have been the result of two main lines of influence. First, we find in the human organism the deposit of a potential morality; or to state it in other words, *conditions favorable to the development of morality*. Second, we find a varied environment by means of which these conditions bring forth actual morality. As the result of these two influences we have diversity growing, as it were, upon a stem of uniformity. The stem may be said to be *an intuition that, among the many incentives to conduct which take their rise in our emotional being, some tend to produce a higher, or more satisfactory self, and ought to lead; while others tend to the encouragement of a lower self, and ought to be subordinated*. But while there is no question about the underlying uniformity, it is a mistake to regard the original deposit as absolutely uniform. It varies just as intellectual endowments vary. It furnishes those original impulses toward diversity that are further modified and shaped by environment.

Of the cause or causes of these variations we have, physically speaking, no knowledge. In the words of Professor Huxley, "Species have been evolved by variation, a natural process, the laws of which are for the most part unknown, aided by the subordinate action of natural selection." Professor Huxley, it is true, may have intended by the phrase "natural process" to restrict the realm within which we are to seek for the origin of variations. But the efficiency of nature is certainly a part of natural process, though physical laws do not in any way explain it to us. And originating efficiency pervades the universe as mind pervades the human body. Professor Huxley's general principle is stated, in a form more closely related to our subject, by Bagehot: "The cause of types must be something outside the tribe acting on something within. . . . But what that something [within] is I do not know that any one can in the least explain."¹

The study of the action of environment upon this unexplained originating factor becomes, therefore, a large part of the science of history, just as the study of soils, plant food, and climatic condition becomes a large part of agriculture.

"The morals of men," it has been said, "are more governed by

¹ *Physics and Politics*, p. 184.

their pursuits than by their opinions." This very broad statement of a limited truth is specially applicable to the earliest stages of moral evolution. Morality exists in the beginning not in an abstract but in a concrete form. The sentiment of duty attaches itself to some particular person or interest. Right action is obedience or faithfulness to that person or interest. We have reason to believe that this feeling existed first toward the head of the family, extending, in a modified way, to all the members of it; and that in this we have the germ of that which, in the highest form, expresses itself as "loving the Lord thy God with all thy heart and thy neighbor as thyself." The expansion of this earliest, restricted form of duty was the outcome of changed circumstances. And if we follow Sir Henry Maine in tracing the growth of the family through successive aggregations into the gens, the tribe, and the commonwealth, we can recognize in the sentiment of loyalty and patriotism the moral relations of the family carried to a higher stage.

In the course of expansion, however, these have become in some respects changed. Each new aggregation has made life somewhat more complex. It has multiplied the relations of the individual, and, to some extent, differentiated responsibilities. The duty of one man is not the same as that of another. As this elaboration goes on, a foundation is laid for a great step forward in moral evolution. When duty has embodied itself in forms so unlike that the morality of one man seems to be the immorality of another, thinking minds take naturally to investigating the subject for the purpose of finding a principle common to both forms of activity; and this is the beginning of morality apprehended as a quality of mind, or governing principle, in distinction from a particular form of service. The performance of this task, simple as it may seem to us, could not in the first instance have been the work of an ordinary mind. He who first questioned the finality of the concrete forms of virtue, and essayed to teach it as a principle, must have been a great man, — a revealer of truth.

But no demonstration is needed to show that this earliest generalization would of necessity be a narrow one. Some one form of virtue, like loyalty to the state, would be paramount, and other virtues, so far as they had come into view, would be subordinated to this. That is, they would be emphasized or depressed just to that degree which the interests of the leading virtue seemed to require. Thus an *ideal* would be formed from a specific type of virtuous living; and this would differ greatly from another, per-

haps equally true, ideal, the abstract of a society fashioned by different outward conditions. This thought has been admirably stated by Lecky: "Although it cannot be said that any virtue is the negative of another, it is undoubtedly true that virtues are naturally grouped according to principles of affinity or congruity, which are essential to the unity of the type. The heroic, the amiable, the industrial, the intellectual virtues form in this manner distinct groups; and in some cases the development of one group is incompatible, not indeed with the existence, but with the prominence of others."¹ In early ages the heroic or military type would in most cases be the prevailing one.

Again we have to observe that, considered as an ideal, this well-defined type is imperfect, not simply because it is the reflex of a partially developed or specialized society, but, further, because it is the outcome of a generalization and of an abstraction. The principles that have been formulated are a deduction, not from *all*, but only from *some*, of a variety of actions performed under a variety of circumstances. They are, therefore, only approximations to the truth, which may be derived from the facts already evolved. In the case of a stationary environment, therefore, moral progress is possible, for the abstract morality, if it gain the attention of many individuals, is subjected to the test of a wider circle of social facts by the effort to embody it in actual life. And this effort brings to light the necessity of an expansion of that ideal of virtue that once seemed sufficiently complete.

But where there is also change of external environment the process may be greatly accelerated. When a nation that has been absorbed in the struggle for existence emerges at length into a season of calm weather, so that it is able to develop the arts and manners of peace, or when it has in the course of conflict penetrated other nations, and either absorbed them or established permanent communications with them, the way is opened for a great expansion of life and thought. New relations arise to which the old principles must somehow be adjusted; and a morality of far wider comprehensiveness and deeper insight is possible. This change of circumstances does not, however, alter the process. It only quickens it, and adds new materials. We may, I think, lay it down as a fundamental principle that *it is only when reason and experience interact freely upon each other that a normal progress in morality is possible.*

When life has widened and multiplied its relations, and the in-

¹ *History of European Morals*, i. 153.

sufficiency of its standards has been laid bare by some mind of exceptional moral insight, it is likely to be the case that some *one* thought, out of many that balanced each other in the discourse of the great man, the revealer of incompleteness, will be seized upon and pressed to an isolated and one-sided development. This thought may be a truth, but in its one-sidedness it is also an untruth. Most of the great ideas that have slowly embodied themselves in a higher morality have made their entrance into the world in this one-sided fashion. Thus when the traditional answer given to the question, "Who is my neighbor?" first under the family and then under the municipality, had become too narrow for the enlarged conceptions of Greece, the Cynics were ready with one that, properly modified, was true enough, but unmodified made society impossible. They proclaimed themselves citizens of the universe. But this was not enough. Carried away by the grandeur and novelty of their conception, they further declared, and with greater emphasis, that they were not morally citizens of the state which had hitherto commanded their allegiance. Thus through the reactions of conflict the *positive* principle of race sympathy and responsibility was almost lost sight of in the effort to establish the negative and false position that municipal patriotism was a prejudice, and love of the city an immoral sentiment.

From a purely logical point of view their position was by no means contemptible. Their positive principle was a broad and inspiring truth. Whatever interfered with its realization could easily be made to appear as the dictate of selfishness; and every modification of it might be demonstrated to be a base surrender to lower principles. Not, therefore, in the speculative reason, but by means of the inducting faculty applied to actual life was the correction of their fallacy to be sought. Only when it was recognized that practicability is a legitimate source of truth, and that there is a natural law of limitation in human affairs that is as sacred as any other law, could their great idea stand in any normal relation to society. Socrates, their intellectual father, had fully recognized and emphasized this law as a fundamental fact, while he insisted on the inductive method as an indispensable organ of truth. At a later day, the Stoics illustrated this method in a truer development of the Cynic idea. They accepted the larger thought as to human relations. They affirmed the brotherhood of all mankind. But they, at the same time, studied life in its actual developments for the modification and correction of their general principles. Defective, therefore, as Stoicism was, in its non-

recognition of good in the emotional nature, its conception of a *jus naturalis* — a moral order, to be discovered by studying actual life — was a truth of the first importance. It gained the acceptance of the ripest minds of its own age, and became fixed in the thought of the world by its adoption as the fundamental postulate of Roman law.

So much for the progressive factors in moral evolution. We must now turn to the other side of the process, and study that element which makes for permanency. The preservation of type is no less essential to development than the progressive principle of variation. Nothing in moral education is more justly emphasized than the necessity of fixed principles. For as in all physical nature the tendency to variation exposes the type and the organism to degeneration, so also in the moral sphere the mutability of moral conceptions is rightly esteemed their weakness. The most vulnerable point of any growing thing is that where growth, change, is going on most rapidly; and until the vital powers begin to be exhausted, the weakest period of life is that of the most rapid growth. It is dangerous to stimulate this function overmuch. To repress it altogether is to defeat the ends of existence. The conviction that progress must be continually aimed at and labored for is, therefore, a dangerous possession if it blind us to the equally important principle that stability in our moral conceptions is the indispensable condition of moral survival.

This latter necessity has, in the past, been far more generally recognized and consciously acted upon than the former. Sir Henry Maine affirms that the idea of progress which is so prominent an element in our moral creed at the present day is not an ordinary but a distinctly exceptional phenomenon in human thought.¹ Mr. Grote takes the same view; and Mr. Bagehot says: "Our habitual instructors, our ordinary conversation, our inevitable and ineradicable prejudices, tend to make us think that 'Progress' is the normal fact in human society, — the fact which we should expect to see; the fact which we should be surprised if we did not see. But history refutes this. The ancients had no conception of progress; they did not so much as *reject* the idea; they did not even entertain it."²

The same writer has given a further development to this thought, in showing that the one great necessity of ancient nations was the formation of that which he calls "a cake of custom," a firmly

¹ *Ancient Law*, ii. 22, 23.

² *Physics and Politics*, p. 41.

cemented organization, by which individuals should be held together and enabled to move in the conflicts of life as one man. What the woody fibre is to the tree, that the cake of custom was to nations that held their own in the world. Toward this end, therefore, all progress during the earliest ages of growth tended. In this it found its satisfaction and termination. Families and groups of families that did not succeed in this did not succeed at all. Natural selection made an end of them.

What we may gather from history, then, is this. Every nation had an age of progress, at some time in the past, during which it achieved this first and most difficult step. But, having accomplished this, its progress was, generally speaking, arrested. In other words, the next most difficult thing after forming the cake of custom was to break it. And as existence was possible within the limits of this custom-formed organization, and exceedingly hazardous outside of it, everything tended to confirm and petrify ideas in specific forms. This fact of early history, which throws so much light on political development, is equally instructive in the study of morals and religion.

The same pressure of external circumstances that made men politically unprogressive made them at the same time religiously so. In fact, the two spheres were in early ages one. Government lived by religious sanctions. It found in these the one effective agency for controlling the eccentric tendencies of rude men, and the one cohesive principle by which it could hold them together. The head of the ancient family was invested with authority and sanctity not simply or chiefly as its progenitor. He was above all things else its king and priest. The power with which the imagination invested him and the sense of duty which fastened itself upon him had an almost purely religious origin. When he ceased by death to be the priest of the family he became its god. At a later date, when families sprung from a common ancestor became united as a gens, a tribe, or a city, there was no essential change in this primitive conception, though there was an extension of it. The chief of the tribe, the king of the city, was still the priest. Divinity hedged him about. He had no need of material force; he had neither army nor treasury; but, sustained by a faith that had a powerful influence over the mind, his authority was sacred and inviolable.¹ So also was the whole system of things. The king, no less than the people whom he ruled, was fixed in the iron grasp of beliefs consecrated by the adhesion of

¹ *The Ancient City.* By Fustel De Coulanges.

untold generations. It is easy to see how under such a *régime* the ordinary sense of duty would be called forth solely in defense of that which was inherited, that which was known to be ancient. Innovation was an act of impiety not for a moment to be tolerated. It demanded more than opposition; there must be expiation, lest the anger of the gods should fall on the city that permitted the man of ideas to live.

How this inviolable order came to be broken through and finally superseded in the case of Greece and Rome is one of the most deeply interesting stories the world has to tell. But we cannot enter upon it here. As to the process, it may be said in a general way that the irrepressible originality of the Greek mind represents the internal initiating factor, and that the Roman conquest was the most prominent among the external. The general outcome of it was free thought underneath an external respect for the observances of state religion.

The uses made of this liberty were as various as are the tendencies of human nature, but in the diversity there were certain well-defined currents. With that great stream of tendency that swept toward sensuality we have nothing to do. This was the plunge into degeneration and extinction that ever waits the breaking-up of a society that has leaned hard on external supports. What we are concerned with is the career of those vital principles that worked the disintegration of the old order.

Before Socrates, it has been said, "men never thought of a duty except as a command of the ancient gods." He separated morals from religion, by teaching that the principle of duty is in the human mind, and that the concrete forms of duty must be ascertained by a diligent study of the relations of actual life. This separation was progressively wrought out during five centuries. In the course of it some few minds tried to keep their hold on religion by elevating the conception of it to correspond with an expanding morality. But for the most part religion remained stationary, while ethics developed away from and in antagonism to it.

In the enthusiasm of a new intellectual life philosophers were confident of the ability of man to stand alone. The established conception of the gods was so far below their apprehension of the ideal man as to seem hopelessly out of relation to it. But as thought and life moved on it became more and more evident that morality could not stand alone, — that its truths, though elevating and unmistakable, were, without God, things separated from the

vital element of the universe. Stoicism had moral and intellectual treasures of great value. Epicureanism had the same. But somehow both were like cleverly constructed machines that will not work. The stream of energy that moves the world could not be made to enter them.

Then, when it was clearly seen that morality without religion is morality without life, a seeking after God ensued. Men began to search diligently among the ruins of their old conceptions for some germinal grain of truth that might be quickened in the embrace of a higher morality, some forgotten and overlaid spring of the water of life that should make the empty veins of their ethical systems throb again. By the idealization of popular conceptions their poets labored to construct a God that should satisfy the conditions of their higher human creed. "As regards the educated classes," says Uhlhorn, "we may perhaps come to this conclusion: faith in the gods of the old religions had disappeared. . . . The majority substituted a kind of monotheism. They imagined something godlike above the gods, a divine first principle, or at least they had a presentiment of this without clearly discerning it, and especially without being able definitely to distinguish it from the world. This dissolving polytheism led naturally to pantheism."¹ But all was unsatisfactory. The cry of earnest seekers after religious truth in that period was like that of some bewildered souls in our own age: —

"I falter where I firmly trod,
And falling with my weight of cares
Upon the great world's altar-stairs
That slope through darkness up to God,

"I stretch lame hands of faith, and grope,
And gather dust and chaff, and call
To what I feel is Lord of all,
And faintly trust the larger hope."

And this attitude of mind, this hungering and thirsting after a God of righteousness, this exacting moral sense, refusing to be fed with shams, was of all things in that proud old Roman world the rarest and the most precious. For this was the condition of a higher type of humanity. It was the gaping matrix into which was to fall a germ of spiritual life prepared and watched over by that God who seeks men while they are seeking Him.

What Greco-Roman culture with all its philosophy and poetry could not produce for itself, that it was ready to receive. So hum-

¹ *Conflict of Christianity with Heathenism*, p. 51.

ble had it become in its need that, while conquering the world, it could stoop to ask a religion from any nation that had anything satisfactory to offer. The earnestness and depth of this feeling is powerfully manifested in the zeal with which multitudes devoted themselves to the severely ascetic discipline of the god Mithras. This was a progressive cult with many degrees of consecration. Its disciplines included the rack, horrors, flagellations, standing and lying in ice and snow sometimes for twenty days at a time. "They were so severe, that many lost their lives in them. Yet great numbers, including nobles, and even emperors, pressed forward for the privilege of becoming warriors of Mithras."¹

Not less remarkable was the attitude of many toward the religion of a people who beyond all others were the objects of hatred and contempt. The Jews, with the synagogue and the Greek translation of the Old Testament, were established in almost every city of the empire, and around them had gathered many who recognized, in the God of the moral law, the prophets, and the psalms, that which they were seeking. In these, the proselytes of the gate, "devout persons," as they are called in the New Testament, we have the first indications of the new type that is to be. This is the true Israel accepting the higher and purer thought of God enshrined in Judaism, and ready for the fuller revelation of Christianity. Their position is unique. They do not become Jews. They reject just that part of Judaism that Christ rejected; and they assimilate, by the selective instinct of normal spiritual wants, just those elements that the Old Testament has in common with the New. The beginnings of things are apt to be obscure. They are often small and therefore overlooked as insignificant. But they are of all things the most important. It will, therefore, be worth our while to study this phenomenon, that we may understand, so far as may be, the nature of the adjustments that produced it. Let us scrutinize first the want that is to be met.

The thought of the age had, as we have seen, worked itself free from polytheism. It had achieved a speculative monotheism. But in the process it had emptied the thought of God of almost every characteristic. He was the all-pervading and most adorable essence of things; the energy and life of the world. But the face of this imposing idealization was a blank. It had neither eyes to behold nor ears to hear. It was a god afar off and not a god near at hand. It was as difficult to associate it with morality as with the love and joy and sorrow of the human

¹ Uhlhorn, p. 324.

heart. Every effort to reach a conception that brought God near to the creature seemed the destruction of the greater thought, and a return to the little gods of polytheism. This insurmountable difficulty led Varro, "the most learned of the Romans," to assume the necessity of three kinds of religion, — one for the poets, another for the philosophers, and a third for the people. How did Judaism solve this problem?

Did it disclose a deity in whom there were no conflicting attributes? On the contrary, it offered a conception of God made up of those very elements that the philosophers and poets of heathendom had deemed mutually exclusive. It proclaimed one God, the infinite, all-embracing power, the comprehensive intelligence of the universe, who is at the same time the intimate of every human soul. The Hebrew prophets made no effort to harmonize these conceptions. The difficulties that beset the philosophers had for them no existence. They not only affirmed these antithetical aspects of the divine character without qualification or explanation, but they continually associated them in the most startling contrasts.

"Thus saith the High and Lofty One that inhabiteth eternity, whose name is Holy; I dwell in the high and holy place, with him also that is of a contrite and humble spirit." "Thus saith the Lord, the heaven is my throne, and the earth is my footstool. Where is the house that ye build me? and where is the place of my rest? For all these things hath my hand made; and all these things have been, saith the Lord: but to this man will I look, even to him that is poor and of a contrite spirit, and that trembleth at my word." The exaltation of God does not make Him oblivious of the thoughts and motives of the heart. "The Lord is in his holy temple; the Lord's throne is in heaven: His eyes behold, his eyelids try the children of men." He is above all things the author, the upholder, and the embodiment of morality. He and He alone represents the highest ideal of righteousness possible to the conception of man. Where, then, shall we say was the relief? Is ignoring the difficulty equivalent to a solution of it? Isaac Taylor, in allusion to this antithetical characteristic of Hebrew theology, truly remarks: "The theistic affirmations that are scattered throughout the books of the Old Testament are not susceptible of a synthetic adjustment by any rule of logical distribution."¹ The relief, therefore, does not lie altogether in the results. Let us, then, look at the method.

¹ *The Spirit of the Hebrew Poetry.*

Let us make the hypothesis that the secret of the power and sufficiency of this religion lies in the fact that its methods are so adjusted to the human consciousness as to produce *conviction*, — conviction with regard to truths which by different methods had been and could be grasped only speculatively. I am aware that there is nothing novel in this supposition. It underlies an explanation of the problem with which we have been made familiar; namely, that the power of the prophets resides primarily in the tone of absolute authority which they assumed, as the direct and irresponsible mouthpieces of God. But in this, it seems to me, we have been in the habit of stopping short in the application of a true principle. Authority was nothing new in the ancient world. The very substratum and essence of society was, as we have seen, absolutism in the name of God. The Jews had no more of it than others. The free spirit of inquiry that had made a place for itself in the Greek mind had been achieved after a prolonged conflict against this authority. It, like freedom in all ages, had been bought with a great price. It had come through much tribulation. To ascribe the power of the prophets, in an age of free thought, to this source, therefore, is simply to refer it to a chance in the intellectual oscillations of the time. In accordance with the law of reaction, we must say, minds that had become weary of their liberty were thrown back into the arms of that special form of absolutism that presented itself at the opportune moment. In a word, to magnify this element of authority in the production of the phenomena before us is to obscure that which is distinctive by preoccupying the mind with that which is not.

That the utterances of the prophets were authoritative while those of the philosophers were hesitating is without question an important fact. But this is not the contrast that carries us to the root of the matter. What we want to find out is, wherein lies the essential difference between the authority of the higher Hebrew faith, and that of the lower organized religions from which the thought of this age had won its freedom? To find this we must make a further hypothesis. It shall be this: The difference between these two authorities is to be found in the sources from which they respectively originate. The absolutism brought to bear on the soul by a humanly organized religion is from an external source. That of the prophets proceeds from within. What Socrates did for morality by transferring the seat of it from the external authority of priests to the soul itself, that the Hebrew

prophets did for theology when they found God within them. The Greek thinkers had applied the principles of a subjective philosophy to the first department, but not to the second. God was to them something external, to be reached, if at all, by a synthesis of their fragments of truth in a region external to the human soul. "In no Greek writer, in none anterior to the diffusion of the gospel, are there to be found any rudiments whatever — any mere fragments, however small — of that life of the soul toward God, and of that divine correspondence with man, which in every psalm, in every page of the prophets, shines, burns, rules with force."¹

The inspired Hebrew, equally with the Greek philosopher, assumes that God in his absolute essence is unknowable and unapproachable. "Canst thou by searching find out God? Canst thou find out the Almighty unto perfection? It is as high as heaven; what canst thou do? deeper than hell, what canst thou know?" "Such knowledge is too wonderful for me; it is high: I cannot attain unto it." But the human spirit may be known, and God may be known through it. "Thou shalt find him if thou seek for him with all thy heart and with all thy soul." In so far as the soul becomes truly conscious of itself, just to that extent may it become conscious of its relations to God and of his relations to it. This is not to make the human soul the measure of God. It can know only in part. It is partially developed. It reaches out and becomes conscious, now on this side, and now on that. God, therefore, while He can be known truly, can be known only in parts, — manifoldly. Aspects of his character as related to the growing human soul may be progressively apprehended. Here, then, we have a theological method that is not divorced from the ethical method. The one cannot outgrow the other. God is discovered where morality has been discovered, — in the soul of man. "Know thyself" is the starting point of theology as of ethics.

But at this point we may be challenged. How can the soul of man be the authority for the existence of a being external to itself, of which it has no outward sensible evidence? Can a God known in the soul be authoritatively declared as a God distinct from the soul? Have we any evidence of an externality other than that with which our senses make us acquainted? We certainly have. We have no ground for our belief in the existence of the outside, material world, except we assume the truth of the mind itself. And this same mind obliges us to assume, also, an

¹ *The Spirit of the Hebrew Poetry*, p. 312.

objective world distinct from the things of sense, — a not-ourselves on the side of the unseen, the unheard, the untouched, — an externality extending toward the source from whence all energy flows.

What the nature of this objective power may be, or what relations we sustain to it, neither the senses, nor the logical faculty working upon data which the senses afford, can clearly make known to us. Inferences, probabilities, bear the mind powerfully, now in one direction and now in another, and the result is a *maze*, in which personality melts into pantheism. Yet from out this pantheistic maze personality still haunts us. Look squarely at it, there is nothing. Turn from it, and the Eternal is there again bending over us and moving us. But where the intellect fails, there the concentrated rays of a quickened moral consciousness give light. The dark track of causation is illuminated, and we are face to face with a Personality touching ours. As a God afar off we could, through the logical faculty, know *of* Him. But through the medium of the moral consciousness we *know* Him. We know Him as a voice crying in the wilderness of our hearts, "Prepare ye the way of the Lord."

The prophets heard this voice as no other men ever had; and it was a fire within them till they proclaimed it to others. To open this living way between God and man is the distinctive office of the prophet. He does not try to exhibit the Almighty to the eyes of the logical reason. He does not prescribe external moulds into which the thought of Him must be run. He declares and strives to draw out in others that witness for the truth which, from the side of God, is forever pressing its claims in the face of conflicting influences, both inward and outward. "Wherewith shall I come before the Lord and bow myself before the high God? Shall I come before Him with burnt-offerings, with calves of a year old? Will the Lord be pleased with thousands of rams, or with ten thousands of rivers of oil? Shall I give my first-born for my transgression, the fruit of my body for the sin of my soul?" There speaks the very spirit of heathen religion. It is the voice of the unenthralled worshiper seeking the direction of a humanly organized infallibility. How does the prophet answer it? "*He* hath showed thee, O man, what is good; and what doth the Lord require of thee, but to do justly, and to love mercy, and to walk humbly with thy God."

It is not easy to define inspiration, perhaps it is unwise to try to define it. But in the prophets of the Hebrew Scriptures we have

the thing itself. In these writers the consciousness of God realizes itself to a degree which is absolutely unique. They know God. Their utterances are their experiences. He has spoken in their souls. They see clearly and with certainty that which others have beheld only vaguely. And as the scattered, incoherent thoughts of a mind that has sought in vain the solution of an intellectual problem rush together and become organic at the touch of a true explanation, so the ineffectual reachings of the mind after God are merged in *conviction* through the sincere, unsophisticated utterances of souls in which God has truly manifested himself. In the inspiration of the prophets there is nothing contrary to nature. It is simply nature at its highest. It is the prophetic embodiment of the new creature, — of the new type which struggles for supremacy.

One of the greatest possible mistakes is often made by those who attempt to apply the principles of evolution to the Hebrew literature, when they assume the utterances of the prophets to have been merely the outcome of the national consciousness. It is the blunder of those who in the physical world have tried to make antecedently known factors account for everything. The prophets cannot be thus accounted for. More than elsewhere that element in human evolution which initiates variation, that mysterious, separate, transcendental power that comes into the world like a spirit from another realm, manifested itself in the Hebrew prophet.

In other literatures there is abundant evidence of process. But for more than a thousand years the Hebrew poetry, without passing through any known period of infancy or of decline, up to the close of the prophetic record, keeps unchanged its tone of lofty isolation. From the very beginning the prophets are a higher element, unique in the nation, unique in the history of the world. Anticipating, as they do, in the rudest ages, the latest results of social development, they are an inexplicable enigma to those who fail to recognize the reality and the greatness of the creative factor in evolution. "Where," asks Dean Church, in speaking of the Psalms, "in those rough, cruel days did they come from, those piercing, lightning-like gleams of strange, spiritual truth, those magnificent outlooks over the kingdom of God, those raptures at his presence and his glory, those wonderful disclosures of self-knowledge, those pure outpourings of the love of God?" Where, indeed, but from God himself? It is vain to look in the contemporaneous life for their sources. It is useless to try to

bridge the moral chasm that separates them from the Book of Judges. They are out of relation to the historic development of the nation. They are at an immeasurable height above it. As Christ was above his generation, so were the men who uttered these thoughts above theirs.

Assuming now that a higher element has entered the world, an element which we may call *God-consciousness*, our next inquiry shall be as to its career. What, from an evolutionary point of view, ought this to be? Let us briefly gather up our postulates with regard to its nature. Moral consciousness came to the human race as a gift. The inspired outbursts of the prophets in God-consciousness are of the same nature. We know nothing of an antecedent process that can fully account for either. Whether there has been such a process of intermediate causation or not the conclusion as to the origin of this higher element is the same. It is in no sense the achievement of the human mind. It is from God. Secondly, moral consciousness, as given to the race, is of the nature of a talent to be improved. So, also, is the God-consciousness.

The recognition of God in the soul may be confined to particular moments or crises in the experiences of men, or it may be extended as a habit to the whole life. It may be intensely real or it may be vague and shadowy. It may be a narrow consciousness, the outcome of a narrow life, or it may be a constantly widening, progressively comprehensive knowledge of God, embracing elements contributed from every department of thought and activity. Whether it shall be this or that — the transient or the abiding, the clearly defined or the shadowy, the narrow or the expansive — will depend, in part, upon what is done *for* a man through original endowment and environment; but it will also depend upon what he does for himself. What comes to him without effort is blessed only in and through effort of his own. "Whosoever hath, to him shall be given."

Effort, as related to the consciousness of God, reaches out in three directions, corresponding to man's threefold consciousness. There must be intellectual, social, spiritual activity. There must be doctrine, life, and communion with God. This last-mentioned activity, which includes prayer, is dependent on the other two for its health. Just as nerve force in the physical organism is dependent upon the muscular and alimentary systems, so our personal relations to God are normal in proportion as thought and social intercourse are normal. Or, to put it in another but cognate

form, the truest consciousness of God can be attained only when reason and experience react freely upon each other in the application and development of the inspired writings.

When reason acts alone, and assumes to present to the intellect in an absolute systematic form those intuitions of God that have come to us clothed in the lofty utterances of the prophets, it falls into error as certainly as when it commits itself to independent theorizing in any other department. A metaphysical theology that strives to translate the figures of revelation into the terms of a scientific dialect arrives at substantially the same results that the unaided reason attained under paganism. The tendency is always to some form of pantheism or dualism. This is not the fault of the data, nor the fault of the reason; it is the result of a false method,—of the application of reason to the working-out of problems which it cannot by itself master.

What, then, are the results arrived at by the true method,—that which, consciously or unconsciously, bends from logic to the necessities of human life? Do we reach a perfected final system by its use? We certainly do not, any more than in the development of morals. The systematized form in the one case as in the other is only an approximation to the truth. It is necessarily one-sided, because it bears the impress of the imperfectly developed society to the wants of which it is adapted. Those who have framed systems of practical theology have, more or less designedly, proportioned them to the real or supposed needs of the society in which they found themselves. This was unavoidable; it was useful, but it could not lead to anything absolute.

We have seen that the effort to present men with an absolute idea of morality resulted in the enthronement of some one virtue like patriotism, and the subjection of other virtues with reference to it. Just so attempts to systematize theology, to set forth the mutual relation of its truths, in forms that should serve the need of the church militant, at different stages of its career, have in every case produced an emphasized development of some one aspect of God's character and a corresponding subordination of other attributes. But the tendency to regard such an adjustment of inspired truth as perfect and final is at times irresistible. Hostile influences which threaten its overthrow or its modification act as a solidifying press to harden into permanent forms combinations of truth that are only relatively true. Custom helps to drape these forms with the semblance of divine authority, and surrounds them with the woes that stand sentinel over the transgression of the moral law.

But the Bible contains within itself vital principles of growth; and these when times are suitable have power to break through the deposits of custom and authority, be they never so deeply incrustated. The penetrating, wide-reaching morality of the New Testament, slowly and imperfectly as it has realized itself in the world, yet evermore presses for realization. The duty of loving one's neighbor and even one's enemy, of forgiving till seventy times seven, and on the other hand the wickedness of a vindictive spirit, the depravity of an egoism that is indifferent to the sufferings of others, or that knowingly makes use of them for interest or self-glorification, — these truths continually urged upon the attention have resulted in a profound modification of our institutions, and in a still more marked elevation of our ideals of virtue as between man and man. The mind that has been formed on Christian conceptions is outraged at the commission of acts of cruelty and injustice that in a former age would have excited no attention. And the reaction which this change of view produces upon our thought of God is as necessary as it is inevitable.

I say it is necessary, because otherwise we are threatened with the same gulf between morality and God that in the highest classic thought made a belief in the traditional gods impossible. If an authoritative theology takes its immovable stand upon a conception of God lower than the highest moral ideal of a community, it loses, and ought to lose, the support of the best part of that community. It is not only deficient, it is a positive and perennial source of degeneration. It works for immorality and irreligion. It stands in the same relation to the moral ideal that the low conceptions of the people that knew not Jehovah bore to the higher thought of the prophets. But are we then to give up the God of the Scriptures? Not so, we are to search them anew in the light of our acquired experience. And the result will be this. When we seek for Him with all the heart we shall find there the God of our moral ideal. We shall discover that we have been in the habit of reading the Bible through the medium of a system of doctrine elaborated from it to meet the real or supposed wants of another age. Passages not in harmony with this have appealed to eyes that see not and to ears that hear not. After a little examination they have been disregarded, classed as things hard to be understood, pitched as it were into the mind's waste-basket. But now the things hard to be understood become luminous, they expand and support each other, they develop under the ardor of pursuit and the fascination of discovery; and very probably the

impetus acquired will cause the awakened mind to overshoot the mark. But so long as the principle of progress through the free play of thought and experience in the development of the written word is adhered to this extreme is sure of correction.

But it will be said, "This plan of interpreting the Bible through experience is only another name for finding our own thoughts in it, making it mean what it pleases us to have it mean." If the demand of the highest moral ideal developed under the inspiration of Christianity is identical with that which we desire to find in the Bible, the criticism is a justification of the method; if not, it is irrelevant. And further, it must be said that no system of theology ever has been or can be formed that is not open to this same objection. Every scheme of doctrine assuming to be drawn from the Bible has been dominated by the moral ideal of its age, and more or less consciously adjusted to it. And, when the advocates of a creed that insists upon the literalness of those figures of Scripture which present God in the most awful but according to human standards immoral light justify this insistence on the ground of the necessity of this presentation as a stimulus to the fears of men, they ground their interpretation of Scripture upon this very principle. They find in the Bible that which the interests of men, in their view, require them to find. They elevate one doctrine and depress another as their experience dictates.

But is there any Scriptural warrant for this coördination of experience with reason in the study of the truths of revelation? It seems to me that such an employment of experience is not only permitted by Christ, but that it is specially prescribed by Him as the indispensable and necessary organ of truth. He does not ignore the intellect. His own discourses and those of the apostles powerfully evoke the reason and the imagination. But for the regulative, modifying, confirming principle He directs us to the concrete embodiment of doctrine in life. "If any man willeth to do his will, he shall know of the teaching." For the proof of his own genuineness He appealed to the harmony of his works with those of God. "My Father worketh hitherto and I work." "If I do not the works of my Father believe me not." "*I am the way, the truth, and the life.*"

Still more clearly does the experience of a progressive life appear as the measure and test of doctrine when we consider the human embodiments through which God has authorized us to study Him. He has pointed us to a human relationship as affording the most complete expression of himself as related to us. The

varied and apparently conflicting aspects of his character that no logical process can harmonize, that must ever antagonize each other in any purely intellectual portrayal of his personality, admit of a perfect synthesis in and through our knowledge of fatherhood. An ideal fatherhood can no more be exhaustively described in scientific terms than the character of God can be described. No one can know it except through experience. It is a concrete idea that can be reduced to its elements only by the destruction of that which is most vital in it.

Now, is this conception of fatherhood a fixed, perfected thing, or is it a moving, developing thing? We have only to look about us to answer the question. And a glance backward into history will show us that the word "father" has represented to men in different stages of society conceptions very wide apart. In the old Roman ideal we have the most striking portrayal of this relationship as absolute sovereignty. It was the prerogative of a Roman father to accept or to reject his legitimate children at birth. If he received a son, he received him as his property. While the father lived the son continued to be a minor. He could own nothing. He could acquire nothing. If a will was made in his favor by a stranger, his father received the legacy. The father could at any time sell the son, if it pleased him to do so. The father was the judge of the son, and from his jurisdiction there was no appeal. As judge he might condemn him to death.¹ The same conception of the absolute property of a father in his child is forcibly illustrated in the history of Abraham. That the natural love of a father's heart existed in the Roman and in the patriarch we may not doubt. But it is not difficult to see how this would be obscured and in many cases lost sight of under so one-sided a conception. It was a condition of things most favorable to the production of filial fear and cold reverence, but love had little chance to grow in such an atmosphere. "Of all the forms of virtue," says Lecky, "filial affection is perhaps that which appears most rarely in Roman history."²

Now, it is true that departure from this primitive conception is not certainly in the line of progress to something truer. This rigid, severe type has its justification in nature. It is a true development of one side of fatherhood, one that was not confined to ancient times, but which, in spirit, continually reappears in history. A change from it may be of the nature of extreme reaction.

¹ *The Ancient City*, Book ii., chap. viii.

² *History of European Morals*, i. 299.

There is a soft, limp type of paternity which lacks every element of morality. What is to prevent men from taking this as the expression of the Almighty Father? If a special confirmation from Scripture is sought for, it can be found. By the segregation of some of the most beautiful passages of the Bible, like the parable of the Prodigal Son, and the 103d Psalm, plausible data are at hand for the portraiture of an easy-going, weakly forgiving father.

How is it, then, that so fundamental and all-determining an element of truth as the conception of God has been committed to such a shifting and uncertain embodiment as that of fatherhood? We should indeed be lost in a puzzle of uncertainty were it not for the other principle of progressive knowledge. It is only when the constructive reason brings together all the rays of divine manifestation and passes them through the authorized medium of the purest human relationship that we arrive at the closest approximation to the knowledge of God's character that is possible at any given stage of social development. The severer aspects cannot be left out of the conception. Nature and revelation unite to compel their inclusion. And the course of development downward in any society that ignores them is the demonstration of the fatuity of the one-sided construction. But these severer aspects reach us in a radically changed form when they come through the medium of a father's love. This does not, indeed, explain everything satisfactorily to the intellect, but it takes the crude, hard, extreme conceptions which the intellect presents, sifts, fuses, purifies, re-creates these, and gives them back in a concrete, living form, that we can accept.

There is no end to the interaction of these two organs of truth. Living experience is continually carrying us to a position in advance of our formulated doctrines and compels their modification. But revelation as interpreted by reason, though flexible, is not indefinitely so. It is not mere material to be worked upon. It is also powerfully formative and controlling. Neither element is independent of the other. But by their continual reaction upon each other they bring us into an ever wider and clearer consciousness of God as our Father and infinitely wise Educator, working about us and within us, — a God hating iniquity, but whose mercy is over all his works; — a Father whose very essence is love, but who is none the less unflinching in the application of discipline.

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EDITORIAL.

THE PROPER LIMITS OF LUXURY.

A STYLE of living which goes beyond the uses of bare necessity brings perplexing questions to every conscientious person. To have and enjoy what one can do without is to choose one use of money rather than another use. Such choice, if it is made at all intelligently, has in view one's relations and obligations to those about him. The conditions of the needy, the straitened circumstances of those who manage only to earn a subsistence, the social reciprocities of one's own class, the tendencies which a self-indulgent use of wealth encourages, the work of the church in carrying the gospel through the earth, must be considered, when one is deciding on the extent to which he may enlarge the uses and enjoyments of his life, beyond what he must have, out into what he may have. Whether the margin of opportunity is wide or narrow, whether necessary uses require only a fragment or all but a fragment of the income, there is need for a wide knowledge of the times, and an honest determination to make wise use of surplus means.

The annual season of recreation gives peculiar occasion for comparison of views on the proper limits of luxury, because money is then more freely spent for purposes of enjoyment, and because people from different sections of the country, with their various habits of expenditure, are brought together in friendly relations. At such a time the question arises, how people can spend so much money on that which pleases taste, and heightens personal enjoyment, while want, suffering, and sin are crying out for relief. And is it right for one to purchase pictures, bric-a-brac, expensive furniture, to drive, ride, entertain, when money is sorely needed to enlighten and evangelize the world? Yet where shall the line be drawn? One should not dwell within bare walls, nor subsist on oatmeal and salt fish, nor wear threadbare clothing, nor decline to extend and receive hospitality, nor shut himself up in a treadmill of work, with no respite for pleasure. Modern life should not be pushed back into primitive conditions. We cannot become savages, nor frontiersmen, nor Shakers, nor hermits.

Christianity cannot be separated from the civilization which it has produced. The secondary results of the gospel in education, refinement, society, art, do not conflict with the salvation of the individual, but are part of it. The reason perplexity arises concerning the limits of luxury is because it is difficult, first, to understand the indirect results of Christianity, and then to render intelligently a personal contribution to them. And yet wise and conscientious decisions concerning one's duty and opportunity in this respect are of untold importance for his own character and for the progress of the gospel.

There are, first, certain considerations of a general sort which pertain to the demand for luxuries, and which properly precede any suggestions concerning the duty of the individual.

It is to be remembered that money spent on luxuries, even with extravagance, is not entirely wasted. The individual who purchases the enjoyment may seem to have gained no appreciable good, but the money when it goes from him flows in other channels where it may be serviceable. Extravagance distributes wealth. A discussion was carried on last year in the London papers on occasion of the expenditure of several thousands of pounds for flowers by a gentleman who gave an entertainment. It was urged as an offset to the extravagance that the money went to florists and gardeners, that the liberal demand for flowers sustains a healthy industry in which many persons are employed. A rich woman buys expensive laces which she could do without, but at any rate some part of the price goes to needlewomen. It is said that working-people make less objection to a man who spends than to a man who hoards his wealth, because they are aware that lavish expenditure creates employment for labor and sale for products.

It is also to be remembered that wealth which can be used for good ends is produced largely by reason of the advance which has been made beyond the line of mere necessity. Subtract from the mass of labor all those manufactures, handicrafts, employments of direct production, with the consequent occupations of exchange and transportation of merchandise, which provide luxuries, and there would disappear skilled pursuits of many kinds, such as cabinet-making, upholstery, brass-working, carving, manufacture of silk, linen, velvet, jewelry, china, carriages, pianos, etc., etc., to say nothing of the occupations of artists, musicians, and authors. Wealth is possible only from diversified industries, and there can be no sufficient diversity if life is reduced to the minimum of sheer necessity. It is better that some individuals should be wasteful than that demand and supply of luxuries should be abolished. The many live now as the few lived a century ago. What was then luxury is now necessity. In many respects the average home of to-day is equal to the exceptionally favored home of the past. Increase of wants is progress; for progress is enrichment and multiplication of wants. Increase of wants and increase of wealth beget each other. Therefore, that surplus of means which this or that person expends on luxuries, while he is doubtful about the rightfulness of enjoying any luxury, is his to expend only because there is a constant demand for luxuries. If all in the prosperous classes should devote the money now spent on luxuries to the direct support of benevolent and religious societies, in an incredibly short time they would have no money either to give or to spend, for they would destroy the conditions on which the very existence of wealth depends.

The question is whether the church shall have a spire. The spire does not keep out the rain nor heat nor cold. In this world of poverty, suffering, wickedness, why spend money on a church spire? But if the place

where rich and poor meet together should be beautified, so may the home be adorned and the life refined. The prophet did not criticise the people for dwelling in ceiled houses, but for their inconsistency in neglecting to build a stately and beautiful house of worship. And so the question is not about having a spire, but about the kind of spire, not about the enjoyment of luxuries, but about the proper enjoyment of luxuries. Beauty and luxury are legitimate. The precious vase of ointment was not wasted, although it might have been — but was not — sold for three hundred pence and given to the poor.

There are, then, some definite rules by which each person may guide those expenditures which are not determined by necessity. These rules or suggestions are appropriate to all persons who have a controllable margin of income.

Every one should have a good end in view. He may have only indifferent success in accomplishing the end, but it is a rule of universal application that some worthy end should be sought. One should not be satisfied to do as he does merely because others do so; for he would then be a slave to customs which he has not taken the pains to examine and judge. He should not try to maintain a certain style of living for the sake of display, to make an impression on acquaintances. It is not necessary that every detail of outlay shall be brought to the testing, but the general scale and standard of his establishment should be determined by its fitness to promote some good end. Directly or indirectly, the welfare of his fellow-men should be his object. His possession of luxuries should contribute to the strengthening of the Redeemer's kingdom. The ointment may be poured out, — upon the Saviour's head.

Another rule is that outlay in the interests of taste and refinement should not be disproportionate to gifts of benevolence. To spend lavishly on equipage, house, dress, travel, and to give little or nothing for great philanthropic and religious enterprises, is an inconsistency so glaring that even the one guilty of it cannot be unaware of it. One man spends a thousand dollars on a fine painting and is to be applauded, because while he thus brings beauty into his home, he also gives a thousand dollars in direct ministration. But another man buys an expensive painting and is not to be applauded, because, while he beautifies the home, he pleads off from every request for needed gifts, or grudgingly gives a sum ridiculously small. One is not conscientious who excuses himself from giving on account of his great expenses, when those expenses are chiefly for luxuries, and when he does not hesitate to make new outlays for himself and his family. No such rule can be adopted as that precisely so much, or twice, or half so much shall be given away as is expended on luxuries, but a fair measure of equality can be maintained between luxury and generosity.

Another rule is, so to refine and enrich the home that children shall at the same time be influenced for good by the attractions of home, and also be prepared for the difficult and responsible tasks of later life. It is

common to ascribe the easy or doubtful morals of some persons to reaction from the strict religious training of their childhood, and no doubt a severity which was unmingled with gentleness was much at fault. But children have broken loose from high standards of conduct more on account of the poverty of home life on the side of beauty and enjoyment than by reason of undue extremes in religious teaching and example. Homes without books, without pictures, without comfortable seats, without amusements, without hospitality, homes distinguished chiefly for economy of furnishing, decoration, table, dress, were worse than places destitute of attraction. They were fruitful sources of evil, of widening alienation between parents and children, of repulsion to other places of amusement and good fellowship. A good deal of money may be judiciously invested in a roomy, handsome house, ample grounds, tasteful decorations, profusion of books and periodicals, choice and expensive paintings, the entertainment of friends, social leadership. When money can be commanded, it is immoral to surround children with hair-cloth furniture, unadorned walls, hideous carpets: to have them sit at table in silence, meeting no guests, and with no reading but the daily newspaper, the denominational weekly, and the "Farmer's Journal." The other extreme is equally bad: to build and furnish a house only with a view to great entertainments, but without providing a cozy, comfortable centre anywhere. One of the most noticeable gains of the last decade is the improvement in household decoration. Whereas formerly ugliness and tiresome uniformity were the rule, and it was difficult to find materials for a tasteful interior, now for a moderate outlay the most pleasing effects can be produced in color, form, and combination.

But care must be taken that children are not unfitted for the hard work of the future by the ease and luxury of domestic, and by the extravagance of social, life. So much may be done for young people that they will become incapable of doing anything for themselves. Health may be undermined by too rich and various a table. Habits of luxury in dress, personal expenditure, equipage, and home may unfit them for the simpler conditions of self-support. Not the least anxiety of some wealthy parents is the fear that their children will be pampered by too much softness, made effeminate by indulgence, and become nobodies. There may be too much education, a prolongation of the years of study into the time when a boy should be making his own way, while a luxurious home is the base upon which he is always falling back.

Another rule is to encourage the simple, dignified, real, instead of the artificial and showy. In this respect existing tendencies are favorable. The exaggerated value which has been set upon mere wealth and its accompanying display is declining in favor of other and more trustworthy standards of merit. Fortunately, parade and ostentation are not good form. Wealth can no longer give *carte blanche* to architects, artists, upholsterers, caterers. The ideas and taste of the owner must appear in the new house, the furnishings, the decorations, the entertainments.

There must be something characteristic throughout, and in the direction of quietness, unobtrusiveness, reality. Wealthy people wish to be distinguished for other reasons than because they have a pot of money. It is coming to be felt that in spite of its purchasing power, the possession of money is the very cheapest distinction. The rich man identifies himself with a reform, is a patron of a college, is a collector of rare books or etchings, initiates some social experiment with his workmen, does not forget that his father was a professor or a clergyman, thinks better of himself because his son writes a clever story or invents a machine, because his daughter's poems are printed and her water-colors are on exhibition at the Academy. All this is at a good remove from vulgar display. And every one should keep watch of his luxuries that they partake of true refinement. Refinement is usually simple. The size of a painting does not determine its value. The frame should not be worth more than the picture.

Still another rule, which all may adopt, is to keep in sympathy with all classes of society. One should not become secluded in a life of comfort and beauty from those who are less fortunate and less refined. One's world will become very contracted if he is in real communication only with those whose customs and standards are identical with his own. A noble character has personal friends among all classes. The social relationships of a real man cannot be limited to a clique, however refined and intelligent it may be. The danger of a luxurious life is to narrow one's view and to deaden his sympathies. Any aristocracy except that of personal merit is hard-hearted. If circumstances identify one with a single class, he needs to test carefully all his plans for enjoyment, culture, refinement, lest he lose all sympathy with the great beating heart of a common, toiling, suffering, advancing humanity. He may forget that "the column holds the cornice up."

But great danger signifies great power. The greatest power in this world is the Christian who has intelligence, refinement, culture, and wealth. A woman with social influence and means at command has a power which cannot be measured.

The time has passed when the worldly can be distinguished from the unworldly by external marks. Poverty, even if self-imposed, is not a condition of piety. Neither is any kind of abstinence from amusement, enjoyment, possessions. Motives and objects are the decisive tests. Character is above circumstance. The worthy employment of that which enriches, strengthens, beautifies life constitutes success and power.

The best ministers of truth and righteousness are those who have learned how to use this world as not abusing it.

THE RIGHTS OF YOUNG MEN IN THE MISSIONARY SERVICE:
CONSIDERED WITH REFERENCE TO CURRENT EVENTS.

THE American Board of Commissioners for Foreign Missions had its origin in the consecration of certain young men to the service of Christ in heathen lands. Their names, always to be mentioned as often as the fact of their consecration is recalled, were Samuel J. Mills, Adoniram Judson, Samuel Nott, and Samuel Newell. The distinct and determined commitment of these young men to the missionary service antedated by a considerable time the organization of the American Board. As early as September of 1808 a society called "The Brethren" was formed, through the agency of Mills, at Williams College, having for its object "to effect in the person of its members a mission or missions to the heathen." The character of the founder appears in the memorable saying preserved by one to whom it was addressed, "Mills proposed to send the gospel to that dark and heathen land, and said *we could do it if we would.*" The society of "The Brethren" was transferred in 1809 from Williams College to Andover Theological Seminary, where its membership was increased by the incoming of young men from other colleges, who seem to have been awakened to the subject of missions in entirely independent ways. In 1810 the young men above mentioned, who, with the exception of Mills, were about to graduate, memorialized the General Association of Massachusetts at its meeting in Bradford, June 29th, in regard to their commitment to the cause of Christ in heathen lands. "These young men and their memorial were the occasion that gave rise to the Board, though the idea and plan of it arose in other minds. The idea would seem to have first occurred to Dr. Worcester on Wednesday morning, June 27th, as he and Dr. Spring rode together in a chaise from Andover to Bradford; and the plan of it was discussed between them as they rode along." As a result of this memorial three commissioners were appointed by the Association to consult with others with a view to united effort, and in September of the same year the American Board was organized at the house of Rev. Noah Porter, D. D., in Farmington, Conn. The charter of the Board was not obtained till 1813, and the first missionaries were not sent out till 1812.

We have reminded our readers of these facts attending the inception of the foreign missionary enterprise in this country that we may be sure that we rightly relate the spirit of the movement to that about it which is more formal and institutional. The spirit of missions declared itself in the hearts of young men. It was their brave and determined purpose which created the necessity for organization. It was their persistent and plaintive cry, Who will send us? which finally aroused the churches to furnish the means to send them out. And it was their heroism, illustrated in their life and death in foreign lands, which reacted upon the church at home and developed the institutions whose workings are now attended with such magnificent results. From the nature of the

case the spirit of missions must always have its home in the hearts of the young men and young women of the church. They only can be missionaries. And the missionary is the most vital human factor in the whole problem of the conversion of the world. Institutions are necessary to conserve and develop spiritual life. Boards must exist to use consecrated power. But those who inhabit institutions and control boards must never forget, they must never be allowed to forget, that in dealing with young men and young women in their missionary consecrations they are dealing with a spiritual quantity for which there is no equivalent in machinery or funds or dogmas.

The American Board celebrated its seventy-fifth anniversary at its meeting in Boston, October, 1885. At that meeting, amid many causes for congratulation and hopefulness, one question was continually forcing itself out of the anxieties of the hour, How shall the demand for more missionaries be met? In his opening report the Home Secretary made the startling statement that "during the past year no missionary or assistant missionary, except those reported at the last annual meeting as on the outward journey, has entered upon the work in the foreign field," adding later in the same report: "We need immediately an additional force of not less than fifty ordained men with their wives, and fifty single women, in order properly to sustain the work now committed to our trust." The state of affairs revealed in this report had been in part anticipated, and measures had already been taken to rekindle the missionary spirit among young men. The secretaries of the Board, missionaries, and others, who had become aroused to the emergency, had visited the theological seminaries, and met the students in public and in private. When the Board met, the exercises of the various seminaries within available distance of Boston were suspended that their students might attend the meeting. Very many young men in training for the ministry were present and brought away an additional inspiration and incentive to missionary consecration. The weeks and months following this meeting were characterized by an extraordinary missionary awakening throughout the seminaries. Meetings were frequently held, addressed by missionaries; students were ready and eager to study into the various fields of work; and in at least two of the seminaries bands were formed with a view to specific labor in the foreign service. As a natural result of this interest young men began to put themselves into correspondence with the Board. Some wrote letters of inquiry stating very frankly their personal and social circumstances; others offered themselves directly for service and asked for instructions.

What, now, was the reception given these young men as they appeared as applicants for missionary service under the American Board?

We take note only of that which was official, following the ordinary course of procedure. First each one of the earlier applicants received from the office of the Home Secretary, in connection with the "Manual" of the Prudential Committee, and usually inclosed in it, a leaflet con-

taining a creed. This creed, it is now understood, was the one drawn up to embody the views of the dissentients from the creed of the Commission, — the creed introduced to the public under the auspices of the Boston Monday Lectureship. It is the creed which has been since naively referred to by the Home Secretary as that of the Pilgrim Church, Worcester, Mass., it having been adopted at the organization of that church.¹ No statement was made or explanation given in regard to the use of this creed or as to its insertion in the "Manual."² The natural impression, therefore, left upon the recipient was that it was the creed of the Board, or at least a creed to be used in examination for admission to the service of the Board. The correspondence which then ensued, in answer to the questions of the "Manual," or in reference to the creed, invariably brought out the fact that the applicant was expected to accept, as a part of his doctrinal belief, the dogma of the decisiveness of the present life in respect to the eternal destiny of the heathen. This correspondence was usually followed by an interview with the Home Secretary, in which the endeavor was made to secure the assent of the candidate to this dogma. Notes of the interview were taken by the Secretary, or memoranda prepared after the interview was over. The case, as thus made up, based partly upon the correspondence and partly upon the report of the interview, was then submitted to the Prudential Committee, and with this result: in every case thus far where there has been an unwillingness on the part of the candidate to accept the dogma of the absolute decisiveness of the present life as applied to the heathen, the candidate has not been accepted. He has been informed that it is deemed inexpedient to appoint at the present time. Sometimes incidental reasons have been given for this course, apart from the main issue, but meanwhile other candidates affected by precisely the same incidental reasons have been accepted without delay.

What was the theological temper and attitude of these applicants? Were they dogmatic and controversial in their disposition? Did they seek the service of the Board to proclaim a dogma of their own?

Fortunately the testimony on this point which has been made public is sufficient for a clear and full answer. From the correspondence, which

¹ It has been objected by some, on ecclesiastical grounds, that too much stress has been laid upon the Commission's creed as a standard of doctrine for ministerial or missionary service. We are not urgent in our advocacy of that symbol above any of the "well known Confessions of Faith," like the Burial Hill Confession or that of the Evangelical Alliance. Those who defend the action of the Home Secretary in this matter because of their opposition to the creed of the Commission violate their own principle. For what he did was to virtually substitute the minority report of the Commission for the report of the majority.

² More recently the creed has been sent out, not in the *Manual* but in the course of correspondence, as giving a convenient text for the examination of candidates on doctrinal points.

is now being printed in "The Christian Union," we make the following quotations.

Extract from a letter written by a young lady, a graduate of an Eastern college, under date of August 1, 1885 (this date shows that this method of procedure had begun before the meeting of the Board): —

"I found him [Dr. Alden], as he had said, not at all worried about my doctrines, but it was because he had supposed that an hour's conversation with him would convince me of the absolute correctness of his views. I have been too long thinking on the views of such men as Dr. McKenzie, Dr. Duryea, and Dr. Abbott to say with Dr. Alden that I was as sure there would be no probation after death as I was of the existence of God. On the other hand truth compelled me to say that I am tending to the other side in my beliefs, since I do not think the Bible forbids that belief. *However this is only my opinion, and I do not care to go to Japan to teach my opinions, but what the Bible does positively teach.*"¹

Extract from a letter written by a graduate of Boston University and of Andover Theological Seminary to Dr. Alden, under date of May 5, 1886.

"I have ascertained that the particular and only point to which the committee took exception was my view upon the eschatological question as to whether the destiny of all men is decided in the present life. My position here was, that I do not believe that the Bible clearly and definitely answers the question, that I do not regard it as belonging integrally to the content of Revelation, and that any particular view upon it should be held only as a matter of opinion, and not as a dogmatic dictum of theology."²

Extracts from letters as yet private might be multiplied, showing the same general disposition on the part of rejected or suspended applicants for service under the American Board. But these cases are sufficient to show the method pursued by the Home Secretary in dealing with those who were unwilling to support his dogma concerning the destiny of the heathen, as absolutely determined in this life. Can anything be more distinct than the avowal of these two candidates that they held the theory of a future opportunity for those who have no knowledge of Christ in this life as an opinion or a hope, not as a "dogmatic doctrine of theology," or a "part of the content of Revelation"? They were simply unwilling to say that they are as sure that there will be no probation after death as they are of the existence of God. And for the failure to accept and affirm this dogma they are held back from service.

It is easy to infer the effect of this course of treatment upon young men and young women in our training-schools who have the missionary life in view. The facts, which are now beginning to be made public, have been for some time known to them. There is a community of interest among those within our schools who are shaping their lives towards ends of special consecration. Subjects of mutual concern are sub-

¹ *The Christian Union*, Aug. 5, 1886.

² *The Christian Union*, Aug. 12, 1886.

jects of frequent correspondence. Whatever affects one affects all, for it is quickly known of all. An earnest worker for missions in a given school cannot be rejected or held back by the Board without the fact being known and felt throughout the school and beyond. A leader of the missionary band in one of our seminaries, whose case had been deferred, and is still undecided, did indeed seek to conceal the fact for a time for fear of its effect upon his associates, but the delay could not after a time be explained without giving the reason for it. The fact of the virtual rejection of the young lady from whose letter we have quoted has been for more than a year smouldering in the hearts of teachers and students in the college from which she graduated. And the effect is by no means confined to those who share the doubts or opinions of those rejected. We have in mind a young man, a recent graduate of one of the seminaries, whose views were opposed to those of the rejected candidates, who delayed his application and at last entered another field of work, because he would not ask to labor where such men as his associates, whom he knew in their beliefs and in their consecrations, could not work as freely as himself.

So far as we are aware, two reasons have been urged in justification of the course taken by the Home Secretary and approved by a majority of the Prudential Committee. One reason is, that any doubt as to the decisiveness of the present life, as applied to the destiny of the heathen, "will cut the nerve of missions." The phrase which we have just quoted originated, we believe, at the meeting of the American Board in Portland, where the first concerted attack was made upon what was then termed the "new departure." The phrase has been frequently used since to signify that those who doubt the above dogma will cease to give their money or themselves to the cause of missions. The Portland meeting was held in 1883. We have not learned that the churches which sympathize with the hope that the heathen will know Christ in his atoning sacrifice before they meet Him in judgment are failing in their contributions to the American Board. And now the answer to the charge in respect to the offer of men is beginning to assert itself as a fact. We say, therefore, to those who, assuming to speak in behalf of missions, have predicted the failure of young men to respond to other motives than those born of this dogma, "But here they are. They are knocking at the doors of the Board. They are present in equal numbers, at least, with those who hold to your dogma. *The very embarrassment under which you labor* is due to the number, the earnestness, and the representative character of the applicants for missionary service whose views you claimed would 'cut the nerve of missions.'"

The other reason urged is that the introduction into the missionary service of those holding the views of the rejected candidates would prove divisive: these recruits, if accepted, would not harmonize with those already in the field. It would be a sufficient answer to say that missionaries themselves are by no means a unit in respect to matters of theologi-

cal discussion at home. Testimony enough has been published to show this. Neither the missionaries, nor in many cases the churches abroad, are ignorant of the issue now before the constituency of the American Board. And we think that we hazard little in saying that a larger proportion of the missionaries under the American Board are intelligently and sympathetically interested in the theological bearings of this issue than of ministers throughout the country. There are questions about which the missionary must think, if he think at all, which some ministers conceive that they can ignore. But a better answer would be to say that harmony, or the want of it, in mission fields will depend upon the character and disposition of those holding varying theological opinions. If those who go out, or if those on the ground, are contentious there will be divisions. If, on the other hand, all concerned are inquirers rather than dogmatists, if they have the sense of proportion in the holding of truth, if above all they have learned how to hold the truth in love, they will be able to coöperate to the full in the one work which they have in common, that of giving the *gospel* to the heathen.¹

¹ The theology of missions has been set forth with great directness in an editorial in *The Golden Rule* of August 12, 1886, under the title "The Heathen's Need," from which we make the following extract:—"Much of the recent discussion concerning our missionary theology appears to have proceeded upon a wrong conception of the meaning of God's revelation of himself in Christ. It seems to be taken for granted that, if God's justice is vindicated through the sinner's destruction, because the light of nature suffices for his condemnation, the great point is gained. But is it?"

"Christ came not primarily to vindicate the divine justice, but to manifest the divine grace. He came not to condemn the world, but to save it. He died, the just for the unjust, to bring men to God. If we concede that the heathen have light enough for condemnation, ay, more, light enough for salvation, if rightly followed, still it remains true that their great need is a power unto salvation. Because of sin they are morally weak, and need the truth and love and spiritual power of the gospel. It is not thought that the light of nature suffices but for a very few. But God so loved the world that He gave his Son. And a declaration of that love, the preaching of the gospel, is God's chosen instrumentality for saving men. This is nothing new, but by some controversialists it seems to have received too little emphasis.

"What the heathen need is the gospel. And we can hardly emphasize too strongly the proposition that God has acted in view of this fact, in the sacrifice on Calvary, and his command to proclaim the blessed truths of the gospel to all people. It is not enough that God knows of the great sacrifice which Christ has made for the sinner; the sinner must know it. It is not enough that an atonement has been made; it must be proclaimed. And God's free grace is such that He commands the proclamation to be made to all. However many and however zealous are the earnest souls which God has inspired to labor for the evangelization of the heathen, the evidence is clear and overwhelming that no one is so much interested in giving them the gospel as is its divine Author. He is no respecter of persons, and He wants his grace, as revealed in Christ, declared unto all men."

There are men of undoubted ability and piety amongst us who cannot make a public address without making extended reference to the "heresy of a second probation." We would not send such men to the heathen. We much prefer their presence amongst us, who have "grown familiar" with their words. If there are men who would make the preaching of the gospel secondary to the establishment of any theory of a future probation, we would neither send them abroad, nor encourage them in the liberty of "prophesying" at home. But as far as we are advised, and in all cases which have come under our personal knowledge, there is not a person now seeking the foreign missionary service who does not know and is not intent upon doing his Master's business.

What are the rights of young men in the missionary service? What are the rights which are now imperiled by the action of the Home Secretary and of a majority of the Prudential Committee of the American Board?

(1.) *The right of young men applying for service under the Board to be considered as honest applicants; as men of singleness of purpose and simplicity of consecration.* They are not to be viewed with suspicion. It is not to be assumed that they are the agents of designing men. It is not to be assumed that they are controversialists. It is not to be assumed that they have some incidental or ulterior object in their consecration. The motives to the foreign service are not such as to invite men who have other ends than the love of Christ and of those for whom He died. It may be said that in the present theological situation men who offer themselves from a given seminary ought to expect to be received with a certain degree of suspicion. We answer that they had reason to expect nothing of the sort. What distinction has been made as between seminaries in the summons addressed to young men? Were not all recognized equally at the meeting of the Board in Boston? Have not the secretaries of the Board visited all alike? Have not missionaries labored with equal earnestness, in each of the seminaries, for recruits? What intimation has ever been given that the student of any seminary would not be welcomed as a missionary provided he offered the requisite spirit and qualifications for his work? And yet it was with a surprise from which they have not recovered that some found themselves upon their application to the Home Secretary viewed, as it seemed to them, more in the light of theological athletes than of men of simple and single consecration in their missionary purpose.

(2.) *The right of young men applying for service under the Board to the benefits of ordination.* Ordination confers the advantage of ministerial standing. It ought to confer the advantage, in all that pertains to theological opinion, of missionary standing. There are, we grant, special qualifications demanded in the foreign service, but among these qualifications we can see none of a theological character for which special tests can be set up. To attempt this would be to introduce confusion into the whole economy of the ministry. The alternative is becoming clearer and

more definite in the light of present discussions — either the Board is an ecclesiastical institution independent of the churches in the theological tests which it may impose, and competent to override councils, or it must acknowledge the supremacy of councils, and the rights which they confer upon those who have gained theological standing by their authority.

(3.) *The right of young men applying for service under the Board to that range of thought to which the subjects with which they are to be concerned invite them.* The great theological questions of the immediate future will be intimately related to missions. We are already beginning to feel their breadth and their *personality*. They are not, as some seem to suppose, abstractions and speculations, but questions of flesh and blood. They involve the fate of living men, and they are questions which the missionary must meet. They beset him in his daily work. They speak to him out of the faces of the multitude which confront him. The missionary, above all men, must have a free and ample gospel. He must have a conception of God commensurate with the difficulties of his task, and able to control the doubts and questionings which it continually suggests. The necessity will vary in degree with different minds. With some the necessity will be imperative. They must have, in other words, a theodicy if they would have a working theology. Such minds must be allowed liberty of thought and opinion. They ask it not for purposes of speculation, but for the support of the practical work of missions. That missionary must be the better worker whose *mind* is satisfied in God, who is able to give to himself the reason for the hope that is in him.

The issue now before the churches which support the American Board cannot be fairly decided without the consideration of the rights of young men whose interests are involved. From this point of view the issue is very clear and very simple. Certain young men have offered themselves in good faith to the service of the Board, or better, through the Board, to the service of Christ in heathen lands. They have not been accepted, because they will not commit themselves to the dogma of the absolute decisiveness of the present life for those who know not Christ. Their cases are representative. Many others of the same opinion and of the same consecration are waiting the result. It is not to be supposed that those in waiting will prove more acceptable than those now before the Prudential Committee. It has been shown that these are unexceptionable in their temper and disposition. If they are formally and finally rejected it must be because of their opinions, not because of the manner of their holding of them. Neither can it be said that these young men are unfortunate in being involved in what has become an aggressive movement. The date of the letter which gives the story of the first rejection is fatal to that explanation — *August 1, 1885*. Before the charge of aggressiveness had been introduced, when the charge against the new movement in theological thought was that of vagueness, a young lady, applying as an associate missionary, whose case was not complicated with the position of any men or of any seminary, was turned away. No! the issue cannot be

confused. It is perfectly plain, and upon its settlement depends the answer to the question whether the American Board can hereafter summon young men to the ranks of its missionaries.

We append to this editorial a brief criticism of a statement which appeared in an editorial article in the "*Bibliotheca Sacra*" for July, 1886. The statement is as follows:—

"It is definitely proposed, we understand, to make up an Andover band to transport this new theory into Japan, and practically reorganize the Mission of the American Board on the lines of the 'New Departure.'"

We ask the author of this offensive statement to withdraw it or prove it. We are not concerned with his discussion of theories. He may choose his own methods of discussion and reach his own conclusions. We are concerned with a charge, like the one quoted, of attempting to manipulate young men. We are familiar with the charge of heresy. We are not familiar with the charge of scheming, and do not intend to suffer such a charge to pass unchallenged. The present writer has known, by personal knowledge, everything in intention and method connected with the organization of the Japan Circle in Andover Theological Seminary, and distinctly denies the motive or purpose attributed to those concerned in it. He denies it on the part of the young men who compose it, and on the part of the professors who were consulted in its formation.

At the beginning of the fall term of 1885 there were marked signs of a missionary awakening in the Seminary. This was evident at the first meeting of the Society of Inquiry, the Missionary Society of the Seminary, and was still more evident in the prayer-meetings of the Seminary Church. Early in the fall Mr. Neesima came to Andover for his health, as the guest of Dr. Bancroft of Phillips Academy. For some weeks he was not able to speak in public or to meet the professors and students. When he was able to put himself into contact with the students his influence was immediately and powerfully felt, and the existing missionary enthusiasm was turned toward Japan. As the interest began to take shape it was agreed with him among the members of the Circle that two or three should be prepared to go out at the end of the year, and that others should follow, if needed, upon their graduation. Theological considerations were not presented, and were not raised. A strong and consecrated man made an appeal for his country and for Christ, and young men quick of heart and strong in their faith responded. The theological opinions of the young men who applied to the Board to be sent to Japan were not known to any of the professors till after they had applied, and we doubt if they were known to one another until the theological issue was forced upon them by the creed and correspondence of the Home Secretary. The movement from its inception was the expression of manly and single-hearted missionary consecration, and knowing this to be the fact, we do not propose to allow the movement to appear before the public as an organized attempt to transport a theological dogma

into Japan. We have our opinions, but we have, we trust, interests in Christ's kingdom on earth for which we are more deeply concerned.

The same mail which brought the copy of the "*Bibliotheca Sacra*" from which we have taken the above statement brought the following official letter from the Conference of the Churches in Japan connected with the American Board to the members of the Japan Circle in Andover Theological Seminary. We publish the letter without further comment than to remark that it seems to have anticipated the trouble which has actually arisen. Mr. Neesima and his associates will in time understand why the expected aid has not been assured to them.

KIYOTO, JAPAN, June 28, 1886.

To the Members of the Japan Circle at Andover Seminary.

DEAR BRETHREN :— We have been requested by the Annual Conference of the Congregational Churches of Japan, which met here in Kiyoto last month, to write to you in order to present before you for your consideration a great demand there is in Japan for more missionaries ; for it was with great pleasure that we heard the announcement from Mr. Neesima and some missionaries of your interest in the evangelization of Japan. We believe it is needless to write you about the great opening there is in all classes and in all places for the reception of the gospel, a sudden transformation of public opinion from that of hostility to great friendliness towards Christianity, for we believe that this fact is too well known to you and all in America. So we wish in this letter to dwell more particularly on the imminent dangers that seem to threaten the progress of the gospel. 1. The influential classes that favor Christianity have not wholly got rid of their old notions that religion is for the ignorant classes, and that it is a good means for the welfare of society, and so though they may embrace Christianity, yet it is in many cases with a patronizing air, from all sorts of motives but the salvation of their souls. For instance, they see that Christianity is superior to Buddhism and Shintoism, so they want to introduce it ; or they say that Christianity is the religion of the civilized countries, and in order that the national right of Japan may be respected by the foreign powers, Japan must first become a Christian nation. There is a real danger, for this reason, of Christianity's becoming a fashionable religion, and the great masses coming into the churches without real faith. 2. The above-mentioned class is mostly composed of practical men, who care very little whether Christianity be true or false, if only its influence on the morals and welfare of society be good. But there is another class of persons who in intelligence and influence are their equals, and who care more for truth for its own sake. We refer to the scholarly class. We have a large number of the graduates of the Imperial University, who are scattered all over the empire as doctors, professors, lawyers, officials, editors, scientists, etc., whose number is yearly increasing, and many besides of their number are pursuing their further studies in America and Germany. They are men who have had a high mental training, are well read in literature and philosophy, thoroughly imbued with the scientific thoughts of the nineteenth century, and almost all of them are skeptics, and their influence is by no means small. What they say will have weight with the rising young men of the nation and with the influential middle classes. The skeptical and agnostic and, in some cases, atheistic views are being propagated by them fast enough. These young men are too eager and docile pupils, these intelli-

gent middle classes are too incautious, welcoming light from whatever quarter and of whatever color. Yet these young men are those to whom we should look for the future guides of this people, and these middle classes are those to whom we should look for the pillars of the church of Christ in Japan. How shall we win them, if we do not so present the truth of Christianity as to stop at least the gainsayings of the scholarly class if we cannot win their hearts?

There is no doubt that the opportunities of the present hour are unparalleled in history, and our hopes and encouragements are by no means small. But he is a shallow man who imagines that this state of things will last forever, or that this nation can be easily won. To those who observe things carefully there appear away beyond the sunny sky of to-day the black thunder clouds ready to burst in all their fierceness when the time comes. It is all nice to rejoice and feel grateful that the evangelization of Japan is well-nigh accomplished, but it is more true to fact, and it is necessary to see, that not even the foundations are yet laid. Very probably the kind of Christian work to be done hereafter in Japan is different from that of any other country in the past or the present, and what is needed are men of thorough earnestness and consecration, of catholic spirit, and disciplined mind, who are young and so can devote their vigorous powers to the cause and can adapt themselves to the kind of work to be done and the circumstances of the cases. The great pressing need of more missionaries can be seen from the fact that though it has been proposed a long time since to establish missionary stations in Fukuoka (Kiūshū) and Tokio, and recently in Sendai (in a wide northeast), yet we hear with great regret that the Board has not been able to secure the men. The need is urgent, and the work suffers immensely from the non-presence of missionary forces in these places, and when we ask the question, whether on the other hand the present stations are well supplied with men or not, we must answer that not one of them is so. A few missionaries that come out now and then are not even sufficient to fill the vacancies of those who have to go home for health, etc., and the work is all the time growing in magnitude. Twenty years ago, your missionaries came without waiting for the real openings, now the openings do not wait for men. A few that graduate from "Doshisha School" now and then are not sufficient to fill the churches which are without pastors, and how can we get men for newly opening places, many of them places of great importance?

Allow us to say, in conclusion, that here in Japan, in the hearts of her young men, the graduates of Andover will find a warm welcome. "The Andover Review" has preceded you and has familiarized to us the views so courageously propounded in it. If you will but take it, our right hand is already extended to welcome you. We do not intend to dictate to you the course you shall take, but we trust when this great need is fully known to you, you will not think that Japan is not worth your coming; that the difficulties that beset us, and the dangers that threaten us, will rather stimulate you to come to our help and that you *will not be turned back* from your course by what man may do, when there are such great issues at stake. And now may God be with you, and take you body and soul to this Land of the Rising Sun.

Your humble servants and brethren for Christ's sake,

*For the Annual Conference of the Churches connected
with A. B. C. F. M.*

{ H. KOSAKI.
P. KANAMORI.
J. T. ISE.

BIBLICAL AND HISTORICAL CRITICISM.

THE GENUINENESS OF THE PASTORAL EPISTLES.

INTRODUCTION. — The criticism of the Pastoral Epistles begins with Schleiermacher,¹ who rejected 1 Timothy as a compilation from 2 Timothy and Titus, but of the genuineness of these expresses no doubt. His main lines of argument against 1 Timothy were: Peculiarities of diction and lack of close logical connection, which indicate a writer inferior to Paul in thought and power of expression, and the impossibility of finding a place for this Epistle, with its historical allusions, in the known life of Paul. The positive part of Schleiermacher's view — his compilation theory — was soon overthrown, but his arguments against the Pauline authorship of 1 Timothy were not so easily disposed of. It was soon seen, however, that Schleiermacher's position was not tenable, that, in fact, a consistent application of his method requires the rejection of all three Epistles. Eichhorn argued,² with much force, that these Epistles are an inseparable triplet, and refused to tear apart what in spirit belongs together. He uses Schleiermacher's arguments to prove that they are not from the hand of Paul, yet he finds so much that is Pauline in them that he attributes their composition to some pupil of the apostle, who was well-grounded in his ideas of doctrine and polity. De Wette finds less of the direct influence of Paul, but he, too, admits that certain passages have an unmistakable Pauline stamp. With Baur³ the era of positive criticism begins. He advanced from the denial of Pauline authorship to the identification of the Pastoral Epistles with the character and conditions of a later age. They are not productions of the first century, but can be understood only in the light of the Gnostic speculations of the second. About the year 150 these writings were palmed off as Paul's by some orthodox churchman, who tried in this way to use the authority of a great name to check the rising tide of Gnostic heresy. Baur derived some support for his view from the alleged hierarchical tendencies of these writings, but he regarded the Gnosticism which they oppose as his conclusive proof, and this he identified with the school of Marcion. Many critics have followed Baur in holding that the Pastoral Epistles show a more advanced state of church organization and more developed heretical tendencies than could have existed in the apostolic age, but the details of the argument have been essentially modified. It is now generally admitted that the teaching which the Pastoral Epistles condemn cannot be identified with any one school of Gnostics, and it is, therefore, not unnatural that more stress should be put upon highly developed church organization as evidence of a late date. Among those who have accepted Baur's conclusion, though with much variety of opinion concerning details, are Ewald,⁴ Hilgenfeld,⁵ Schenkel,⁶ Hausrath,⁷ Pfeiderer,⁸ Immer,⁹

¹ *Sendschreiben an Gass*, 1807.² *Einleitung*, 1812.³ *Die sogenannten Pastoralbriefe*, 1835.⁴ *Sieben Sendschreiben des neuen Bundes*, 1870, p. 216.⁵ *Einleitung in das neue Testament*, 1875, p. 744.⁶ *Bibel-Lexikon*, 1872, iv. 393.⁷ *Neutestamentliche Zeitschichte*, 2. Auflage, 1877, iv. 361.⁸ *Paulinismus*, 1873, p. 464.⁹ *Theologie des neuen Testaments*, 1877, pp. 387, 398.

Mangold,¹ Beyschlag,² Holtzmann,³ Renan,⁴ and Davidson.⁵ Even Meyer⁶ gives free expression to doubt. Holtzmann's work is the most exhaustive and the ablest that has yet appeared. He carefully reviews all previous discussions, eliminates many errors, and fully elaborates all branches of the argument. He covers the whole ground of external and internal testimony. He examines all the attempts to find a place for the Pastoral Epistles in the narrative of the Acts, and rightly concludes that every one is beset by insuperable difficulties. He discusses the hypothesis of a second Roman imprisonment, and finds it a makeshift of apologetics. He enters into a minute investigation of the style and diction of the Pastoral Epistles, and claims to find in the differences which distinguish them from the writings of Paul conclusive proof of their un-Pauline character. He attempts to show, by a most elaborate analysis, the dependence of the writer upon the Epistles of Paul, the writings of Luke, the Epistle to the Hebrews, and 1 Peter, and reiterates, with modifications, the arguments previously drawn from heresies and church organization. Some critics try to mediate between the theory just outlined and the traditional view. Credner⁷ first broached the hypothesis that these Epistles contain genuine Pauline fragments, which in some way came into the possession of the author and were made the nuclei of his compositions. 2 Timothy has been an especially attractive field for such conjecture. Those who have attempted this solution of the problem are Hitzig,⁸ Weiss,⁹ Hausrath, Ewald, Krenkel,¹⁰ Pfeiderer, and Immer, while Renan and Beyschlag look upon it with some favor. As to details, there is no general agreement, except in the opinion that iv. 9-18 is a genuine Pauline fragment. This passage is full of personal allusions, the one passage in the whole Epistle where its genuineness can be put to a conclusive test, and the hypothesis of these critics is a virtual confession that at this point the theory of spuriousness breaks down. As the plan of this paper does not embrace further discussion of this middle theory, suffice it to say that, in my opinion, it is more untenable than the other; for this alleged Pauline fragment, inasmuch as it has nothing to do with the main purpose of the composition, would have been utilized in order to accredit it as Paul's, and hence, on this hypothesis, the Epistle would no longer be, as alleged, an innocent piece of pseudonymous writing, but an out and out forgery.

With the exception of Holtzmann, all recent commentators hold to the genuineness of these Epistles; so Wiesinger (in Olshausen), Huther (in Meyer), Van Oosterzee (in Lange), Hofmann, Beck, Weiss (in 5th ed. of Meyer, 1886), and Dwight (in Funk & Wagnalls' Meyer); so, too, Salmon, in his recent "Introduction to the New Testament." Weiss's commentary is the newest and, with no disparagement of the others, the best. It contains much incisive criticism of Holtzmann; still, the author is too candid to blind his eyes to real difficulties. His position is sufficiently indicated by the following statement:—

"For finally it must be admitted that the hypothesis of spuriousness has as

¹ Bleek's *Einleitung*, 3. Auflage, pp. 553, 560, 577.

² *Die christliche Gemeinde-Verfassung im Zeitalter des N. T.*, 1874, pp. 4, 85.

³ *Die Pastoralbriefe*, 1880.

⁴ *St. Paul*, 1869, p. xxiii.

⁵ *Introduction to the Study of the N. T.*, 2d ed., 1882, ii. 21.

⁶ *Römerbrief*, 5. Auflage, p. 19.

⁷ *Einleitung*, pp. 449, 478.

⁸ *Ueber Johannes Marcus*, 1843, p. 154.

⁹ *Philosophische Dogmatik*, 1855, i. 146.

¹⁰ *Paulus, der Apostel der Heiden*, 1869, p. 208.

yet borne little fruit for the historical understanding of our Epistles, above all, however, that it has not solved the problem by its suppositions with reference to their tendency; but, on the contrary, as apologetics has asserted from the beginning, has produced an abundance of new difficulties and unsolved riddles. Just this is the reason why, even for him who does not conceal from himself the difficulties which still remain for the acceptance of their Pauline origin, it ever remains the first task to investigate how far the difficulties permit of solution under this presupposition given by the Epistles themselves in agreement with tradition." (Page 72.)

In spite of the goodly array of works which defend the traditional view, it is perhaps fair to say, with Professor Hatch, in the "Encyclopedia Britannica," that the majority of modern critics question or deny the genuineness of these Epistles. This is certainly true of German critics. Since Holtzmann makes the strongest presentation of the arguments upon which this conclusion is based, it will be the aim of this paper to scrutinize his statements of fact and test the validity of his reasoning, especially in those points which he most emphasizes. One remark, by way of preface: Eichhorn's view that these three Epistles must stand or fall together is now almost unanimously accepted both by the defenders and the assailants of their genuineness. Reuss is a noteworthy exception. He has now given up 1 Timothy and Titus, though he holds as firmly as ever to the genuineness of 2 Timothy, which, he affirms, would never have been suspected if it had not been in bad company.¹ But the similarity in style, tone, and subject-matter is so marked, and the conditions of church life which they reflect are so exactly correspondent, that few can resist the conclusion that they are products of the same mind, and not far separated from each other in time. The correctness of this conclusion is assumed in the following discussion.

THE EXTERNAL TESTIMONY. — It is not necessary to enter upon a detailed examination of the external evidence, but I cannot refrain from calling attention, in a few words, to the unusual strength of this line of proof. Baur said there was no witness to the existence of these Epistles earlier than the end of the second century. "Irenæus, Tertullian, and Clement of Alexandria are the first authors who are acquainted with them and quote them as apostolic." (Page 136.) With the Canon of Muratori added to the list this is correct, as far as the direct quotation of these Epistles as apostolic is concerned, but it is far from correct to assert that there are no witnesses to the existence of these Epistles earlier than the close of the second century. It is not necessary to claim any more than Holtzmann admits in order to show that earlier witnesses are surprisingly numerous. In the Epistle of Clement of Rome to the Corinthians Holtzmann discovers many coincidences in idea with the Pastoral Epistles, and notes the reappearance of many of their characteristic expressions. In fact, he cannot deny that all these Epistles "look like products of one and the same workshop, though elaborated at different times and by different masters." (Page 259.) There is pretty general agreement that the Epistle of Clement was written about 95 A. D. The Epistle of Barnabas and the Shepherd of Hermas have much less in common with the Pastoral Epistles, but even here there is enough of similarity to lead Holtzmann to the conclusion that the writers breathed a "common ecclesiastical atmosphere with its liturgical, dogmatic, and rhetorical terminology." (Page 259.) Of echoes in the Ignatian Epistles Holtzmann says "they

¹ *Les Épitres Pauliniennes*, 1878, ii. 243, 307.

are much more definite and even imposing by their multitude." He has no doubt that the writer of the shorter recension (which, however, according to his chronology, cannot be earlier than 166) was familiar with the Pastoral Epistles. Schleiermacher doubted whether the Epistle of Polycarp betrays any acquaintance with 1 Timothy, but Holtzmann is certain that it does. In addition to this, Holtzmann finds indications (page 262 ff.) of acquaintance with the Pastoral Epistles in the writings of Justin Martyr, the Epistle to Diognetus, *πράξεις Παύλου*, the Epistle of the Church at Vienne and Lyons, the Testaments of the Twelve Patriarchs, and even in Celsus, as quoted in Origen. Baur held that the Pastoral Epistles borrow some of their terminology from Hegesippus, but according to Holtzmann this view is no longer entertained, but the relation of dependence is reversed. There is ample evidence, then, that these Epistles were widely circulated in the second century, and strangest of all is the fact that 1 Timothy, the one of the three which has been the especial object of suspicion, was more widely known and used than the others. Holtzmann closes his review of the external testimony with this statement:—

"The Epistles are nowhere expressly mentioned before the last third of the second century; and, too, it is past the middle of this century when the first clear reference is made to their contents. They can, therefore, with reference to the total judgment of the second century, be designated almost as Antilegomena only." (Page 266.)

Perhaps the "almost" ought to save the assertion from criticism. But it is necessary to protest against even this cautious application of the term Antilegomena, for Holtzmann does not furnish a scintilla of proof that at any time in the second century the claims of these Epistles were disputed, except by Gnostic heretics. The only basis for the assertion, upon his own construction of the evidence, is silence, and silence is no justification of the term Antilegomena. But even silence is secured only by assigning a very late date to many of the writings referred to. If the Epistles of Ignatius and Polycarp are genuine, to say nothing of the rest, we have witnesses which belong to the second decade of the second century. That these Epistles are genuine is no longer an empty assertion. Lightfoot's recent work furnishes conclusive proof.¹ The early testimony to the existence of the Pastoral Epistles is not complete without a reference to the heretics of the second century. Clement of Alexandria makes the general statement that the heretics reject the Epistles to Timothy.² Tertullian³ and Jerome⁴ state that Marcion repudiated the Pastoral Epistles. Jerome makes the same statement of Basilides, and says that Tatian accepted Titus, although he rejected the other two. Now both Marcion and Basilides belong to the first half of the second century, and must therefore be added to the early witnesses to the existence of these Epistles. This brief survey suffices to show that very few New Testament books are more strongly fortified by external proof than the Pastoral Epistles. The controversy has been, and is, over their contents, but this tends to withdraw attention from the remarkable strength of the external attestation.

THE HYPOTHESIS OF A SECOND ROMAN IMPRISONMENT. — It is not necessary to discuss the numerous attempts to fit the Pastoral Epistles

¹ *Apostolic Fathers*, Part II.: S. Ignatius and S. Polycarp.

² *Stromata*, ii. 11.

³ *Adversus Marcionem*, v. 21.

⁴ *Comment. in ep. ad Tit. proem.*

with their historical allusions into the narrative of the Acts, for no one of them has been, and no future attempt can be, successful. There is not only the difficulty of reconciling Paul's journeys with his movements in Acts, — a feat not yet accomplished without setting grammar and common sense at defiance, — but another insuperable obstacle in the way of such a scheme is the necessity which it imposes of separating 2 Timothy from the other two by an interval of at least four years. But these three Epistles belong together and represent a distinct period in the apostle's life. Just as truly as Romans, Galatians, and Corinthians represent one stage of Paul's career and the Epistles of the imprisonment another, just so surely do the Pastoral Epistles represent a still later stage; and it is throwing history into utter confusion to carry two of these back into the three years' stay at Ephesus, making them antedate the Romans group, and assign the third to the close of the Roman imprisonment. Since, now, 2 Timothy was written from a Roman imprisonment, and 1 Timothy and Titus when the apostle was at liberty, it is not possible to defend the Pauline authorship of these latter, without supposing that Paul was released from the Roman imprisonment of which Acts speaks, revisited the scenes of his former labors, and was again incarcerated in Rome before his martyrdom. This hypothesis is stigmatized as an apologetic invention, with no basis except the impossibility of finding any place for the Pastoral Epistles in Paul's recorded life; but this is a sufficient basis unless the Pastoral Epistles can be proved to be spurious. There is, however, independent evidence which ought not to be overlooked. Eusebius says there was a report current (*λόγος ἔχει*) in his day that Paul was released from his Roman imprisonment.¹ It is evident from the way in which Eusebius speaks that he accepted this report, for he immediately refers in corroboration to 2 Tim. iv. 16, 17, where he finds in the words *ἡ πρώτη ἀπολογία* an allusion to the first imprisonment as distinguished from that which Paul was then undergoing. He is probably incorrect in his exegesis, but it is not true, as has been stoutly asserted, that Eusebius' only source of information was a misunderstood passage of 2 Timothy. He first states a current opinion, which he evidently shares, and then seeks to confirm it by his quotation. It was the current opinion which suggested to him his interpretation of Paul's words. There is, too, in the Canon of Muratori a fragment of a sentence which implies Paul's release. It is appended to the following brief description of the Acts: —

"The Acts of the Apostles are all written in one book. Luke relates to the excellent Theophilus the events of which he was an eye-witness, as also in a separate place he evidently declares the martyrdom of Peter."

Then follow the words: —

"Sed protectionem Pauli ab urbe ad Spaniam proficiscentis."

Here the corrupt text ends, leaving us ignorant of what the writer said about Paul's departure for Spain. But whatever the rest of the sentence may have been, it is reasonably certain, as the large majority of scholars admit, that the author believed that Paul at some time set out from Rome for Spain. If such a departure took place, all will grant that it must have followed a release from the Roman imprisonment. Eusebius has preserved a statement of Dionysius of Corinth, which, if it is trustworthy, justifies the inference of Paul's release. The statement refers to Peter and Paul, and is as follows: —

¹ *Ecclesiastical History*, ii. 22, 2.

"For both having come to our city, Corinth, and planted us, taught the like doctrine, and in like manner having also gone to Italy and taught together there, they were martyred at the same time."¹

Now if Paul and Peter were in Corinth together and went from there to Rome to a common martyrdom, as this passage seems to imply, these events must have taken place at a period later than that covered by the Acts, hence Paul must have been set free. This statement is claimed to be unworthy of credence because Dionysius makes Peter and Paul the joint founders of the Corinthian church, and this flatly contradicts the New Testament. But if Peter and Paul were in Corinth together at a time subsequent to that covered by the Acts, this fact would be enough to justify the very general statement of Dionysius, especially since the point he emphasizes is that the two apostles taught the same doctrine. The trustworthiness of this statement is partially confirmed by the mention of Troas and Miletus in 2 Timothy, which makes it probable that Paul's last journey to Rome was via Corinth. This remark of Dionysius and the Canon of Muratori are both assigned to about 170 A. D. There is, too, an important passage in Clement of Rome. After describing Paul's sufferings, he says:—

"Having preached the gospel in the East and in the West he received the glorious reward of his faith, having taught the whole world righteousness, and having come to the limit of the West (*τέρμα τῆς δύσεως*)," etc.²

What does Clement mean by "limit of the West"? Many say Rome, and hold that he speaks from the standpoint of Paul. If so, the transfer was not very successful, for Paul intended to go to Spain. It is much more likely that Clement speaks from his own standpoint, and as he was writing in Rome, it is hardly possible that he should refer to that city as *τέρμα τῆς δύσεως*. It is said, however, that Clement's language, instead of being precise and definite, is rhetorical and exaggerated, and hence no certain conclusion can be drawn from it. But the fact must not be overlooked that Clement speaks of Paul as having preached in the East and in the West and immediately after uses the phrase "limit of the West." The West is his general expression for the whole region as opposed to the Orient, and in comparison with this the "limit of the West" must mean something more definite and specific. Clement's residence at Rome suggests Spain as the most natural interpretation, and this is corroborated by the designations of Spain found in other writers. Velleius Paterculus calls it *extremus nostri orbis terminus*.³ Strabo speaks of the Pillars of Hercules as *πύλας τῆς οἰκουμένης*,⁴ and Philostratus describes Gades as *κατὰ τὸ τῆς Ευρώπης τέρμα*. Ewald, whose view of the Pastoral Epistles acquits him of any apologetic motive, says:—

"These words of Clement in their entire connection are so clear that one cannot comprehend how in our times they could be so much misunderstood, or rather perverted."

Harnack⁵ and Renan⁶ agree with Ewald. The value of Clement's testimony comes from the fact that he wrote only about thirty years after Paul's death. The lack of any trace or tradition in Spain of Paul's visit there is by no means decisive against so early a statement as that of Clement.

¹ Ecclesiastical History, ii. 25, 8.

² See Lightfoot's *Epistle of Clement*, p. 49 f.

³ *Pat. Apos. Opera*, i. 1, p. 16.

⁴ *Ad Corinth.*, c. 5.

⁵ *Geographica*, ii. 1.

⁶ *L'Antichrist*, p. 106.

The testimony of the Canon of Muratori, Dionysius, and Clement may be considered meagre, but it is entirely independent of the Pastoral Epistles. It may be thought strange that if Paul spent two or three years in free missionary labor after his first visit to Rome, there should be no record of his activity. But no good reason has been found for expecting more than we have. The Fathers give extremely little information about the apostles. Their aim was not historical, but hortatory, apologetic, dogmatic; their historical statements are generally incidental and are borrowed almost exclusively from the New Testament. The meagre evidence we have with reference to Paul's later career all points in the same direction, and there is not the shadow of a proof that he suffered martyrdom at the end of the imprisonment mentioned in the Acts. This is generally assumed, however, by those who deny the genuineness of the Pastoral Epistles. Holtzmann asserts that the impossibility of finding a place for these Epistles in the known life of Paul makes it mathematically certain that they are not Pauline. But Luke leaves us wholly in the dark as to the time of Paul's death. The fact that he closes his narrative at the year 63 gives us no more right to conclude that Paul was martyred at that time than to infer that he was set free.¹ But while it is arbitrary to interpret Luke's silence as favoring either of these views, it is of some moment that Paul expresses his confident expectation of release in his Epistle to the Philippians, and still more positively in that to Philemon (though many refer this latter to Cæsarea). Again, it is not at all probable that Paul was condemned on the charge for which he was taken to Rome. The combined force of these facts raises a strong presumption that the apostle was released and reimprisoned; and unless there is in the Pastoral Epistles some conclusive proof that Paul did not write them, we shall be compelled to accept this as historic fact.

INTERNAL EVIDENCE. I. STYLE AND DICTION. — The argument from style and diction alone is, in Holtzmann's opinion, sufficient to establish beyond a doubt the spuriousness of these Epistles. His first assertion is that the writer of the Pastoral Epistles has a special fondness for unusual compound words. "The real Paul," he says, "would often use two or three words where these Epistles employ a single clumsy compound." (Page 92.) He gives this list of the most striking instances: *ἀγαθοεργεῖν*, *αἰσχροκερδής*, *ἀναζωπυρεῖν*, *ἀντιδιατιθέμενος*, *αἰτοκατάκριτος*, *διαπαρατριβή*, *ἐτεροδιδασκαλεῖν*, *θεόπνευστος*, *ιεροπρεπής*, *κακοπαθεῖν*, *καλοδιδάσκαλος*, *κενοφωνία*, *λογομαχεῖν*, *λογομαχία*, *ματαιολογία*, *ματαιολόγος*, *νομοδιδάσκαλος*, *οἰκοδεσποτεῖν*, *συγκακοπαθεῖν*, *συναποθνήσκειν*, *τεκνογονεῖν*, *τεκνογονία*, *τεκνοτροφεῖν*, *ὕδροποτεῖν*, *ὕψηλοφρονεῖν*, *φιланθρωπία*. The charge is that the writer is specially fond of these sesquipedalia, while Paul expresses himself more intelligibly and forcibly by the use of simpler terms. As a matter of fact, however, long compounds are not infrequent in the other Pauline Epistles. Indeed, two of the words in Holtzman's list are found in them, *συναποθνήσκειν* in 2 Corinthians and *ὕψηλοφρονεῖν* in Romans. Twelve of the others are used by such writers as Plato, Aristotle, and Herodotus. The rest are rare, and some of them were in all probability coined by the writer, for example, *ἐτεροδιδασκαλεῖν*. But the making of new compounds is not un-Pauline. With very little search I have found a dozen compounds as striking as those in the above list, which bear as probably as any of them the stamp of Paul's mint. Another resemblance is in the fact that almost all are *ἄπαξ λεγόμενα*. This indicates

¹ Cf. Salmon's *Introduction*, p. 498.

facility in the making of new words to meet new emergencies. These Pauline compounds are as follows: ἀνεξιχίαστος, ἀνεκδιήγητος, δικαιοκρισία, ἐθελοθηρσκέα, ἐπιπόθητος, ἐτεροζυγείν, θεοδιδάκτος, καλοποιεῖν, ὀρθοποδεῖν, ὀφθαλμοδουλεία, παρείσακτος, συζωποικεῖν. Paul's writings contain, too, a long list of compounds which are rare elsewhere, and a large number of these occur but once. A few examples are: αἰσχρολογία, ἀκατακάλυπτος, ἀνεξερεύνητος, ἀμετανόητος, ἀνθρωπάρεσκος, ἐτερόγλωσσος, κενοδοξία, πολυπόικιλος. It should be noted that several of these have one element in common with words in Holtzmann's list. A special point is made of the writer's fondness for compounds in φίλος. (Page 92). There are more than seven hundred of these on record. Paul in his other Epistles uses five. In the rest of the New Testament, exclusive of the Pastoral Epistles, there are nine. That in these Epistles eight new ones are found is hardly sufficient to prove the writer's special fondness, especially since all but one of these were in common use, and that one is the negative of a commonly used positive (ἀφιλάγαθος). In view of these facts I deny that the use of compound words in the Pastoral Epistles throws any just suspicion upon their Pauline origin.

Holtzmann quotes Schleiermacher with approval to the effect that instead of numerous words and phrases in the Pastoral Epistles Paul would have used others. His list is quite long. I can give only a few examples. It is said that Paul would have used κτίσις instead of κτίσμα. But Paul's diction is not stereotyped. In his other Epistles he uses ὀφείλημα and ὀφειλή, περίσσευμα and περισσεία, πόμα and πόσις, δωρεά and δώρημα. The last pair are an exactly analogous instance; for δώρημα is used only once, but δωρεά several times. It is said that instead of ἐτεροδιδασκαλεῖν Paul makes paraphrases with ἕτερον εὐαγγέλιον. He does use such phrases twice, once each in Galatians and 2 Corinthians, but the context in 1 Timothy shows that the new word does not refer to a ἕτερον εὐαγγέλιον, hence its use is justified. Again, it is said, that instead of ἀμοιβή Paul would have used ἀντιμισθία or ἀνταπόδοσις. But he uses the former of these only twice and the latter only once. It would be just as reasonable to say with reference to ἀνταπόδοσις in Colossians that Paul would have used ἀντιμισθία, or even ἀνταπόδομα, for that, too, is found once in Romans. But ἀμοιβή fits the idea in 1 Timothy far better than any of the others. The writer is speaking of the requital which children should make to parents, and by the choice of ἀμοιβή he designates it as a return in kind, an exercise of the tender love and care of which they themselves have been recipients. That is strange criticism which will not permit a man of Paul's versatility and culture to use a new word when it more fitly and exactly expresses his meaning. Certain longer forms of the imperative are said to be characteristic of our author. The only instances mentioned are περίστασο and ἀφίστασο for περίστω and ἀφίστω. The former is found twice and the latter once. It is impossible to repress curiosity as to the way in which the critics have ascertained that Paul would have used the shorter form, for, outside of the Pastoral Epistles, there is no instance in the New Testament of the second person singular of the imperative of these verbs. Besides single words there are numerous phrases which are characteristic of the Pastoral Epistles, many of them being found in all three. Here, too, in his zeal to prove different authorship, Holtzmann makes his list unduly long. Such a phrase as διώκειν δικαιοσύνην is equally characteristic of Romans, and others, like τὸν καλὸν ἀγῶνα ἀγωνίζεσθαι, cannot with any show of reason be considered contra-

Pauline. The presence of these new phrases is sufficiently explained by the new circumstances in which the apostle writes, especially the perils in the life of the church to which he so often refers. The menace of erratic teaching accounts for his emphasis upon sound words, in the phrases: λόγος ὑγιής, ἡ ὑγιαίνουσα διδασκαλία, ὑγιαίνειν τῇ πίστει, etc. So, too, the oft-repeated phrase, πιστὸς ὁ λόγος, puts the absolute trustworthiness of the gospel in contrast with the empty theorizing which was so much in vogue. This, I urge, is a natural and sufficient explanation of most of the phrases peculiar to these Epistles. Just as Romans and Galatians mark the period of Paul's opposition to the Judaizers by the numerous characteristic phrases which they have in common, so the Pastoral Epistles represent his opposition to a new form of error by forms of speech adapted to the new conditions.

Holtzmann's suspicions, aroused by the presence of so many new words and phrases, are increased by the conspicuous absence, which, he says, can hardly be accidental, of many terms characteristic of Paul. He mentions thirty-three, namely: ἄδικος, ἀκαθαρσία, ἀκροβυστία, γνωρίζειν, διαθήκη, δικαίωμα, δοκεῖν, ἕκαστος, ἔξεστιν, κἀγώ, κατεργάζεσθαι, κρείσσων, μείζων, μικρός, μωρία, ὁμοιοῦν, ὁμοίωμα, ὁμοίως, ὁρᾶν, οὐρανός, παράδοσις, παραλαμβάνειν, πείθειν, πεποιθέναι, πεποιθήσις, περιπατεῖν, οἱ πολλοί, σπλάγχνα, ταπεινός, ταπεινοῦν, φύσις, χαρίζεσθαι, χρηστός. He also gives a list of ten families of words whose absence is equally unaccountable. These are: ἐλεύθερος, -ία, -οῦν; φρονεῖν, -ημα, -ησις, -ιμος; πράσσειν, πρᾶγμα, πράξις; τέλειος, -οῦν, -ότης; ἐνεργεῖν, -ημα, -ής, -εια; συνεργεῖν, -ός; περισσεύειν, -εία, -εσμα, -ός, -ότερος; πλεονάζειν, πλεονεκτεῖν, -ης, πλεονεξία; ὑπακούειν, -ή; ἀποκαλύπτειν, -ψις; καυχᾶσθαι, -ημα, -ησις. How important these omissions are in Holtzmann's estimation is seen by the assertion:—

"This one point decides the question. This explains why an ear, that is, so to speak, satiated with Pauline phraseology, begins to feel dissatisfaction at the mere sound of the Pastoral Epistles." (Page 98.)

But the fact that all these words are used by Paul is no sufficient reason for their necessary reappearance in the Pastoral Epistles. The question of the circumcision is not alluded to by a syllable. It was evidently not a live issue when these Epistles were written. Why, then, should we miss the terms which refer to it? The word μωρία is used five times in 1 Corinthians, but nowhere else in Paul. Does its repeated use in one Epistle make it so characteristic of Paul's style that its absence here is noteworthy? So μικρός is found once each in Galatians and 1 Corinthians, both times, however, in the same proverbial expression, "a little leaven," etc. Does the fact that Paul twice uses a popular proverb make the terms of that proverb characteristically Pauline? I do not wish, however, to seem to deny that most of the words in Holtzmann's list are in some degree characteristic of Paul's writings; but a careful examination proves that they are specially characteristic of the four greater Epistles, while in the others they are either used with much less frequency or entirely disappear; and even in the four Homologoumena, as Holtzmann calls them, the distribution of these words is so obviously fortuitous as to preclude his confident conclusion. Contrast the use of the ἐνέργεια group in Romans and Philemon. In the former there are five instances in twenty-five pages, in the latter three in a little more than a page. But three of the instances in Romans are in the last chapter, so that, omitting this, there are only two in twenty-three pages. There are

twenty-four instances of the *περισσεύειν* group in 2 Corinthians, but only one in Galatians. In Romans there are eleven instances of the *ὑπακούειν* group, but none in 1 Corinthians and Galatians. The *καυχᾶσθαι* group is specially characteristic of the four great Epistles, being used forty-nine times, twenty-nine in 2 Corinthians alone, but there are only six instances of these words in the other six Epistles. So of the *ἐλεύθερος* group there are seven instances in Romans, seven in 1 Corinthians, eleven in Galatians, but only one each in 2 Corinthians, Ephesians, and Colossians, and none in the remaining four. This shows that the choice of words, in Epistles very close to each other in time and subject-matter, may exhibit striking differences. Why, then, should we take offense at a still greater difference in diction between groups of Epistles separated by an interval of several years and still farther apart in the subjects which they treat?

The discussion thus far may have given the impression that the Pastoral Epistles are utterly destitute of Pauline words and phrases. Such words, however, are numerous. Holtzmann prefaces his discussion of them with this remark: "In consideration of the characteristic difference which, from beginning to end, distinguishes these Epistles on the negative side from the Pauline, it is of no importance if a wide linguistic domain appears, which these Epistles have, in common with the other ten, yes, even with the four first and greatest of the Pauline collection." (Page 99.) It has been proved already, then, by the absence of characteristic diction, that these Epistles are not Paul's, and, in view of this conclusive proof, the presence of Pauline words, however numerous they may be, must count for nothing. Still, their presence is a phenomenon which must be explained. One example will suffice to illustrate Holtzmann's method of explanation: "The verb *καταργεῖν* [he says] is found in the four Homologoumena twenty-two times, but elsewhere in the New Testament only five, one each in Luke, Ephesians, 2 Thessalonians, Hebrews, and 2 Timothy. Since now in the four other cases the dependence upon Pauline diction is assured, all antecedent probability points also in the fifth case to a similar relation." (Page 99.) The presence of Pauline words, then, instead of raising a presumption that Paul was the writer, proves that the author borrowed from Paul. It must be kept in mind that, in Holtzmann's opinion, several other New Testament books share the fate of the Pastoral Epistles. Not only Luke, Acts, and Hebrews, but Ephesians, Colossians, and 2 Thessalonians are, he alleges, post-Pauline, and demonstrably dependent upon the Pauline writings. He admits, of course, that these all belong to the school of Paul, but regards them as secondary and derivative. With reference to the fact that Ephesians contains certain expressions and conceptions not found elsewhere, except in the Pastoral Epistles, Holtzmann says: "Such phenomena could be used as proofs of the transformation of the apostle's style . . . only on the condition that the genuineness of Ephesians rested on a firm basis." (Page 108.) Let it be remembered, then, that Ephesians and Colossians, if they are genuine, stand as a natural connecting link between Paul's earlier Epistles and those to Timothy and Titus, and that the weight of Holtzmann's argument for the dependence of the Pastoral Epistles is conditioned by the validity of the assumption that Ephesians and Colossians are spurious.

To return now to the Pauline terms actually found in the Pastoral Epistles. Holtzmann gives a list of twenty-nine which they have in common with the four Homologoumena, and which are not found else-

where in the New Testament. These are : ἀδιάλειπτος, ἀθανασία, ἀλαζών, ἄλοον, ἀνακαίνωσις, ἀποτόμῳ, ἀρσενοκοΐτης, ἀστοργος, ἀτιμία, αὐτάρκεια, ἀφορμή, ἐκκαθαίρειν, ἐπιταγή, ἱερός, μόρφωσις, ναναγείν, ὁδύνη, οἰκείν, ὀστράκινος, πλάσσειν, προνοεῖν, στρατεία, συζῆν, συμβασιλεύειν, ὑβριστής, ὑπεροχή, ὑποταγή, ὑποτιθέναι, ὑψηλοφρονεῖν. (Page 100.) In view of the argument already considered, I cannot refrain from calling attention to the number of compound words in the list. There are twelve words which are common to the Pastoral Epistles and the other ten of Paul, but occur nowhere else in the New Testament, namely, αἰσχύρος, ἀνέγκλητος, ἀφθαρσία, γνήσιος, ἐνοικεῖν, ἐξαπατᾶν, μνεία, νοουθεσία, οἰκείος, ὁλεθρος, προιστάναι, χρηστότης. (Page 99.) There are eight more which are found in the Pastoral Epistles and the six minor Paulines, but in no other New Testament book, namely, διάβολος, λουτρόν, κέρδος, προκοπή, σεμνός, σπένδεσθαι, ἐπιφάνεια, εὐχρηστος. In the last list διάβολος is incorrectly inserted; for it is found about thirty times in the New Testament, outside of Paul. Dropping this, there are in Holtzmann's three lists a sum total of forty-eight distinctively Pauline words, which belong to the vocabulary of our Epistles. This number, added to the former list, the absence of which from these Epistles is sufficient, in Holtzmann's eyes, to prove that Paul did not write them, gives a total of one hundred and sixteen. Only forty-eight of this group are found in the Pastoral Epistles. Let us see now how the case stands with those that are undoubtedly genuine: Romans has sixty-six, 1 Corinthians forty-three, Galatians thirty-one, 1 Thessalonians twenty, Philemon eight. In 1 Corinthians the number is not only actually smaller, but very strikingly so in proportion to the length of the Epistle. In Westcott and Hort's text 1 Corinthians covers twenty-four pages and has forty-three of these words; the Pastoral Epistles cover less than fifteen pages, and have forty-eight; and if these words were as numerous in Romans as they are in our Epistles, we should find eighty-three instead of sixty-six. Shall we conclude, then, that the Pastoral Epistles are more Pauline than Romans and 1 Corinthians? The argument, as Holtzmann puts it, makes a strong impression, but it is utterly specious. The fact is that the Pastoral Epistles have as many characteristically Pauline words, in proportion to their length, as any of Paul's writings, even the four Homologoumena.

Holtzmann next calls attention to the fact that the article, which Paul uses with whole sentences, adverbs, numerals, and especially with infinitives, is never so used in the Pastoral Epistles, and that prepositions and conjunctions are there used in a way very different from that of Paul:—

"Here [he says] imitation was much more difficult. It could be undertaken with success only by an author who paid more attention to the disguise he was using than to what he had to say. This would be the characteristic of the real forger. Our author, on the other hand, pays no attention to this matter. It does not trouble him that ὡσαύτως, which he uses six times, is found in Paul but twice. Γὰρ, which so enlivens the dialectic character of Paul's style, is found oftener in the one Epistle to the Galatians than in our three. On the other hand, the following particles, hardly less characteristic of the movement of Paul's thought, are entirely wanting, namely, ἡρα, ἡρα οὖν, διό, διότι, ἔπειτα, ἔτι, ἵδε, ἰδοὺ, μήπως, ὅπως, οὐκέτι, ὅπως, οὕτε, πάλιν, ἐν παντί, πότε, ποῦ, ὥσπερ; and no less, too, the following prepositions, so often met with in Paul: ἀντί, ἐχρη, ἐμπροσθεν, ἐνάντιον, παρά with accusative, and especially σύν, for which our author uses μετὰ." (Page 101.)

Every candid investigator will admit that the points here enumerated are closely connected with peculiarities of style. The choice of idea-

words in a writer of Paul's power and culture depends upon subject and circumstances, but the use of particles is not conditioned so much by the ideas expressed as by the author's habitual mode of expression and processes of thought. Before admitting, however, the conclusiveness of this argument, we must first see whether the words and constructions mentioned are characteristic of Paul's style to such a degree as to make their absence irreconcilable with Pauline authorship. A careful examination of the ten Epistles of Paul shows that this argument has just as little validity as the one we have already considered. The limits of this paper forbid a full presentation of details, but the following seem sufficient to establish my proposition. In the first place, several of these words are not characteristic of Paul. *Πότε* is not used in any of Paul's Epistles, and *οὕτω* occurs once in 1 Corinthians, but nowhere else. A word may be used a few times in one or more Epistles and still not be characteristic of the author's style. It is true that *γάρ* is found in Galatians oftener than in our Epistles, but as the instances are thirty-seven and thirty-four respectively, the difference furnishes no basis for argument. *Γάρ* occurs but eleven times in Ephesians and six in Colossians. It is not true that our author uses *μετά* for *σύν*. Paul uses *σύν* thirty-nine times, almost exclusively with persons, not at all, however, in 2 Thessalonians and Philemon, only four times in Romans and two in Ephesians, while he uses *μετά* with genitive fifty-two times, once at least in each of the ten Epistles. Hence *μετά*, which is found in our Epistles eighteen times, is more characteristic of Paul than *σύν*. In thirteen of these eighteen instances it is safe to say that Paul certainly would not have used *σύν*, and the remaining five can be easily paralleled in his other Epistles. The whole number of particles mentioned by Holtzmann, exclusive of prepositions and those already discussed, is sixteen. Of this number only five are found in Ephesians, four of them occurring but once each; only six in Philippians, five of them but once. Not a single one is found in Colossians. In fact these words are really characteristic of the four Homologoumena, and of these only. But they are not equally distributed through these four. They are characteristic of the argumentative passages, but not of the hortatory and practical. Not one of them occurs in Romans xii. Since now the Pastoral Epistles are not argumentative, but hortatory and directive, how can the absence of argumentative particles be reasonably urged as a mark of un-Pauline authorship?

In regard to the various constructions of the article specified, Paul's use is not so constant as to justify Holtzmann's conclusion. Philemon is evidence that he could write a short epistle without using the article in any of these ways. It is a fact that Paul frequently omits the article where we would expect to find it. Buttman refers to such omission with phrases in Romans and 1 and 2 Corinthians (page 92), and Winer to omission with numerals in Corinthians and Ephesians (page 126). Paul uses the article with entire sentences only six times,¹ in four of these instances with an Old Testament quotation which is interwoven into his sentence. There remain but two cases, then, as proof of his fondness for this construction, which is often found in Luke.² Paul does use the article with the infinitive frequently, but the variableness of his usage is seen in the fact that while Philippians has fifteen instances, Galatians has only three. Unless, then, anarthrous constructions can be pointed out in which it can

¹ According to Kölling, *Der erste Brief an Tim.*, 1882, p. 194.

² See Buttman, p. 96.

be shown with a good degree of certainty that Paul would have used the article, this test of style cannot be admitted to have any decisive value. (Cf. Kölling, page 197.)

Finally, Holtzmann describes the impression which the Pastoral Epistles make upon his mind as contrasted with the other Pauline writings. The real Paul, he says (p. 101 f.), shows himself so possessed of his subject that he controls it, and his handling of it leads to a definite result. He writes with a firm, sure hand. The structure of his thought is solid and compact. He has, too, such a superabundance of ideas that the rising tide of his thought sometimes breaks away all barriers and the grammatical construction of the sentence goes to pieces. But in the Pastoral Epistles all is different. In the place of vigor and richness we find weakness and poverty. The association of ideas is loose throughout, conditioned by contrasts accidentally suggested. Davidson echoes Holtzmann's judgment and adds the remark: "Though enfeebled by a life of suffering, the apostle could hardly have written in a way so inferior to his former self."¹ These assertions of the inferiority of the Pastoral Epistles are altogether too strong, and the underestimate is occasioned by the application of an unjust standard. It is admitted on all hands that a large subjective element enters into the decision of such questions, and that few can free themselves from the bias of training and prejudice. It is well, then, to observe with what different eyes other critics, equally fearless, look upon some of these Epistles. Bleek, who rejects 1 Timothy, says of 2 Timothy: "Genuineness is stamped on the letter throughout so clearly and unmistakably that we cannot for a moment entertain the idea of its being a forgery."² Reuss says of the same Epistle, though he now gives up the other two: "Among all the Pauline Epistles attacked by criticism, none (next to Philemon) bears the stamp of genuineness so evidently."³ Schleiermacher, who gave up 1 Timothy and had doubts about 2 Timothy, says that Titus contains nothing un-Pauline.⁴ But, as has been observed, recent critics of all schools are nearly unanimous in the opinion that these three Epistles stand or fall together, and there is little which can be said either for or against any one of them which does not hold with reference to the other two. Are these Epistles weak and poor, as Holtzmann and Davidson assert? A multitude of scholars say "no." Farrar says of them: "There are flashes of the deepest feeling, outbursts of the most intense expression. There is rhythmic movement and excellent majesty in the doxologies, and the ideal of a Christian pastor, drawn not only with an unfaltering hand, but with a beauty, fullness, and simplicity which a thousand years of subsequent experience have enabled no one to equal, much less to surpass."⁵ This is Gloag's judgment: "The character of the great apostle is distinctly impressed upon these Epistles, — the same fervor of spirit displayed in numerous parentheses and digressions, the same tendency to run off at a word, the same humility and self-depreciation, the same earnest desire after the spiritual welfare of his converts, the same habit of alluding to his own sufferings for the gospel, and the same vehemence of expression as are seen in the other Epistles are traceable in these."⁶ Such citations might be multiplied indefinitely. If these last opinions have any truth in them, how can we

¹ Vol. ii., p. 61 f.

² *History of the New Test.*, i. 121.

³ *Einleitung*, p. 175.

⁴ *Introduction to the Pauline Epistles*, p. 373.

⁵ *Introduction*, ii. 73.

⁶ *St. Paul*, ii. 611.

account for Holtzmann's conclusion? Obviously thus. He makes the four Homologoumena the standard of Pauline thought and style, and any claimant which deviates in any marked degree from these he condemns as spurious. I protest against this method. As Dr. Schaff has well said, "Paul's mind was uncommonly fertile and capable of adapting itself to varying conditions, and had to create in some measure the Christian idiom."¹ The estimate of the negative critics ignores the different circumstances in which his Epistles were produced. Those which are made the standard of comparison were written to churches. They were called forth by special emergencies in congregations which had not yet been thoroughly indoctrinated. In them the apostle unfolds the great vital truths of the gospel and elucidates them by argument and illustration. It is not strange that such themes should move his whole soul and find expression in words that breathe and burn. Eloquence is in the subject and the occasion as well as in the man. The Pastoral Epistles, on the other hand, are addressed to individuals, — to men who had been Paul's missionary helpers for several years. They do not need to be taught the fundamental truths of Christianity. It is natural enough to find here only occasional allusions to the great doctrines upon which elsewhere the apostle lays so much stress. He writes to Timothy and Titus to urge them to do as well as they know, and to give specific directions concerning the particular perils which confront them. When Paul speaks of errorists he does not stop to prove their doctrines false. Such proof would have been superfluous in writing to such men. He simply emphasizes the pernicious practical consequences of the errors which were multiplying, and tries to stir up his spiritual children to vigilant, successful opposition. A candid recognition of these changed conditions goes far toward explaining the peculiarities of style and diction which mark these Epistles, and in the light of these facts it is unreasonable to condemn them because they are not pervaded by Pauline dialectics. It is fair to say, indeed, that if, in spite of these different circumstances, the style and diction were the same as in the four Homologoumena, that fact alone would be conclusive proof of spuriousness.

We now come to Holtzmann's proof that the Pastoral Epistles are dependent upon other writings. He introduces the discussion with this statement: "With all our author's independence and individuality there is also a far reaching dependence in vocabulary and forms of expression which show him to be a *pedisequus Pauli*. Indeed it is not only the genuine Epistles of Paul which serve as models, but also all of those which had been put into circulation under Paul's name, including the work of the author *ad Ephesios*. In fact he has his eye upon the whole school of Paul." (Page 109.) It is interesting to find the affinities of the Pastoral Epistles with the whole range of Pauline literature thus naively asserted. Holtzmann devotes several pages to the task of showing just how passages of Paul's Epistles and of other New Testament books, now as reminiscences, now as copied quotations, by various modifications and combinations were wrought into the texture of these compositions. If these Epistles were elaborated in this manner it ought not to be difficult to prove it. The following are Holtzmann's most striking proofs. He says the parenthetical assertion in 1 Tim. ii. 7, "I speak the truth, I lie not," is introduced without any apparent reason except the desire to quote Rom. ix. 1. (Page 110.) "My conscience bearing witness with me

¹ *Church History*, i. 806.

in the Holy Ghost" might have been added. A writer who would copy from Romans, as Holtzmann alleges, would not mutilate so striking a passage. In 1 Tim. i. 15, Paul calls himself chief of sinners. This, according to our critic, is only an adaptation of the phrase "least of the apostles," found in 1 Cor. xv. 9. The most convincing proof of the dependence of 2 Timothy is found in i. 3, 4. The passage runs: "I thank God, whom I serve from my forefathers in a pure conscience, how unceasing is my remembrance of thee in my supplications, night and day longing to see thee, remembering thy tears, that I may be filled with joy." In this passage reminiscences of three distinct passages are blended. Acts xxiv. 14, "So serve I the God of my fathers," furnishes the opening words. The ἀνθρώπος συνειδήσεως of Acts xxiv. 16, in combination with the πάση συνειδήσει ἀγαθῇ of xxiii. 1, explains the phrase ἐν καθαρῇ συνειδήσει; while Rom. i. 9 contributes the rest: "For God is my witness, whom I serve in my spirit in the gospel of his Son, how unceasingly I make mention of you," etc. (Page 111.) To say that such a theory of the origin of this passage is nonsense is mild criticism. Holtzmann's admissions in regard to the independence and individuality of the writer are absolutely incompatible with any conscious attempt at such combination, and it is not clear to see how reminiscences could be involuntarily patched together so as to produce such a result as Holtzmann describes. Again, the catalogue of sins in 2 Tim. iii. 2-4 is said to be modeled after Rom. i. 30. But Romans has only twelve words while 2 Timothy has eighteen, and only four are common to the two lists. Our author cannot repress his originality even in the act of borrowing. Another example of extraordinary expansion is 2 Tim. iii. 16, "Every scripture inspired of God," etc. This is only a circumlocution for Rom. xv. 4, "For whatsoever things were written aforetime were written for our learning." These are, I repeat, the most striking proofs. A large majority of the coincidences consist of single words or of general agreement in idea. Agreements in whole clauses or phrases are very few. One who was deliberately attempting to write in Pauline fashion would not have been content with so little. An imitator would have stuck closer to his model. The salutations furnish conclusive proof that these Epistles are not mere imitations. An imitator, after he had warmed to his work, might neglect to array his ideas in Pauline garb, but this could not be the case at the very start. Then, if ever, he would be careful to conform his diction to his model. But this is just what the writer of these Epistles has failed to do. There is, to be sure, much variety in the Pauline addresses, some being very long (as in Romans), others very short (as in 1 Thessalonians), but the salutations exhibit a striking uniformity. All of the ten Epistles have "Grace to you and peace from God our Father and the Lord Jesus Christ," except Colossians, which omits the last phrase, and 1 Thessalonians, which has only "Grace to you and peace." Is it probable that an imitator would depart from this stereotyped form? But our author does so by inserting "mercy" between grace and peace in two of the Epistles, while in the other he changes the customary phrase, "the Lord Jesus Christ," into "Christ Jesus our Saviour." Is it not much more probable that Paul, who was by no means bound to stereotyped phrases, modified the usual formula, than that an imitator, who was doing his best to write like Paul, meddled with phraseology which must have been very familiar to his readers? A comparison of Romans and Galatians brings to light several

coincidences that are much more striking than any in Holtzmann's list. The same ideas are often repeated, and in a few instances in almost identical words.¹ Coincidences of the same kind are found between Ephesians and Colossians.² Now the relation in both these cases is of the same general kind as that between the Pastoral Epistles and the other Pauline writings, but it is considerably closer, and this the nearness of these Epistles to each other in time would lead us to expect. But what would even Holtzmann think of the claim that Galatians is dependent upon Romans, or *vice versa*? It is not strange that Paul in his later years did not discard all his former vocabulary, nor banish all his old ideas. Old words and thoughts crop out here and there in the Pastoral Epistles, but they are found for the most part in new connections and applications, and are used with naturalness, ease, and freedom.

II. ERRORS OPPOSED. — The references to these are numerous, and the following are the chief characteristics mentioned. The errors are called vain talking, profane babblings, fables and endless genealogies, profane and old wives' fables; and those who teach them, vain talkers and deceivers.³ The word which describes their activity is *ἐπεροδιδασκαλείν*.⁴ They are said to be puffed up, although they know nothing, and to desire to be *νομοδιδασκαλοι*, although they have no real understanding of that about which they make such confident affirmations. The phrase "those of the circumcision" proves that some of them were Jews, and the Jewish element in their speculations is strongly marked by the designation "Jewish myths," as well as by the statements that they themselves wished to be law teachers, and that their teaching led to fights about the law (*μάχαι νομικαί*).⁵ This Jewish element is the clearest feature of the picture. These teachers are described in Titus as *ἀντιλέγοντες*, and in 2 Timothy they are said to put themselves in opposition and to withstand the truth; but most of the references and characterizations are of such a sort as to indicate that they did not stand in direct antagonism to the saving truth of the gospel. They were engaged rather in discussions which had no connection with holiness and salvation, which were foolish, vain, unprofitable, and were spreading in the churches like a gangrene.⁶ Timothy and Titus are not enjoined to refute these doctrines, but to avoid them. They are to sharply rebuke and silence those who are propagating them, yet correction is to be administered in a spirit of forbearance and meekness.⁷ The writer justifies this course by pointing to the pernicious practical consequences of these discussions. They cause envy, strife, railing, evil surmisings, factiousness. The character of the men who engage in them is thoroughly bad. They are corrupted in mind and bereft of the truth. They profess to know God, but by their works they deny Him, being abominable and disobedient and unto every good work reprobate. They are not inspired by an unselfish purpose to do good to others, but they teach for filthy lucre's sake.⁸ They have in fact a form of godliness to cover their godlessness, and, naturally enough, the effect of their activity is not so much the perversion of doctrine as the corruption of

¹ Cf. Gal. ii. 20 with Rom. vi. 6; Gal. v. 14 with Rom. xiii. 8 ff.; Gal. v. 18 with Rom. vii. 15. For other parallel passages see Lightfoot's *Gal.*, p. 45 ff.

² For a list of the parallel passages see Meyer on *Eph.* p. 24.

³ See 1 Tim. i. 6; 2 Tim. ii. 16; Tit. i. 10; 1 Tim. iv. 7.

⁴ 1 Tim. i. 3 ff.

⁵ 2 Tim. ii. 16; Tit. iii. 9.

⁶ Tit. i. 11, 16; 1 Tim. vi. 5; 2 Tim. iii. 1-3.

⁷ Tit. i. 14; iii. 9; 1 Tim. i. 7.

⁸ Tit. i. 11-13; 2 Tim. ii. 25.

morals. Their speculations are foolish and unprofitable, but their practical influence is insufferably bad. These, with the growing tendency toward asceticism, are the essential details of the picture. A few passages, omitted here, will be discussed later.

Who are these errorists? Can we identify them with any particular school? Before the time of Baur several different opinions were held, but the settlement of the question was not considered important. Baur was the first to try to fix the date of the Pastoral Epistles by identifying these false teachers with the Gnostics. That his attempt to prove a reference to the school of Marcion is a failure is now generally admitted, by none more frankly than by Holtzmann. The expressions "Jewish myths," "law-fights," "law-teachers," and "those of the circumcision" cannot by any exegetical jugglery be brought into harmony with Marcionite Antinomianism. Most of the details upon which Baur relied apply as well to several other Gnostic schools, and some of them are by no means specifically Gnostic. The fact is, Baur was misled by a striking coincidence. The term *ἀντιθέσεις*, found in the phrase *ἀντιθέσεις τῆς ψευδοπροφητοῦ γνώσεως*, was the name of one of the chief symbolical books of the Marcionites, and Baur jumped to the conclusion that the writer warns against this book. But Holtzmann rightly rejects this interpretation because the Pastoral Epistles do not contain any unmistakable reference to Marcionism, while they do emphasize points that are antagonistic to it. Attempts have been made to identify with other Gnostic schools. Lipsius¹ and others suggest pre-Valentinian Ophitism. This hypothesis is shown to be as indefensible as Baur's. After examining all the proposed identification Holtzmann arrives at this conclusion:—"A reference throughout to a definite Gnostic system cannot be proved, though individual features of the portrait of Gnosticism are clearly recognizable, and it is exactly designated by its name in 1 Tim. vi. 20, and in such a way that the designation appears as a current one; hence there is indicated by it a definite tendency and kind of doctrine." (Page 132.) The opinions of many other scholars are in substantial accord. Pfeleiderer finds a plurality of references, to Cerinthus, Saturninus, Basilides, and the Ophites.² Hilgenfeld makes a primary distinction between Judaistic and Gnostic opponents, and of the latter finds the schools of Saturninus, Marcion, Valentinus, and the Marcosians referred to.³ The old claim that the Pastoral Epistles aim at one particular Gnostic school is generally abandoned, and now it is alleged that the author has his eye upon the development of Gnosticism as a whole; and it is said the fact that this development took place in the first half of the second century proves these Epistles to be second-century productions. But is this a fact? Are there in these Epistles indubitable references to the thought of the second century?

Let us examine the passages which in Holtzmann's estimation prove the affirmative (page 129 ff.). One of these is 1 Tim. iv. 3, "forbidding to marry, and commanding to abstain from meats." It is true that ascetic tendencies are characteristic of many Gnostic schools, but they were not confined to them. The Essenes were very decidedly ascetic, and their asceticism included the particulars here mentioned. Asceticism had begun to affect the church when Romans was written, and in Colossians it is much more pronounced. There is nothing improbable in the supposition

¹ *Gnosticismus*, p. 141.

³ *Einleitung*, p. 760 ff.

² *Protestanten-Bibel*, p. 836.

that a later development of this same tendency is referred to in the Pastoral Epistles. Asceticism belongs to the first century as well as to the second. The statement in 2 Tim. ii. 18, that some taught that the resurrection was already past, is said to refer to the Gnostics, many of whom denied the resurrection of the flesh and held only to a resurrection out of the death of ignorance into the life of knowledge. But the passage contains no distinct reference to this view. All that is asserted is, that certain persons held the resurrection to be past. Of what sort they conceived it to be we are not told. They may have been led by such an utterance as Col. iii. 1 to believe in a spiritual resurrection only, but such a view would not be necessarily identical with the peculiar tenet of the Gnostics. In short, there is no certain reference to Gnosticism. Again, this passage does not represent the false doctrine about the resurrection as an element of a heretical system, but rather as an aberration of two individuals who are mentioned by name, from which it is obvious that the writer does not think of this error as having general currency. It cannot be admitted, then, that this passage helps in any way to fix the date of the Epistle. Holtzmann finds traces of Gnostic phraseology in the Pastoral Epistles. The only words he mentions are: *ἄφθαρτος*, *ἀφθαρσία*, *χρόνιοι αἰώνιοι*, and, with a "perhaps," *αἰῶνες* and *ἐπιφάνεια*. He adopts Baur's explanation of the presence of these alleged Gnostic terms. "In a time when Christian dogma was undefined and undeveloped and only Gnostics were seeking to formulate and systematize their views, Gnostic ideas and expressions would involuntarily be used by the Orthodox church teachers."¹ Holtzmann would hardly admit that Paul in writing to the Romans and Corinthians borrowed these expressions from the Gnostics, but in those Epistles he uses them all but one, and most of them more frequently than here. The exception is *ἐπιφάνεια*, the only one noticeable for the frequency of its use (five times), and that is found in 2 Thessalonians. The Gnostics may have derived these terms from the New Testament, but to reverse the relation is impossible. Holtzmann affirms that 1 Tim. ii. 5 is directed against the Gnostic Christology, by emphasizing the unity of the Mediator as opposed to the Gnostic double personality, and putting stress upon the humanity of Jesus in opposition to Docetism. I fail to detect any polemic intent. Neither the unity nor the humanity of the Mediator is more strongly emphasized than in Rom. v. 15. The writer is speaking of God's will that all should be saved. He brings into connection with this the unity of the Mediator to indicate that there is but one way of salvation, and emphasizes his humanity to show his relation to the whole human race. The writer's aim is not Christological but soteriological. Holtzmann says further that some of the ethical characteristics fit the Gnostics. He quotes 2 Tim. iii. 6, "Of these are they that creep into houses and lead captive silly women," etc., and says that Irenæus and Epiphanius charge the Gnostics with conducting their propagandism among the women, the latter applying this very text to them. To this Weiss's reply is sufficient. "The experience of all ages shows how readily the propagandists of new doctrines turn to the female sex, because women are more susceptible and responsive." (Page 308.) It must be shown that the second century had a monopoly of this practice to give this passage any value as proof. Holtzman refers to the prohibition of teaching on the part of women in 1 Tim. ii. 12, and says that Tertullian charged the heretical women with this misdemeanor. Was Paul, when he wrote to the Corinthians, "Let the

¹ *Pastoralbriefe*, p. 28.

women keep silence in your churches," etc., looking forward with prophetic eye to the Gnosticism of the second century? Again, Holtzmann quotes the statement of Irenæus that many Gnostics would not teach without a fee, and says we have a description of these men in the words "who suppose that godliness is a way of gain" (1 Tim. vi. 5). But 2 Cor. xi. 20 shows that Paul's opponents at Corinth had this same greed of gain.

This exhausts Holtzmann's list of alleged references to second century Gnosticism. In order to give these passages any probative force it must be shown that they cannot apply to the first century. This has not been and cannot be done. Those whom Holtzmann stigmatizes as apologists rightly urge that a writer of the second century whose sole aim was to combat Gnosticism would have drawn a distinct and unmistakable picture of his own times. Holtzmann tries to parry this by saying that it attributes to our writer a greater confusion of the two epochs than he is really guilty of. He felt obliged to allude to contemporary heresy in the most general terms in order to succeed in passing off his productions as those of Paul (page 157). But the supposition that our author toned down and simplified the phenomena of his own day so as to attribute only their beginnings to the age of the apostle is an admission that there is here no decisive reference to the second century. If we could prove independently that our author wrote in the second century, some such hypothesis would be a necessity; but if we are dependent upon the heretical phenomena of the Epistles to establish their date, the conclusion is indubitable that they belong to an earlier period. Furthermore, this hypothesis assumes a refinement of the forger's art to which we find no parallels in those times. Holtzmann admits this in discussing another matter and so demonstrates the untenableness of his own theory. He says that the Pastoral Epistles must be of earlier date than those of Ignatius, because there is nothing in them of those exalted claims with reference to the divine origin of the episcopate of which Ignatius is full. "That, however [this is Holtzmann's argument] the author shrewdly affected such ignorance, and, in order to reproduce artificially the time relations of Paul, traced back only the first elements of the later institution to the apostle, entirely contradicts the analogies of pseudepigraphic literature, whose distinguishing mark is a naive and for the most part *bona fide* carrying back of the actual present into the past esteemed as canonical." (Page 214.) Apply this argument to the heresies of our Epistles, and their alleged reference to the second century falls to the ground. Our author's references to the views he opposes permit but one alternative. Either he was a skillful forger, who reproduced with admirable exactness the church life of a past age, or he is an honest writer, describing the germinant errors of his own time, which required several decades to come to full fruitage. Since the first conclusion would entirely contradict the analogies of pseudepigraphic literature, we are compelled to adopt the second. Weiss finds another strong argument against the second century hypothesis in the fact that Timothy and Titus are nowhere summoned to the refutation of fundamental errors, but are constantly exhorted to reject and avoid foolish and unfruitful speculations. "If one says [Weiss argues] that it seemed safer to the author and at least easier to reject opposing theories *a limine* than to enter upon a refutation of them, he thereby removes these Epistles out of the historical environment in which he wishes to place them, since as an actual fact there was never lacking

to the church a consciousness of its fundamental opposition to Gnosticism, nor confidence in its ability to overcome it with spiritual weapons." (Page 23.)

The utmost claim which the facts bear out is that the Pastoral Epistles contain some germs of Gnostic error. That such germs did not exist till long after the death of Paul is a purely arbitrary assertion. Gnosticism was long in the air before it crystallized into definite systems. It is sufficient proof of this that no spot can be pointed to as its birthplace, no individual as its originator, but at the beginning of the second century numerous systems sprang into existence throughout the Orient. If Gnosticism comes to such abundant fruitage early in the second century, its roots must extend down deep into the soil of the first. Again, the union of Gnostic and Judaistic elements points indubitably to Essenic influence. Mangold has written a little book to prove that the errorists of the Pastoral Epistles are Essenes.¹ His argument is more convincing than any other I have found which attempts a complete identification with a single school, but it does not win entire assent, for some of the points mentioned cannot be proved to be Essenic. While, however, it cannot be demonstrated that Essenes in the strict sense are referred to in our Epistles, it is very probable that the peculiar teaching which they oppose was developed through the contact of Christianity with Essenism. This view is now quite widely accepted.² It accounts for the union of Judaistic and Gnostic elements. It explains, too, the early date of these errors, since Essenism existed when the church was founded. It is probable that the weak brethren of Rom. xiv. exhibit the beginning of Essenic influence upon Christianity. In Colossians we find that this influence has become a serious menace to the life of the church. If Paul wrote Colossians either shortly before or shortly after the year 60, there is no valid reason, in the development of heretical tendencies, for rejecting his authorship a little later of the Pastoral Epistles, two of which were sent to the same region. These tendencies are sufficiently accounted for without calling to our aid the Gnosticism of the second century.

III. CHURCH ORGANIZATION. — Baur was the first to elaborate the argument that the church organization of the Pastoral Epistles is that of the second century. He claims that Paul did not occupy himself with the establishment of church order, and that care for such matters betrays the spirit of a later age. Since the church organization which Baur found in these Epistles rests largely upon his misinterpretation of the passages about presbyters and bishops, as Holtzmann, Pfeiderer, and others of his followers admit, it is not necessary to examine his view in detail. But Baur makes one concession which is too important to be overlooked. He compares the farewell address of Paul to the Ephesian elders (Acts xx. 17-36) with the state of the church described in our Epistles, and admits their close correspondence. He quotes Paul's prophecy that after his departure (by ἀφίξις Baur understands death) grievous wolves should enter in among them, not sparing the flock; and from among themselves men should arise speaking perverse things to draw away the disciples after them; and says that Paul seems to see these dangers not in the distant, but in the immediate, future. He remarks, too, that here, as in the Pastoral Epistles, the bishops are expected to resist and ward off these

¹ *Die Irrlehrer der Pastoralbriefe*, 1856.

² Ritschl, Grau, Van Oosterzee, Immer, Zückler, Huther. Lightfoot argues for it ably in his commentary on Colossians.

dangers and protect the flock, and adds: "This address, then, appears to give the clearest proof that the very thing which is the chief subject and aim of the Pastoral Epistles lay at that time very close to the apostle's horizon." (Page 92). After this admission the only way in which Baur can rescue his theory is to assert that it is only too clear that this farewell address is a prophecy *post eventum*. To those who do not admit that the authenticity of the Acts has been disproved this passage furnishes very important testimony to the claims of our Epistles.

The assertion that Paul paid no attention to church organization, though still repeated with emphasis, is incorrect. The four Homologoumena are almost silent on this subject, but they are not quite so. They give no description of a regular fixed organization, and there is no mention of any church official except the deaconess of Cenchreæ (Rom. xvi. 1); a reference which Holtzmann tries to explain away by rendering *διάκονος patrona*. But in 1 Cor. xii. 28 there are two words (*ἀντιλήψεις, κυβερνήσεις*) which describe the functions of church officers; that is, the offices are clearly referred to, although the official designations are wanting. So, too, Rom. xii. 8 refers to the duties of church officers: "He that ruleth, with diligence, he that sheweth mercy, with cheerfulness." The assumption that this is all the knowledge we have about the organization of the Pauline churches is groundless. In Acts xiv. 23 — the brief account of the work of Paul and Barnabas in Antioch, Iconium, Derbe, and Lystra — we read of the appointment of elders in every church. It is a natural inference from this incidental statement that it was Paul's custom to appoint elders in every new congregation. This inference is supported by other facts. In 1 Thessalonians, the earliest of Paul's Epistles, written, too, less than two years after the formation of the church at Thessalonica, we read: "But we beseech you, brethren, to know them that labor among you and are over you in the Lord and admonish you, and to esteem them very highly in love for their works' sake" (v. 12). There *προιστάμενοι*, who were also *νουθετοῦντες*, must have been church officers and were without doubt elders. In Phil. i. 1 there is mention of bishops and deacons. We have no information concerning the appointment of church officers in Ephesus, Philippi, and Thessalonica, but of their existence in Paul's lifetime there can be no reasonable doubt; and this fact leaves no room for the plea that the apostle's intimate relation to the churches which he founded made church organization in his view unnecessary. It is fair to infer, in the absence of testimony to the contrary, that Paul followed substantially the same method everywhere. It is but natural, too, that as time went on and evil tendencies began to show themselves in the churches, Paul should feel more and more the importance of having strong, true men in the places of authority. If his address to the Ephesian elders is authentic, he had a deep sense of the weighty responsibilities which were sure to come upon the leaders of the Ephesian church. If Paul really uttered such exhortations and warnings, it is not at all improbable that we should find him, a few years later, emphasizing to his associates the necessity of filling the offices of the church with thoroughly good men.

What is the actual organization of the Pastoral Epistles? All admit that *πρεσβύτερος* and *ἐπίσκοπος* are synonymous. Only two classes of officers are mentioned — the same two classes which we have already found at Philippi, and which existed very early in the church at Jerusalem. There is no evidence of the existence of the episcopate. Neither is

there any evidence of a fixed model of organization to which every church must conform, as there certainly would be if these Epistles were pervaded by hierarchical tendencies. Timothy, who was located at Ephesus, where a church had been in existence for several years, is instructed concerning the qualifications of both bishops and deacons. Titus, who is founding new churches, is directed to appoint elders, but nothing is said to him about deacons.¹ Some have tried to make the *πρεσβυτεροι* of Tit. ii. 6 mean deacons, but that meaning is just as impossible here as in 1 Tim. v. 1. In 2 Timothy there is not a syllable about church organization. These Epistles as a whole contain far less about church order than the statements of the critics would lead one to suppose. A writer controlled by the later hierarchical spirit would not have left the scheme of church organization in so fluid a condition, nor would he have been content to say so little on the subject.

But Holtzmann insists that several passages contain the germs of the later hierarchical system. The distinction between clergy and laity which he finds in 1 Tim. v. 20 is wholly imaginary. He thinks that the direction that a bishop should be the husband of one wife (1 Tim. iii. 2), a direction repeated in the qualifications for the diaconate (verse 12), indicates that special sanctity was demanded of church officers. This is a difficult matter to explain, and we must decide with certainty what the direction means before we draw inferences from it. There is hardly a point about which interpreters are more hopelessly divided. The prohibition of second marriage seems to me the most probable interpretation. If it is admitted that those were more highly respected who did not remarry (cf. v. 9), it cannot be doubted that such persons would have more influence as church officers; and the laudable desire to secure the most efficient men would fully account for this prescription without attributing to the writer the purpose of erecting a barrier between clergy and laity. But whatever we may think of this one point, it is evident, when we examine the whole list of qualifications, that moral purity is specially emphasized. Even Holtzmann says: "There is not much demanded, but rather a line is drawn below which one could not go without falling short of the moral character which Christianity demands." (Page 212.) There is in fact no description of a distinct and privileged class. Holtzmann repudiates some of Baur's strange interpretations, but he adopts some that are at least equally strange. His assumption that 1 Tim. iii. 10 points to a probationary period connected with induction into the diaconate, and that iii. 13 points to a difference of rank between church officials, deserves to be classed with the theory that *μὴ δολογος* (iii. 8) means that in case of strife the deacon must hold unconditionally to the side of the bishop. Holtzmann claims that the reference to the support of Christian teachers by the congregation points to post-apostolic times, but 1 Cor. ix. 6-14 and 2 Cor. xi. 7 f. prove the contrary. In one point the Pastoral Epistles mark progress, namely, in the requirement that a bishop should be *διδασκαλικός*. At the first the teaching function was quite independent of the eldership. In our Epistles the teaching and ruling functions are not perfectly united. It is obvious that teaching was not restricted to the presbyters, and that the presbyters did not all teach (1 Tim. v. 17). But it is just as obvious that the apostle desires that those who rule shall also teach. A valid reason for this is not far to seek.

¹ On this whole subject see Kühl's *Gemeinde-Ordnung in den Pastoralbriefen*. 1885.

The unhealthy tendencies away from Christian truth led him to emphasize the necessity of preserving purity of doctrine. This responsibility must rest primarily upon the church officers. How could they discharge it better than by teaching the healthful doctrine themselves?

Some find evidence of a monarchical tendency in the relation of Timothy and Titus to the churches. Some (so Pfeiderer) describe them as bishops, others (as Holtzmann) compare their position to that of the later metropolitan or archbishop. Holtzmann admits that there is no trace of the divine origin of the episcopate, but he thinks the position of Timothy as *vicarius apostolicus* indicates the monarchical trend of the second century, the tendency which resulted in the elevation of one presbyter above his companions. It is of course a fact that later tradition represents Timothy and Titus as bishops, but this was a simple transfer of the system of a later age into that of the apostles. The Pastoral Epistles do not justify any such view of their position. Timothy is called an evangelist (2 Tim. iv. 5) and *διάκονος* (1 Tim. iv. 6). His ministry was that of preaching the gospel. But Holtzmann resorts to this forced explanation. In the opinion of the author, he says, the diaconate was related to the presbyterate as youth to age; hence as Timothy is represented as a young man he calls him deacon, though of course not in the strict technical sense. But the word was common enough in its primary sense, as Paul's frequent application of it to himself shows. There is no more evidence that Timothy was bishop of a district or province than that he was bishop of a single church. A comparison of 1 Tim. i. 3 and iii. 15 shows that Timothy was left at Ephesus to oversee matters during Paul's absence. His commission was but temporary. In 2 Timothy he is summoned to Rome (iv. 9) and we learn that Tychicus had been sent to Ephesus (iv. 12), evidently to take Timothy's place. So, too, Titus is summoned from Crete (iii. 12); but he was not to leave there until Artemas or Tychicus should arrive to carry on the work. There is nothing of the fixed system, the permanent investiture of office, which belongs to the church of the second century. It has not been proved that the writer regards Timothy and Titus as belonging to a new order of the clergy, to which the officers of the local church are in ecclesiastical subordination. The only passage which gives apparent support to this view is 1 Tim. v. 19-25, where directions are given concerning the discipline of presbyters; but that this is more apparent than real is shown by the fact that Timothy had only a temporary commission to act as substitute for the apostle. Holtzmann refers to the repeated mention of Timothy's ordination in support of his view, but this fact cannot bear the weight he puts upon it, for there is no reference to the ordination of Titus, and if Acts is authentic even the first deacons at Jerusalem were ordained.

The relation of our Epistles to those of Ignatius throws much light upon their chronology. We learn from 1 Timothy that the church at Ephesus had presbyters and deacons, but find no trace of the episcopate. The Epistles of Ignatius exhibit the church organization which existed not only at Ephesus, but throughout Asia Minor about 110 A. D. There were then three orders of the ministry in every church, a bishop, a body of elders or presbytery, and a number of deacons. Ignatius asserts that where these are not there is no church. "The threefold ministry is the centre of order and the guarantee of unity in the church" (Lightfoot). There is still no trace of a diocese, no tinge of sacerdotalism. "Episcopacy had not passed beyond its primitive stage" (Lightfoot), but, in

that region at least, its primitive stage had fully come. We find, then, that at the beginning of the second decade of the second century the episcopal office was firmly and widely established. If, now, we suppose that the transition from the polity of 1 Timothy, where there is no trace of the episcopate, to that of Ignatius, where it is firmly established, took place within half a century, we attribute to the organization of the church a rapid development; but half a century carries us back to the days of Paul. In the light of this fact it is impossible to impeach the genuineness of the Pastoral Epistles on the ground that they reflect the church organization of the second century. In order to attribute these Epistles to the second century it is necessary to adopt the hypothesis which Holtzmann repudiates, namely, that the author affected ignorance of the institutions of his own day and reproduced artificially the church order of the apostolic age.

Time does not permit a discussion of the question whether the theology of the Pastoral Epistles is Pauline, a question which I answer with an unconditional affirmative. Many other matters are omitted, but all are of minor importance. The main lines of the argument all point to the alternative of genuineness or out-and-out forgery. Either Paul wrote these Epistles, as they themselves claim, or they are the work of an author who tried to disguise himself under the garb of Pauline ideas and diction, who invented historical situations and perhaps utilized fragments of genuine Pauline documents in order to perfect his deception, and so cleverly affected ignorance concerning the heretical schools and the church polity of his own day as to make his productions speak on these subjects the language of a bygone age. The more knowledge we get of the conditions of the second century, the more impossible it becomes to believe that such a forgery could have been produced. Even the negative critics are shy of this hypothesis, while the traditional view is corroborated by the genuine Christian ring of these Epistles, their high ideal of Christian character, and the strong emphasis they place on a good conscience, sincerity, and truthfulness.

F. E. Woodruff.

BOOK REVIEWS AND NOTICES.

PSYCHOLOGY. THE COGNITIVE POWERS. By JAMES MCCOSH, D. D., LL. D., Litt. D. Crown 8vo, pp. vii., 245. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons. 1886. \$1.50.

THE author remarks in the Introduction, "In Botany we collect plants and look at their forms and habits. In Psychology we notice mind as it operates and mark its various states." This is a sufficient account of the old botany and the old psychology, but by no means a sufficient account either of the new botany or the new psychology. As the new botany is much more concerned with physiological processes and genetic connections than with external forms and habits, so the new psychology aims rather to explain how the mind comes to act in given ways than simply to notice its operations and mark its state. The scope of the book is for the most part limited to the definition given above. Much indeed is said about the part which physiology is coming to play in psychology;

and diagrams illustrating the physiology of the organs of sense are introduced. Still there is no organic connection between the physiology and the psychology. They are not assimilated. The book contains physiology and psychology in separate portions, but of physiological psychology, that is, the explanation of mental processes by their physiological concomitants, it contains scarcely anything.

The classification and description of the faculties or powers of the mind is clear and simple, and, apart from the metaphysics mixed up with it, presents a good inventory of our mental furnishings, coupled with wholesome advice about their cultivation and employment.

The metaphysical portion of the book consists chiefly in a polemic against "that subtle metaphysical error," Idealism; and the assertion of "Natural Realism" as the solution of all the problems connected with sense-perception.

There are two articles in the Natural Realist's creed which we may examine separately. First: "The mind commences its intelligent act with the knowledge of things; by the senses of body, our own frame or things beyond; by the inner sense, of the conscious mind in its present state and exercise."

This is begging the whole question, — assuming the very point involved in the discussion. Kant wrote his Critique of Pure Reason to teach that the knowledge of things, so far as such a phrase has any precise meaning, is the product of the sensations of the various special senses, received into the universal *a priori* forms of space and time, reduced into a synthesis by the categories. Simpler phraseology doubtless may be found; exceptions may be taken to the details of his solution; but he who professes to explain the process of knowledge by a less thorough analysis of the elements, sensuous and psychical, which enter into it, confesses that he has failed to recognize the nature of the problem. Our author, in adopting ready-made the phrase "knowledge of things" as the very corner-stone of a scientific doctrine on this subject, without previous inquiry into the elements of which such knowledge of things is constituted, is like a chemist who should begin his treatise with bodies such as bricks, and trees, and stones, without a hint that these bodies could be resolved into simpler elements. In both cases the books might be full of common sense, and of great interest and profit to the general reader, but their value as scientific treatises would be equal.

The second feature of this natural realism is set forth as follows: "In perception the mind takes cognizance of something external to the perceiving mind." "All knowledge obtained through the senses is discerned as extra-mental, that is, as out of and beyond the perceiving mind."

One would like to know the precise meaning of such phrases as "extra-mental," and "external to the perceiving mind." If we were not forced to regard as a misprint the statement on page 234 that "we know the mind as having extension," the meaning of these phrases would be simple enough. But we are told on page 8 that in order to avoid taking materialistic conceptions with us into psychology we are not to allow ourselves to look on mind itself, or any of its operations, as occupying space or as extended. If mind does not occupy space, what, we are compelled to ask again, is the meaning of "extra-mental," and "out of the mind?" If the phrase be not altogether figurative and meaningless, it means that the author, in company with the whole school of psychologists who insist on putting "things" in the place of ideas in the process of knowledge, has

forgotten the caution against taking materialistic conceptions with us into psychology, and is here applying to mind terms drawn from space, and which therefore are properly applicable only to matter, which alone exists in spatial relations. Space — and mutual exclusiveness, which is the law of space — is utterly inapplicable to mind. In and out, — inclusion, exclusion, — if applied to mind, even figuratively, signify, as Locke taught in his *Essay*, being perceived and not being perceived. To perceive an object as out of the mind and independent of it is flat self-contradiction, on any theory short of the grossest materialism.

As might be expected, such a theory has no explanation to offer of the interaction of mind and matter; and accordingly the least satisfactory, the most arbitrary and mechanical, of all the historic theories — Leibnitz's doctrine of preëstablished harmony — is revived and presented under the phrase "foreordained conformity." The book is written in a clear and simple style; it breathes a sweet and winning spirit; and it is inspired by a noble purpose. In these respects it is a model of what a text-book should be.

Wm. DeW. Hyde.

BOWDOIN COLLEGE, BRUNSWICK, ME.

AMERICAN DIPLOMACY AND THE FURTHERANCE OF COMMERCE. By EUGENE SCHUYLER, Ph. D., LL. D. 8vo, pp. xiv., 469. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons. 1886. \$2.50.

THIS book is based upon two courses of lectures delivered before the students of the University of Cornell, and elsewhere, which had for their object "to explain the actual working of an important department of our government, about which there appears to be much ignorance and misunderstanding." To further this object in a larger field fully justifies their publication in book form, for, to the average American at home, diplomacy — which Mr. Schuyler defines, following Calvo, to be the "art of negotiations" — is, for the most part, a blank, and the diplomatic service appears conspicuous for its defects; and by this same American abroad it is judged chiefly by its ministrations to his personal needs. The constitution and conduct of the system, as well as the appointees filling its offices, are largely responsible for this, and furnish the grounds for Mr. Schuyler's criticisms, which are modestly given, and are the logical sequences of the facts presented. It is impossible to follow Mr. Schuyler's analysis of his subject in detail, which is at times almost tedious to the general reader, but is so clear and thorough as to be of great value to the student of our political system.

His readers will not only learn of the defects of our system, but of its merits, and will gather much information of the duties and responsibilities of American agents in official positions abroad, as well as of the work required of them and the manner in which it has been performed. Our methods are contrasted with those pursued by other nations, especially by England, Germany, and France, and Mr. Schuyler's opinion of their respective merits will be found to agree with that of others who have given the subject attention; the comparison emphasizes the fact that our service is badly constituted, clumsily managed, insufficiently paid, and that the result is a low average of service rendered. Beyond all question, our diplomatic system should be separated from party politics, and elevated to the dignity of a profession, demanding the services of gentlemen of

education and ability, adequately prepared, and showing special fitness for its peculiar work, and to whom it shall offer proper and ample compensation in salaries, secure tenure of office, and ultimately a pension, in return for competent and faithful performance of duty. The service itself would furnish a school in its lower grades for training men to fill its more important offices. We may be a law unto ourselves, within our own borders, and conduct our domestic matters under whatever conditions we choose to adopt, but the power, wealth, and dignity of the republic demand that we regard the methods and respect the conventionalities which obtain among great powers in the management of international affairs. Mr. Schuyler divides his book into two parts. The first treats of the Consular System, — which is “primarily charged with the commercial interests of the country,” and, since the decadence of our foreign shipping, is chiefly occupied in obtaining information of the cost or value of merchandise subject to duty when imported into this country, and such facts as may be of value to our merchants in maintaining or developing our export of American products, — and of the Diplomatic Service, to which is intrusted “the maintenance of friendly relations between states, and the settlement of disputes which may arise between them.”

Part second gives some “examples of American diplomatic efforts to protect commerce and navigation,” instancing the successful attempt to free our shipping interests in the Mediterranean from the exaction of tribute by the piratical Barbary powers, and containing chapters on the Right of Search, the Rights of Neutrals, Commercial Treaties, and a timely chapter on the Fisheries Question.

Mr. Schuyler's important services during the investigation of the Bulgarian massacres, his long journey along the outposts of the Russian advance in Central Asia, and his intelligent account of her aims and position as an Asiatic power, will attract many readers to any production from his pen, while his seventeen years of service in the diplomatic corps fully qualify him to write in this special field.

His book is of handy size, has a good letter-press, a copious index, and while it may not be of great interest to the general reader, is of decided value as a book of reference, and should accomplish its professed object in awakening an interest in, and giving information of, American diplomacy.

Alpheus H. Hardy.

BOSTON.

A HARMONY OF THE FOUR GOSPELS IN GREEK. Newly arranged, with Explanatory Notes. By EDWARD ROBINSON, D. D., LL. D. Revised Edition, giving the text of Tischendorf, and various readings accepted by Tregelles, Westcott and Hort, and in the revised English Version of 1881. With additional notes by M. B. RIDDLE, D. D., Professor of New Testament Exegesis in Hartford Theological Seminary. 8vo, pp. xxvi., 273. Boston: Houghton, Mifflin & Co. 1885. \$2.00.

A HARMONY OF THE FOUR GOSPELS IN ENGLISH. According to the Common Version. Newly arranged, with Explanatory Notes. By EDWARD ROBINSON, D. D., LL. D. Revised Edition, with foot-notes from the Revised Version of 1881, and Additional Notes by M. B. RIDDLE, D. D. 8vo, pp. xix., 205. Boston and New York: Houghton, Mifflin & Co. 1886. \$1.50.

ROBINSON'S Greek and English Harmonies have been widely known and used for more than a generation. These works have been of so much service in the study of the Gospels that improved editions cannot but be

cordially welcomed. The most important change in the Greek Harmony is the substitution of the text of Tischendorf's eighth edition for that of Hahn. It is to be regretted that the edition of Westcott and Hort was not selected, for that is generally considered the best, and, besides, there are two harmonies in the Tischendorf text, Dr. Gardiner's and that of Tischendorf himself. The readings of Westcott and Hort, however, as well as those of Tregelles and the Revised Version, are given in foot-notes, whenever the variations materially affect the sense. In the foot-notes, too, the leading authorities for and against the readings mentioned are cited. These include about a dozen of the oldest uncials, a few of the best cursives, and five of the earliest versions. Of the Fathers Origen alone is frequently named. The purpose of the editor in selecting these witnesses out of the great mass is "to promote a greater familiarity with the weighty evidence they present." All who have even elementary knowledge of the transmission of the New Testament text will unite with the editor in the hope "that few of those who will make an intelligent use of this Harmony are not convinced that the readings of Stephens, when they differ from those of Tischendorf and the editors above named, have no critical value whatever."

In the arrangement of the Harmony the changes are very few. In the appendix, which treats of the mode and order of harmonizing the narratives of the four Evangelists, "numerous and extensive additions have been made, but only slight omissions." These additions, which are always bracketed, increase the extent of the appendix to nearly eight pages and considerably enhance its value. In the new section on the relation of the Gospels to each other the editor "maintains entire independence on the part of the four Evangelists," — a view which many of the ablest Biblical critics regard as untenable. The argument for Robinson's view (held also by Andrews in his "Life of Christ" and by such commentators as Godet and Weiss), that the genealogy in Luke is that of Mary, is strengthened by the bracketed statements. The Quadripaschal theory of our Lord's ministry, which rests upon a very uncertain interpretation of the *ἑορτή* of John v. 1, is retained, although the evidence for it is now quite generally considered to be insufficient. Tischendorf's insertion of the article on the authority of *Ν* is not generally approved, and even if *ἡ ἑορτή* is accepted as the true reading, the reference to the Passover is by no means certain. See Westcott in "Speaker's Comment.," p. 92 f. It is encouraging to note that some absurd methods of harmonizing discrepancies are rejected. For example, on p. 262 the following passage is retained from the original work: — "According to Matthew and Mark, both the malefactors reviled Jesus; while, according to Luke, one was penitent. In the former Evangelists there is here an enallage of number; the plural being put for the singular." Of this explanation Dr. Riddle rightly says: "This method of explaining the different statements is open to serious objection. The Gospels are historical books; the writers, however they were inspired, were not omniscient or independent of literary method. It seems far more likely that two of them were not aware of the fact mentioned by Luke than that they should use the plural for the singular." This applies to several other passages. Also in § 109 the fact of discrepancy is candidly recognized.

The appendix of the English Harmony is substantially the same as that of the Greek. The text of the Authorized Version is retained, and the most important corrections of the Revised Version are given in foot-

notes. It is impossible not to feel regret that the Revised Text was not substituted for the Authorized Version. Why should Bible students be compelled any longer to laboriously correct, each for himself, the hundreds and even thousands of errors in the Authorized Version, for which the Revised Version gives beyond a doubt the correct rendering, while there is so much else in the domain of Biblical study that is infinitely more profitable than the doing over again of that which has been well done already? I do not forget that it is much easier to criticise a book than to make a better one, and I do not wish by these strictures to obscure in any degree the real merits of these revised editions, which stamp them as a decided improvement upon the original works of Dr. Robinson.

F. E. Woodruff.

SOUNDINGS. By Rev. MORTIMER BLAKE, D. D. Edited by his daughter, MRS. EVELYN L. MORSE. Pp. 226. Boston: Congregational Sunday-School and Publishing Society. \$1.25.

"SOUNDINGS" is the metaphorical title given to a collection of fifteen sermons selected from the discourses preached during the last ten years of the author's long pastorate over the Winslow Church (Trinitarian Congregational), Taunton, Mass. His ministry of forty-five years was closed by death at the age of seventy-two. Two of the fifteen sermons were written during the last eight months of his life, and one of the two — "The Inner Strength of Christianity" — was written only two months before his death, which occurred December 22, 1884. A perusal of this strong, fresh, and interesting discourse shows that the mental eye of the man of threescore and twelve was not dim, nor his natural force abated.

The sermons go far towards meriting their title and their praise given by the author's pupil and life-long friend, the Rev. Jacob Ide, of Mansfield, Mass., who furnishes a brief but pertinently-written prefatory note. To one who is not influenced by the emotional bias of affection, these "Soundings" do not appear to be deep-sea soundings in the lowest deeps of religious thought, and yet it is a pleasure to say that they are taken very far out beyond the shallows. It is evident that he avoided what his friend calls the "seaweeds and barnacles of profitless speculation." His mind was too shrewd and practical for that. He also seems to have dropped his line at a distance from the commonplaces of systematic theology. It is easy to discover the truthfulness of a remark made by his biographer: "He had strong convictions, but hated controversy, and knew the value of silence." After reading such sermons as "Origin of Salvation," "Christ the Gift of the World," and "Existing Antagonisms approved of God," one can readily appreciate the testimony of a clerical friend: "I have noticed that when any difficult subject was to be investigated, Dr. Blake was generally appointed as the essayist." Not to strain the figure, these soundings are taken in the depths of a broad mental culture and a rich, healthy Christian experience. The sermons are instinct with sound, living Christian ideas, with wise, helpful, and quickening truths. It would be difficult to discover his exact school of theology, but in every sermon there is the unmistakable meaning and essence of his religious teaching, — Christianity is a *life*, a life in Christ, the power of holy, unselfish, happy living under the control of Christ's spirit and laws of life.

Written as they were in the mellow autumn of life, the sermons disclose the fruitage of ripe, Christian scholarship, and the maturity of vigorous thinking on religious themes. The choice and range of topics indicate much versatility of mind. The "dead-line of fifty" is not discoverable in these living subjects and their interesting treatment. When a preacher who has passed his sixty-second year can speak profitably on "Animate Nature," "Christian Light-houses," "The Dream of Pilate's Wife," "Weak Kinglings," and "Night Service," he reveals an attractiveness in his preaching that suggests the activity of a chastened imagination, and cultivated, spiritual sensibility. We do not wonder that his biographer notes the fact of his gaining "wide-awake and eager listeners." The strength and beauty of his sympathy with children is seen in his tender and searching "Plea for the Little Ones;" his power of addressing the young must have been most apt and skillful.

The possession of a keen, critical insight is indicated in nearly every sermon; but it is the practical use of his critical faculty that is worthy of mention. He was more than a skillful exegete; he had the finer quality of good preaching: the power of interpreting truth to the uses of life. Admirable specimens of his skill as an interpreter are found in "The Meaning of Solomon's Song," in "Christ the First-Fruits," and in "Christian Assurance of Heaven."

His remarkable aptitude for historical study and research is manifested in nearly all the discourses, but is especially noteworthy in "Pilgrims." Historical study furnished him with pertinent and interesting illustrations, that often carried with them the force of argument.

As might naturally be expected in the compositions of a trained writer in the maturity of his powers, there is an utter absence of everything sensational or rhetorical in these sermons. He expresses himself in a clear, forcible, unassuming style, and with an easy naturalness of expression that comes of long practice. Their orderliness and symmetrical completeness of form must have been of great aid to his hearers in the delivery of the sermons. He was not afraid of "first," "secondly," and "thirdly;" he rarely got beyond "fourthly," and had the gift of stopping when he had got through, which he seems methodically to have accomplished within the saving and commendable limit of thirty minutes.

These pulpit addresses, selected from the ordinary work of the preacher, and posthumously published, will serve the double purpose of renewing and establishing many sacred associations to the parishioners and friends of their revered author, and of standing as a fair representative of the quality of work done in the town pulpits of America, by studious, devoted, and accomplished preachers, who do not secure the fame that usually attaches to the brilliant gifts that adorn the genius of metropolitan pulpits. Fortunate is the people that can possess for twenty-nine years the sagacious, stimulating and helpful guidance of the instruction and inspiration typified in the sermons of Dr. Blake.

Mrs. Morse has shown rare taste and skill in the selection and arrangement of her father's discourses, and has wisely printed them just as her father left them. The concise but comprehensive biography prepared by Dr. Blake's successor, the Rev. H. P. De Forest, is extremely interesting reading, and helpful in putting the reader of the sermons into sympathy with the point of view and mental moods of their author. There is special fitness in committing the making of the book to the publishing society of which Dr. Blake was for many years an efficient member.

Not the least valuable feature about this handsome volume is the well executed and life-like portrait of Dr. Blake.

J. W. Churchill.

GRAY'S BOTANICAL TEXT-BOOK. VOL. II. PHYSIOLOGICAL BOTANY. By GEORGE LINCOLN GOODALE, A. M., M. D. 8vo, pp. xx., 535. New York: Ivison, Blakeman, Taylor & Co. \$2.30.

THIS work is the second of a series which is to be regarded as the sixth edition of Dr. Gray's Botanical Text-book, the fifth edition of which appeared in 1857. Since that time the science has made rapid progress, and the single volume then thought ample for the purpose has now been expanded into four. The series well illustrates the extent to which specialization in science is at present carried. Dr. Gray no longer feels competent to undertake the entire series, but intrusts the preparation of two volumes to his colleagues, Professors Goodale and Farlow.

In this volume Part I. treats of the microscopic structure and the mode of development of flowering plants, and Part II. of vegetable physiology. Professor Goodale has here given an admirable presentation of a division of the science with which there is perhaps little general familiarity. While the work is not at all intended to be a popular one it will still prove interesting to others besides botanists. There is a surprising clearness in his manner of presenting topics, combined with a comparative freedom from the use of technical terms. His breadth of knowledge is so great that matters of practical and economic importance are often introduced. These things unite to make a readable book without detracting from its scientific value. The chapter on soils, for example, might not be regarded as strictly pertinent, but its presence here is equally advantageous to the instructor and the student. The work is in fact a full compact treatise on physiological botany, better adapted to general use than any other among the numerous recent publications on the subject. The author shows that his labor has not been that of the mere compiler, but that he has an intimate acquaintance with the things under consideration.

As a laboratory manual it will prove of great value. Full and clear directions are given for the performance of experiments and the making of preparations. It is to be regretted that the author did not see fit to increase somewhat the practical exercises with which the volume closes.

The book will dispel at least one popular illusion. Even a hasty glance through its pages shows that botany is by no means the nearly completed science which some imagine it to be. The author has availed himself of the latest results of study everywhere and has presented them in fullness; yet here and there unsolved problems are found to be awaiting the skillful hand and the trained mind of the origin-investigator. The realization of this is a stimulus to the student which may result in better work on his part.

The indexing has been well done. The illustrations are numerous and fresh, many having been drawn from the best foreign works. They suffer, however, from bad press-work. A little care in this respect would much improve the appearance of the volume.

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
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